Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    Shortly after incident.io moved its infrastructure fully into Google Cloud, the application saw a larger-than-normal number of Postgres connection timeouts, and new database connections per second were in the hundreds, spiking up and down. At the same time, the memcached instance used for transient data and faster API responses had sporadic connection timeouts.

    Trigger

    After the move to Google Cloud, the application opened hundreds of new Postgres connections per second, and an accidental database join made it send thousands of duplicate calls to an external third party in parallel.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An incident was declared when the number of Postgres connection timeouts rose above normal. The remaining cache timeouts were traced through the logs of the Kubernetes node that served an affected request, the request's trace and the node's metrics.

    Remediation
    • Doubled the maximum Postgres connection lifespan from 15m to 30m
    • Made the Postgres connection pools static so they always keep N connections open
    • Raised the memcache client's MaxIdleConns from 2 to 20
    • Moved temporarily from Google's hosted memcached to a memcached inside the Kubernetes cluster
    • Shipped the fix for the accidental database join that made thousands of duplicate external calls
    Action items
    • Set more sensible concurrency limits for outbound network calls
    Lessons

    Network timeouts are not always local to one request or pod: when they appear, the whole activity of the node, including other pods on it, needs to be checked. Staying within a provider's rate limits does not keep outbound calls from affecting a node, so outbound network calls need more sensible concurrency limits.

  2. Symptoms

    On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

    Trigger

    At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

    Remediation
    • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
    • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
    • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
    Action items
    • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
    • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
    • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
    • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
    • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
    • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
    • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
    • Collect logs from nodes centrally
    • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
    Lessons

    When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

  3. Symptoms

    At 18:56 PDT on 23 June 2022 (01:56 UTC on 24 June) several models went offline at once: some fine-tuned curie and davinci models, the Codex beta models code-davinci-001 and code-cushman-001, the legacy GPT models curie, babbage and ada, and all Embeddings models.

    Trigger

    A destructive operation on one of the three production clusters, caused by human error that the existing safeguards did not catch, took the whole cluster offline.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • re-allocated the models from the lost cluster to the remaining two clusters
    • rebuilt the VPN link with Azure support after losing the connection to AKS during cluster setup
    • built workarounds with Azure support after losing the connection to Azure Private Link
    • tore down the cluster and rebuilt it from scratch after the upgraded Kubernetes version broke the ingress
    • moved traffic back into the rebuilt cluster between 05:30 and 06:30 PDT
    Action items
    • Add checks and locks so that this and similar production-critical infrastructure cannot be modified by accident
    • Add better visibility into the operations being performed and make parts of the system more lexicographically distinct
    • Keep working with Azure on the AKS network connectivity issues so they do not disrupt new cluster operations
    • Update playbooks with the new cluster failure modes and change the setup steps for new clusters and infrastructure
    • Upgrade Kubernetes systematically and set aside time so the clusters do not fall behind again
    • Shard fine-tuned models across multiple clusters and work towards more automatic cross-cluster replication
    • Distribute and replicate Azure Blob Storage so fine-tuned models load faster and more reliably
    • Finish rolling out node-to-node caching to relieve Azure Blob Storage bottlenecks
    • Change how model weights are stored so they are more efficient and faster to load
    Lessons

    Losing one of three clusters exhausted the GPU headroom, and GPUs could not be added on short notice, so full recovery depended on bringing the same cluster back. Rebuilding it exposed a deferred Kubernetes upgrade: the newer version broke the ingress, and because AKS cannot downgrade there was no way back except a full rebuild. Recovering many large models at once is limited by the bandwidth of the storage they load from, and the caches that normally hide this do not help when everything moves to a different cluster.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve In-memory cache and CNI plugin. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause3