Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases10 cases

1 to 5 of 10

  1. Symptoms

    From 15:05 UTC on 6 August 2026 GitHub Actions workflow runs failed to start, failed partway through or stayed queued for a long time, on both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners. Some requests to the Actions REST API returned errors, and some customers saw unexpected rate limiting in their workflows.

    Trigger

    A routine deployment to an internal Actions service that processes events and generates Actions jobs replaced pods, and the remaining capacity became saturated.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Expanded capacity of the affected services
    • Throttled incoming webhook-triggered work
    • Increased processing capacity for the backlog of affected events
    • Deployed changes that stopped runners from repeatedly trying to acquire invalid jobs
    • Deployed a fix for self-hosted runners that were not picking up jobs and enabled it incrementally
    • Paused migrations with GitHub Enterprise Importer
    • Restored webhook-triggered Actions workflows to full throughput
    • Rolled back the mitigation that left some ARC runners offline, and recovered those runners by hand
    • Shared CLI and UI steps for customers to clear jobs that could not be retried or canceled
    Action items
    • Improve deployment and capacity safeguards for the affected services
    • Strengthen monitoring for the conditions that preceded the incident
    • Improve the resiliency and recovery of queued work and runner assignment
    • Add automatic recovery for self-hosted runners in upcoming Runner and ARC releases
    • Reduce the risk of cascading failures and speed up recovery during large Actions disruptions
  2. Symptoms

    From 20:01 UTC on 28 May 2026, Buildkite build and job notifications (GitHub commit status, email, Slack and webhook notifications) reached a subset of customers late. Internal queue latency monitoring showed the delay as queues grew while notification-processing workers stayed underprovisioned.

    Trigger

    The Prometheus service used by Buildkite's EKS autoscaling path ran out of storage, so some EKS-based notification workers could not autoscale while their queues were growing.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal queue latency monitoring detected the rising notification delivery latency.

    Remediation
    • Moved the affected notification-processing workloads from EKS back to the ECS-based infrastructure
    • Adjusted scaling configuration and worker counts by hand
    • Completed the rollback and scaled the remaining affected ECS services
    • Increased Prometheus storage capacity and recorded the change in infrastructure as code
    Action items
    • Alert before Prometheus storage exhaustion can affect autoscaling
    • Fix GitHub notification retry behaviour for a class of errors that could cause repeated retries
    • Make the EKS-to-ECS rollback verify destination capacity, autoscaling configuration and traffic movement
    • Review the CPU, memory and storage allocations of EKS control-plane dependencies such as KEDA and Karpenter
    • Move customer-critical workloads to EKS more gradually, with clearer settling periods
    • Improve customer-level monitoring of notification delivery latency to detect customer-impacting regressions earlier
    • Review which notification types sit on customers' scheduling or CI hot path and need tighter latency, separate queueing or specific alerting
    • Update the status page earlier when notification latency is likely to affect customer workflows
    • Describe the customer-visible impact in status page updates, not only the affected internal service
    • Improve internal escalation for customers who report critical CI impact
    Lessons

    Buildkite said recovery took longer than expected because the rollback path from EKS to ECS did not fully handle this failure, and that its public status page did not show the customer-visible impact as quickly or clearly as it should have, since notification latency affects customers differently depending on how their CI and deployment workflows use notifications.

  3. Symptoms

    On 16 May 2025, in Neon's Kubernetes cluster in AWS us-east-1, new compute pods were scheduled but could not start and failed with IP allocation errors. Each Neon compute is a Postgres database running in a lightweight virtual machine in its own pod, so without new pods, idle customer databases could not be woken up.

    Trigger

    On 16 May the Neon control plane's periodic job that terminates idle computes started failing. Compute creations continued, and the number of active computes rose from about 5k to about 8.1k within minutes. On 19 May, a follow-up change that set WARM_IP_TARGET back to 1 started the second round of failures.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    As cluster-autoscaler added nodes, the team saw IP allocation errors on new pods that were scheduled but could not start. The rate of successful pod starts and VPC subnet metrics were then used to follow the problem.

