Cases2 cases

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1. IL-0448 Requests from Uzabase's Kubernetes Job pods to an LLM agent randomly never got responses when they ran past 15 minutes

   Uzabase2026

   Symptoms

   At Uzabase, a product team in the Speeda business uses an LLM agent to extract companies' management issues from public documents, and a client pod run as a Kubernetes Job sends the requests to the agent. The agent reviews its output many times, so a response often takes more than 15 minutes. Some share of the requests never got a response, with no clear pattern in which ones.

   Intermittent timeouts

   Trigger

   LLM agent requests that took more than 15 minutes without packets on the TCP connection.

   Root cause

   DNS or network fault

   Component

   kube-proxy

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsUnknown limit

   Detection

   Client Job pods were not getting responses for some requests to the agent; the client log showed tasks that started but never finished until the 60-minute forced retry.

   Remediation

   • Turned on TCP keepalive in the Python client so packets keep the connection alive

   Lessons

   Application engineers also need to know the network and infrastructure. As AI applications with long response times become common, a silent cut of a long request can come from a network setting such as the IPVS TCP timeout.

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2. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS

   Adevinta2023

   Symptoms

   On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresHigh latency

   Root cause

   DNS or network fault

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheTelemetry agent

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsUnknown limitIgnored early signalUnverified assumption

   Detection

   A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

   Remediation

   • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
   • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
   • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
   • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
   • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls

   Lessons

   The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

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