Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

  1. Symptoms

    At 08:56 on 30 March 2026, about an hour and three quarters after the rollout of a new ingress-nginx to production began, the MoJ Cloud Platform team noticed messages in the #hmpps-auth-audit-registers Slack channel about ModSecurity unexpectedly blocking requests. Users in HMPPS also raised incidents with the MoJ service desk.

    Trigger

    The Cloud Platform team began deploying ingress-nginx 1.14.3, on images maintained by Chainguard, to the three production ingresses at 07:11 on 30 March 2026.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 08:56 the Cloud Platform team saw messages in the #hmpps-auth-audit-registers Slack channel showing ModSecurity blocking requests unexpectedly; HMPPS users also raised incidents with the MoJ service desk.

    Remediation
    • rolled the ingress-nginx deployment back to the previous version, from 09:14 to 09:43
    • HMPPS applied ModSecurity rule exclusions for the rules blocking traffic to HMPPS Auth
    • added a temporary global exclusion for the CRS rule triggered by the PostHog cookie
    • redeployed ingress-nginx 1.14.3 with both exclusions in place, completed at 14:00
    Action items
    • Rescope the PostHog cookie so it is no longer sent with requests to all *.justice.gov.uk services
    • Remove the temporary global exclusion once the PostHog cookie has expired from enough users' browsers
    • Remind service teams to run dev and test workloads through the non-production ingress controllers so future ModSecurity and CRS updates are tested
    • Run production and non-production workloads in separate clusters in Cloud Platform 3.0, so non-production workloads must use the non-production ingress
    Lessons

    An ingress controller upgrade that bundles a web application firewall also changes which requests are allowed, not only how they are routed. A beta or non-production ingress only catches false positives for traffic that actually passes through it, and teams that keep their test workloads on the production ingress miss them. A fix on the client side, such as rescoping a cookie, takes effect only when old cookies have expired in users' browsers, so the rule change has to wait for it or ship with an exclusion.

  2. Symptoms

    From 17:30 UTC on 23 February 2026, right after the ml-serve-codfw Kubernetes cluster was upgraded, 5XX responses appeared in the metrics of a subset of Wikimedia's machine learning model servers and alerts started to fire. About half of the running model servers were affected and stayed unreachable for roughly 24 hours.

    Trigger

    The two production Machine Learning Kubernetes clusters were upgraded to version 1.31, which included upgrading Istio from 1.15 to 1.24; ml-serve-codfw was done at 17:21 UTC on 23 February and ml-serve-eqiad between 08:00 and 11:00 UTC on 24 February.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users of the affected model servers first reported the issue in the talk-to-machine-learning Slack channel. Alerts for HTTP 5XX had fired in the Machine Learning IRC channel right after the codfw upgrade, but nobody on the team noticed them.

    Remediation
    • Deployed an Istio hot patch that restored the broken functionality and fixed most of the HTTP 500 errors
    • Deployed the permanent fix to all affected clusters after verifying it on ml-staging-codfw
    Action items
    • Deliver alerts to the relevant Slack channels and watch IRC or alerts.wikimedia.org
    • Add more SLOs and fix the existing ones, whose Istio metrics changed
    Lessons

    The problem could have been caught on the staging cluster first, or by ad-hoc testing within the team after each cluster upgrade, which had been requested when the upgrades were announced. Not everyone involved knew that httpbb tests existed, and nobody on the Machine Learning team saw the alerts that fired right after the codfw upgrade. Recovery was fairly quick once users reported the problem, helped by having the right person online to find the Istio hot patch.

  3. Symptoms

    From 18:05 UTC on March 17, 2025, GitHub.com web and API requests failed now and then for a small percentage of users, mostly requests about issues and pull requests. At 18:39 UTC the status page reported degraded performance for Issues.

    Trigger

    A framework upgrade rolled out to GitHub's Kubernetes infrastructure caused kernel panics.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The status page opened the incident at 18:39 UTC, 34 minutes after the failures began, as an investigation of reports of degraded performance for Issues.

    Remediation
    • Downgraded the framework upgrade that caused the kernel panics
    • Disabled the problematic feature of the framework
    Action items
    • Investigate why the upgrade caused the kernel panics
    • Take steps to temporarily prevent the problem from coming back
    • Work out longer-term patch plans
    • Improve observability so that similar classes of problems can be reacted to quickly
  4. Symptoms

    About two minutes after an engineer started the Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24 upgrade of the cluster running Reddit's legacy stack, just after 19:00 UTC, the site stopped. The CDN edge request graph, which is kept separate from the cluster, showed traffic by status collapsing. Users saw the error page, a homepage with no posts, or plain errors.

    Trigger

    An in-place upgrade of the legacy cluster from Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24; in 1.24 the node-role.kubernetes.io/master label is removed even from running clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The site broke about two minutes into the upgrade; an incident was opened immediately and responders were on the call within three minutes, working from CDN edge graphs because the cluster's own metrics were gone.

    Remediation
    • deleted the Open Policy Agent webhook configurations to stop API server timeouts
    • terminated all worker nodes of the cluster
    • restored the control plane from the pre-upgrade backup onto the first control plane node
    • switched off the cluster autoscaler until the control plane was stable
    • generated new TLS certificates so replacement control plane nodes could join etcd
    • brought traffic back in steps from 1% to 100%
    • restarted legacy services that had been stopped by hand
    Action items
    • Codify cluster configuration so every choice has a record, and document in detail what cannot be codified
    • Standardise components across clusters and replace bespoke configurations
    • Build tooling to manage the lifecycle of whole clusters so they can be recreated or replicated
    • Add pre-production clusters that can be tested with confidence
    • Improve the backup restore process and make cluster upgrades safe
    Lessons

    Configuration that exists only in a live cluster, edited by hand through a special tool, can be forgotten, as the route reflector setup was, and then break on an upgrade nobody connects it to. A Kubernetes upgrade cannot be reverted without a restore, so the restore procedure has to be kept current and practised. Consistent, codified clusters are what make upgrades testable; bespoke clusters keep producing outages.

Check your cluster for this

These 4 cases involve Admission webhook and Calico. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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