Cases6 cases

1 to 5 of 6

1. IL-0138 A failed Nvidia driver build left broken kernel packages on the only Kubernetes master node, which hit a kernel panic on reboot after a power outage and took the homelab cluster down for six days

   Barush Mendez2025

   Symptoms

   Every service in the homelab Kubernetes cluster stopped answering: the V-Rising server, Grafana, Jellyfin and Linkding were all unreachable, and the Kubernetes API was down, so the cluster could not be managed at all. The outage was found by hand, about 3 hours after it began, when someone tried to use the services.

   Control plane unresponsiveService outageMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   A power outage forced the Kubernetes master node to reboot.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   GPU driverLinux kernelKubernetes API server

   Contributing factor

   Ignored early signalChange with a delayed effectSingle point of failureMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   Manually, when someone tried to access the services; there were no automated alerts.

   Remediation

   • Connected a monitor to the master node and read the boot logs, which showed the kernel panic
   • Booted the previous kernel version, which brought the system back
   • Removed the broken Nvidia packages with sudo apt-get remove --purge '^nvidia-.*' and ran sudo dpkg --configure -a
   • Found remaining broken packages with dpkg -l | grep -v ^ii and removed them by hand
   • Ran sudo apt-get install -f and reinstalled linux-headers-$(uname -r)
   • Rebooted and confirmed the kernel panic was gone

   Action items

   • Make sure GPU driver installations fully succeed, or revert immediately when they fail
   • Move the cluster to a high-availability control plane
   • Expose the Kubernetes API through a load balancer in the HA setup
   • Set up a ticketing system to record incidents and their resolution
   • Write predefined troubleshooting workflows to shorten response time
   • Add infrastructure monitoring such as Prometheus and Grafana
   • Add blackbox HTTP and TCP checks from outside the cluster for critical services

   Lessons

   A driver installation that fails half-way can leave kernel packages broken without any visible effect until the next reboot, which may come weeks later and at the worst time. A failed DKMS build should be fixed or reverted at once. With a single master node and no monitoring from outside the cluster, one unbootable machine meant a total outage that nobody was told about; the fix itself was simple once the boot logs were seen.

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2. IL-0231 Deleting EKS managed node groups also deleted Karpenter's instance profile, and every Stytch worker node shut down

   Stytch2023

   Symptoms

   On 23 February 2023 Stytch's EKS worker nodes went Ready:Unknown one after another, Karpenter failed to launch replacement nodes, and with fewer and fewer pods scheduled the Live Stytch API went down for 14 minutes, returning 5XX on every call.

   Node NotReadyScale-up failurePod evictionPods PendingService outage

   Trigger

   At 14:21 UTC Stytch landed a change to remove unused EKS managed node groups, because it had decided to run its data plane applications fully on nodes provisioned by Karpenter. Because Crossplane resources use an orphan deletion policy, engineers deleted the node groups in the AWS console, first in staging and then in production.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   KarpenterNode poolConfiguration templating

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionShared credentialChange with a delayed effectIgnored early signal

   Detection

   Low-urgency alerts that Karpenter could not find the instance profile fired in staging at 16:06 UTC and in production at 17:48 UTC but were not treated as an incident. The incident process started at 20:26 UTC when node launch failures spiked the Karpenter error rate, and Kubernetes monitoring alerts in production followed at 20:44 UTC. The support team flagged the outage at 21:14 UTC.

   Remediation

   • Reverted the node group deletion, which recreated the managed node groups
   • Manually scaled up one of the Live API node groups with more and much larger nodes and removed its taints
   • Removed node selectors from the applications one after another so their pods could be scheduled

   Action items

   • Treat Karpenter errors as high-urgency alerts that page the on-call engineer
   • Tune cluster alerting thresholds to send a high-urgency page earlier
   • Add alerts for nodes that stay NotReady or Unknown for long periods
   • Raise the thresholds of other deployment alerts, such as unschedulable pods and replicas not available
   • Give Karpenter its own IAM instance profile, separate from the one used by the node groups
   • Separate other AWS resources that were shared between uses, specifically IAM and security groups
   • Rework the EKS and Karpenter configuration so system instance profiles are unique, static per cluster and generated by Karpenter
   • Introduce a cloud visualization tool for engineers making infrastructure changes
   • Add live system and product metrics to the status page
   • Ask AWS to confirm the undocumented actions and side effects of deleting a node group
   • Correct the shared use of IAM roles and security groups across the infrastructure

   Lessons

   The IAM role for Karpenter's self-managed nodes should never have been the same as the one for the managed node groups; sharing it is what let the node group deletion break Karpenter, and the roles had been left combined for speed and simplicity when Karpenter was first set up. The hours-long delay between the configuration change and its effect made the incident hard to assess, and AWS confirmed that this delay is expected, so Stytch will allow for it in future IAM instance profile changes.

