Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    From 15:05 UTC on 6 August 2026 GitHub Actions workflow runs failed to start, failed partway through or stayed queued for a long time, on both GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners. Some requests to the Actions REST API returned errors, and some customers saw unexpected rate limiting in their workflows.

    Trigger

    A routine deployment to an internal Actions service that processes events and generates Actions jobs replaced pods, and the remaining capacity became saturated.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Expanded capacity of the affected services
    • Throttled incoming webhook-triggered work
    • Increased processing capacity for the backlog of affected events
    • Deployed changes that stopped runners from repeatedly trying to acquire invalid jobs
    • Deployed a fix for self-hosted runners that were not picking up jobs and enabled it incrementally
    • Paused migrations with GitHub Enterprise Importer
    • Restored webhook-triggered Actions workflows to full throughput
    • Rolled back the mitigation that left some ARC runners offline, and recovered those runners by hand
    • Shared CLI and UI steps for customers to clear jobs that could not be retried or canceled
    Action items
    • Improve deployment and capacity safeguards for the affected services
    • Strengthen monitoring for the conditions that preceded the incident
    • Improve the resiliency and recovery of queued work and runner assignment
    • Add automatic recovery for self-hosted runners in upcoming Runner and ARC releases
    • Reduce the risk of cascading failures and speed up recovery during large Actions disruptions
  2. Symptoms

    From 20:01 UTC on 28 May 2026, Buildkite build and job notifications (GitHub commit status, email, Slack and webhook notifications) reached a subset of customers late. Internal queue latency monitoring showed the delay as queues grew while notification-processing workers stayed underprovisioned.

    Trigger

    The Prometheus service used by Buildkite's EKS autoscaling path ran out of storage, so some EKS-based notification workers could not autoscale while their queues were growing.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal queue latency monitoring detected the rising notification delivery latency.

    Remediation
    • Moved the affected notification-processing workloads from EKS back to the ECS-based infrastructure
    • Adjusted scaling configuration and worker counts by hand
    • Completed the rollback and scaled the remaining affected ECS services
    • Increased Prometheus storage capacity and recorded the change in infrastructure as code
    Action items
    • Alert before Prometheus storage exhaustion can affect autoscaling
    • Fix GitHub notification retry behaviour for a class of errors that could cause repeated retries
    • Make the EKS-to-ECS rollback verify destination capacity, autoscaling configuration and traffic movement
    • Review the CPU, memory and storage allocations of EKS control-plane dependencies such as KEDA and Karpenter
    • Move customer-critical workloads to EKS more gradually, with clearer settling periods
    • Improve customer-level monitoring of notification delivery latency to detect customer-impacting regressions earlier
    • Review which notification types sit on customers' scheduling or CI hot path and need tighter latency, separate queueing or specific alerting
    • Update the status page earlier when notification latency is likely to affect customer workflows
    • Describe the customer-visible impact in status page updates, not only the affected internal service
    • Improve internal escalation for customers who report critical CI impact
    Lessons

    Buildkite said recovery took longer than expected because the rollback path from EKS to ECS did not fully handle this failure, and that its public status page did not show the customer-visible impact as quickly or clearly as it should have, since notification latency affects customers differently depending on how their CI and deployment workflows use notifications.

  3. Symptoms

    When traffic changed sharply, CoreDNS came under heavy load, and the cluster saw network problems and a sudden rise in latency. The horizontal pod autoscaler then added pods, database connections surged, and the impact spread to the whole service.

    Trigger

    Sharp changes in traffic loaded the small number of CoreDNS pods beyond what they could handle.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Set up the Cluster Proportional Autoscaler for CoreDNS with nodesPerReplica and coresPerReplica chosen for the instance types in use
    • Spread CoreDNS with soft topologySpreadConstraints (ScheduleAnyway) instead of anti-affinity so Karpenter could consolidate nodes
    • Added alert thresholds on CoreDNS error rate, panics, request duration and request rate
    • Deployed NodeLocal DNSCache so each node answers DNS from a local cache and forwards misses to the main CoreDNS
    Lessons

    A fixed, small number of CoreDNS pods cannot follow a cluster whose nodes and pods change quickly with traffic, and the damage spreads: DNS latency triggers autoscaling, which in turn floods the database with connections. Simply adding many CoreDNS replicas created a different problem, because with tainted nodes and a maxSkew: 1 spread constraint the pods piled onto a few nodes and blocked Karpenter consolidation. Scaling CoreDNS in proportion to the cluster and putting a DNS cache on every node handled both.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve CI system and CoreDNS. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1