Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 20 September 2024 at 11:24 the Cloud Platform team received high priority Pingdom alerts for services on the live cluster, and from 11:26 teams reported in the #ask channel that services were unavailable. Users reported that services could not be resolved.

    Trigger

    At 11:21 the infrastructure-vpc-live-1 pipeline was unpaused, and a pull request that had been waiting in its queue ran automatically.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    High priority Pingdom alerts for live cluster services reached the Cloud Platform team at 11:24, and users reported that services could not be resolved.

    Remediation
    • Ran terraform apply locally to rebuild the subnet route table associations
    Action items
    • Review and update the process for pausing and resuming infrastructure pipelines so every team member knows its implications
    • Find a way to hold queued pull requests while manual infrastructure updates are under way
    • Find ways to isolate the plan and apply tasks of infrastructure pipelines better
  2. Symptoms

    On 7 July 2023 from 11:05 to 15:25 UTC many public Jenkins infrastructure services were completely down, including get.jenkins.io, plugins.jenkins.io, accounts.jenkins.io, javadoc.jenkins.io and incrementals.jenkins.io, while ci.jenkins.io, issues.jenkins.io, repo.jenkins-ci.org and www.jenkins.io were partly or completely disrupted.

    Trigger

    After the upgrade to Kubernetes 1.25 changed the range of the pods' originating IP and LDAP access was blocked, a fix (Azure PR 431) deployed at 10:55 UTC to set a proper set of pod IP ranges removed all node pools of the cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    After the upgrade, at 10:30 UTC, the team noticed that services inside the cluster, such as accounts.jenkins.io, could not reach the LDAP service.

    Remediation
    • Created the cluster again from scratch with a fixed network setup
    • Set a custom pod CIDR in a range separate from the virtual network
    • Moved the services and their DNS records to new public IPs
    • Pushed a pull request that recorded the manual rebuild, including the IP setup, in code
    Action items
    • Protect the public IPs from deletion with a Management Lock
    • Keep the public IPs in a separate resource group and point the Kubernetes-managed load balancers to it with the service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-resource-group annotation
    • Improve network diagrams and documentation so possible overlaps are visible when preparing operations
    • Avoid changing the configuration of all AKS node pools at once
    Lessons

    The team said that changing one node pool at a time would have shown the problem after the first pool and avoided a full outage, and that the public IPs should change as little as possible because users behind corporate firewalls with allow-lists depend on them. The team also noted that it could rebuild, in under 4 hours, the cluster that hosts almost all public services.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve CI system and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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