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3. IL-0191 A label selector accidentally added to the Loki distributor Service matched only the new pods of a rollout, which took all write traffic, were OOM-killed and stalled the rollout

   Grafana Labs2022

   Symptoms

   During a rollout of the Grafana Loki distributor Deployment in one Grafana Cloud Logs environment, the write path went down for about 25 minutes. The newly started distributor pods were OOM-killed over and over, never passed their health and readiness checks, and the rollout stopped making progress.

   Service outageOOMKilledLoad imbalanceProbe failures

   Trigger

   Step 1 of moving the Loki ring off a separately deployed key-value store onto embedded memberlist added a new label, gossip_ring_member: 'true', to the distributor pods and Service, together with a small config change, and the change required a rollout of the distributors.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Configuration templatingService discoveryContainer memory limit

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsIgnored early signalUnrepresentative staging

   Detection

   The first clue was kubectl get pods and the kube_deployment_status_replicas_updated metric showing that only 16 of 140 distributor pods had been updated.

   Remediation

   • scaled the distributor Deployment out horizontally so the load spread over more pods with the new label and the rollout could continue
   • reverted the migration step to end the outage
   • set service_ignored_labels:: [$._config.gossip_member_label] and passed it to k.util.serviceFor so the label is no longer copied into the Service selector

   Action items

   • Update the function that generates a Service from a Deployment or StatefulSet to handle edge cases, including this one

   Lessons

   A Service whose selector is built by copying every label of a workload changes which pods it matches as soon as a new label is added. During a rollout it then matches only the new pods, which receive all the traffic before there are enough of them. A few errors during a rollout in other environments hid the problem, because those environments gave distributors more memory and could absorb the shift. Manifest diffs kept for every pull request made it possible to see that the Service selector had changed.

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4. IL-0014 A GKE upgrade to a withdrawn version stalled on slow drains and a stuck node pool, then broke an ingress and confused the HPA

   loveholidays2019

   Symptoms

   On the evening of a long-overdue upgrade of a loveholidays production GKE cluster from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, planned to take 2 to 2.5 hours, the master upgrade and the first two 7-node NodePools went smoothly. After that the NodePool upgrades slowed to a crawl. Each node is cordoned, drained and upgraded in turn. Even a 14-node cluster at about 5 minutes per node took over an hour, and with about 100 more nodes to go, some of them taking over 15 minutes to drain, the sequential drains were too slow to finish at a reasonable hour.

   Upgrade stallPods PendingScale-up failureService outageAutoscaler misbehaviour

   Trigger

   A manual upgrade of the GKE masters and NodePools from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, two versions at once, on 19 March 2019; GKE's release notes of 14 March had already said that version was no longer available for new clusters or master upgrades because masters showed elevated error rates, but it could still be selected.

   Root cause

   Cloud provider outage

   Component

   GKE control planeNode poolCluster autoscalerIngress controllerHorizontal pod autoscaler

   Contributing factor

   Unrepresentative stagingOverlapping failuresIgnored early signal

   Detection

   The slow drains, zombie nodes and stuck NodePool were seen by the engineer running the upgrade; the broken Ingress was noticed after the upgrade and explained by Google support; the HPA problem was noticed the next day.

   Remediation

   • drained the remaining NodePool nodes ahead of the upgrade with kubectl drain --ignore-daemonsets --delete-local-data
   • deleted the zombie instances from the managed instance group with gcloud compute instance-groups managed delete-instances
   • cancelled the stuck UPGRADE_NODES operation with gcloud beta container operations cancel
   • used kubectl port-forward in place of the broken internal Ingresses
   • scaled down the older of two active ReplicaSets, or triggered a dummy deployment, to bring the HPA back

   Action items

   • Alert when a HorizontalPodAutoscaler is at 70% and at 100% of its capacity
   • Alert when a deployment has had two active ReplicaSets for 30 minutes and for 60 minutes
   • Re-evaluate termination grace periods that were set to arbitrary large values
   • Read the GKE release notes before every cluster upgrade
   • Use auto-upgrade in non-production environments, and manual cluster upgrades with automatic node upgrades in production
   • Keep environments as identical as possible, including resource names

   Lessons

   Read the release notes before upgrading: the target version had been withdrawn five days earlier. Drain time depends on pod configuration, so emptyDir volumes, long grace periods and missing disruption budgets turn a NodePool upgrade into hours. Pre-production only catches problems like the ingress bug if it matches production down to resource names. Auto-upgrades in non-production surface problems early, and a mix of manual cluster upgrades and automatic node upgrades in production keeps clusters current without much effort.

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5. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe

   NRE Labs2018

   Symptoms

   The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

   Control plane unresponsiveProbe failuresService outage

   Trigger

   Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

   Root cause

   unknown

   Component

   etcdkubeletKubernetes API server

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureUnreviewed defaultsHarmful manual actionIgnored early signalMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

   Remediation

   • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts

   Action items

   • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
   • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages

   Lessons

   Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

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By root cause5