    Remediation
    • Set WARM_IP_TARGET=1 to release IPs held by nodes without free CPU or memory
    • Fixed the control plane's periodic job so idle computes were terminated again
    • Restarted the aws-node DaemonSet several times, each with a temporary improvement
    • Set WARM_IP_TARGET=0, MINIMUM_IP_TARGET=0 and WARM_ENI_TARGET=0, which let nodes allocate enough IPs and stabilised the cluster
    • On 19 May, set WARM_IP_TARGET back to 0 after setting it to 1 failed again
    • Enlarged the pool of pre-created warm compute pods to absorb failed pod starts
    Action items
    • Open a pull request to AWS CNI to improve how ipamd releases IPs in this situation
    • Follow up with AWS Support about the roughly 100 subnet IPs that were never allocated, for reasons Neon could not explain
    • Change the architecture to support horizontal scaling
    Lessons

    With default settings AWS CNI can keep many IPs on nodes that cannot use them, so the share of subnet IPs assigned to pods does not tell how close the subnet is to running out. WARM_IP_TARGET and WARM_ENI_TARGET follow different logic, a warm IP target of zero switches to the ENI logic, and IPs in cooldown count toward the target, which behaves badly under high pod churn. Changing these settings during an incident without knowing that logic prolonged the outage, and reverting a setting did not bring back the earlier healthy state.

  4. Symptoms

    In January 2022 an etcd memory spike overloaded the Kubernetes control plane of one of Render's clusters in Frankfurt. At first only operations that need the control plane failed: new deploys and cron job runs.

    Trigger

    A memory spike in etcd overloaded the cluster's control plane.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Action items
    • Run CoreDNS on data plane nodes instead of control plane nodes
    • Run etcd on dedicated nodes
    Lessons

    CoreDNS can keep answering from its in-memory cache while the API server is down, but it cannot initialise without it. With CoreDNS on the control plane nodes, a reboot or restart during a control plane outage turned a failure of deploys and cron jobs into a failure of requests to services that were already running. The core problem was that the data plane was not isolated enough from the control plane: even without the reboot, the etcd memory spike alone could have forced CoreDNS to restart.

  5. Symptoms

    When traffic changed sharply, CoreDNS came under heavy load, and the cluster saw network problems and a sudden rise in latency. The horizontal pod autoscaler then added pods, database connections surged, and the impact spread to the whole service.

    Trigger

    Sharp changes in traffic loaded the small number of CoreDNS pods beyond what they could handle.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Set up the Cluster Proportional Autoscaler for CoreDNS with nodesPerReplica and coresPerReplica chosen for the instance types in use
    • Spread CoreDNS with soft topologySpreadConstraints (ScheduleAnyway) instead of anti-affinity so Karpenter could consolidate nodes
    • Added alert thresholds on CoreDNS error rate, panics, request duration and request rate
    • Deployed NodeLocal DNSCache so each node answers DNS from a local cache and forwards misses to the main CoreDNS
    Lessons

    A fixed, small number of CoreDNS pods cannot follow a cluster whose nodes and pods change quickly with traffic, and the damage spreads: DNS latency triggers autoscaling, which in turn floods the database with connections. Simply adding many CoreDNS replicas created a different problem, because with tainted nodes and a maxSkew: 1 spread constraint the pods piled onto a few nodes and blocked Karpenter consolidation. Scaling CoreDNS in proportion to the cluster and putting a DNS cache on every node handled both.

Check your cluster for this

These 10 cases involve CoreDNS and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Capacity exhaustion10 cases

  1. IL-0471 GitHub Actions runs failed or sat queued for 9 hours after a routine deployment's pod replacement saturated capacity
    GitHub2026
  2. IL-0470 Buildkite notifications were delayed after Prometheus storage filled and EKS notification workers could not autoscale
  3. IL-0006 VPC subnets ran out of IP addresses because the AWS VPC CNI kept IPs on full nodes, and WARM_IP_TARGET changes then blocked pod starts after every pod deletion
    Neon2025
  4. IL-0204 An etcd memory spike overloaded the control plane of a Render Frankfurt cluster, and DNS then failed because CoreDNS ran on the rebooted control plane nodes and could not start without the API server
    Render2024
  5. IL-0182 Too few CoreDNS replicas on EKS were overloaded during traffic spikes, raising latency and cutting the network for task pods, and the over-provisioned, tightly spread CoreDNS pods added later blocked Karpenter consolidation
  6. IL-0110 A Grafana Agent pod's high memory use and crash-looping Hangfire pods drove a Kubernetes node into system OOM and NotReady, twice in one day
    DFDS2024
  7. IL-0093 Ingress controller pods crash-looped one after another because the leader pod had exhausted its shared memory
  8. IL-0076 Kubernetes masters went down after Dex filled etcd with AuthRequest objects and deleting its namespace started an endless list-and-timeout loop
  9. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances
  10. IL-0503 mybinder.org launches failed after a GKE node ran out of memory and its nginx-ingress proxy pod crash-looped