Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases12 cases

1 to 5 of 12

  1. Symptoms

    At 08:56 on 30 March 2026, about an hour and three quarters after the rollout of a new ingress-nginx to production began, the MoJ Cloud Platform team noticed messages in the #hmpps-auth-audit-registers Slack channel about ModSecurity unexpectedly blocking requests. Users in HMPPS also raised incidents with the MoJ service desk.

    Trigger

    The Cloud Platform team began deploying ingress-nginx 1.14.3, on images maintained by Chainguard, to the three production ingresses at 07:11 on 30 March 2026.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 08:56 the Cloud Platform team saw messages in the #hmpps-auth-audit-registers Slack channel showing ModSecurity blocking requests unexpectedly; HMPPS users also raised incidents with the MoJ service desk.

    Remediation
    • rolled the ingress-nginx deployment back to the previous version, from 09:14 to 09:43
    • HMPPS applied ModSecurity rule exclusions for the rules blocking traffic to HMPPS Auth
    • added a temporary global exclusion for the CRS rule triggered by the PostHog cookie
    • redeployed ingress-nginx 1.14.3 with both exclusions in place, completed at 14:00
    Action items
    • Rescope the PostHog cookie so it is no longer sent with requests to all *.justice.gov.uk services
    • Remove the temporary global exclusion once the PostHog cookie has expired from enough users' browsers
    • Remind service teams to run dev and test workloads through the non-production ingress controllers so future ModSecurity and CRS updates are tested
    • Run production and non-production workloads in separate clusters in Cloud Platform 3.0, so non-production workloads must use the non-production ingress
    Lessons

    An ingress controller upgrade that bundles a web application firewall also changes which requests are allowed, not only how they are routed. A beta or non-production ingress only catches false positives for traffic that actually passes through it, and teams that keep their test workloads on the production ingress miss them. A fix on the client side, such as rescoping a cookie, takes effect only when old cookies have expired in users' browsers, so the rule change has to wait for it or ship with an exclusion.

  2. Symptoms

    From 10:00 UTC on 11 January 2026 every BSEE SaaS instance in PortSwigger's US and Canada regions was unavailable: customers could not open the Web UI or start scans. The platform team learned of it only when customers reported it through support at 09:52 UTC the next day.

    Trigger

    The upgrade of the AWS Load Balancer Controller from v1.14.1 to v1.16.0 on 28 November 2025 left an orphaned webhook TLS secret that cert-manager could not renew, and the certificate in it expired on 8 January 2026.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Customers reported the outage through support at 09:52 UTC on 12 January 2026, almost 24 hours after impact began, and the platform team began investigating at 10:00 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Deleted the orphaned aws-load-balancer-tls secrets in the US and Canada clusters
    • Redeployed the AWS Load Balancer Controller configuration with Helm
    • Verified that new certificates were generated and the webhooks worked again
    Action items
    • Audit all clusters for orphaned secrets that have no owning Certificate resource and resolve them
    • Add high-level application access alerting for each SaaS cluster from an external probe
  3. Symptoms

    Nodes that already existed kept running, but every new node, spot or standard, on either v1.32 or v1.33, failed to initialise and could not join the cluster. Spot nodes that were preempted and recreated never came back, so services degraded progressively: background workers on spot instances, reporting services and order allocation stopped completely, and the APIs on existing nodes kept answering but could not scale for load spikes.

    Trigger

    Google upgraded the GKE control plane from v1.32.x to v1.33.2 at the version deprecation deadline, although auto-upgrade was disabled on the node pools.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Created a new GKE cluster at v1.33, the version of the forced upgrade
    • Upgraded Istio to 1.27.1 for Kubernetes 1.33 compatibility
    • Updated the cert-manager configuration for Kubernetes 1.33
    • Migrated all production workloads to the new cluster and verified pod scheduling, DNS resolution, PVC mounting and external integrations
    • Decommissioned the broken cluster
    Action items
    • Configure all clusters to use the GKE stable release channel
    • Implement a separate management cluster for Argo CD, monitoring and other control components (Q4 2025)
    • Review spot instance usage for critical workloads and add on-demand fallback pools
    • Document the SRE upgrade procedure: management cluster first, production after a monitoring period of several days
    • Document a Kubernetes, Istio and cert-manager compatibility matrix
    • Create an automated upgrade testing pipeline
    • Reserve static IPs for quick migrations
    • Pin versions of Istio, cert-manager, CSI and DNS addons
    • Stay current with stable releases and regularly check GKE alerts and announcements to avoid deprecation deadlines
    Lessons

    GKE upgrades the control plane at a version's deprecation deadline even when auto-upgrade is disabled, so staying inside the supported version window is how to avoid a forced upgrade. A control plane upgrade can leave existing nodes healthy while every new node fails, and spot nodes that cannot rejoin after preemption turn this into cascading failures. Relying heavily on spot instances for critical workers turned a node join failure into a progressive outage. Kubernetes upgrades have to be planned together with dependent components such as Istio and cert-manager, and without a standby cluster on the same provider there was no immediate failover; the only recovery left was building a new cluster.

  4. Symptoms

    On a Saturday, an OpsGenie alert fired for a ClickHouse cluster in Altinity.Cloud that had gone silent: no queries, no metrics, and no logs from customers trying to connect. The pods were running and the nodes looked healthy, but no traffic reached the database. Other clusters soon showed the same thing, and external access was blocked across several GKE clusters.

    Trigger

    GKE automatically upgraded worker nodes to the ubuntu_containerd image 1.32.3-gke.1785003, which ships kernel 6.8.0-1022-gke.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An OpsGenie alert fired when one ClickHouse cluster stopped receiving queries, metrics and customer connection logs.

    Remediation
    • added maintenance exceptions to pause all upgrades on the GKE clusters that were not yet affected
    • changed the load balancer health check policy to ignore failed kube-proxy health checks, so traffic flowed to the nodes again
    • began migrating the affected clusters from the ubuntu_containerd to the cos_containerd node image by recreating nodes
    Action items
    • Expand image pre-testing pipelines to catch regressions earlier
    • Enable notifications for upcoming GKE auto-upgrades
    • Make GKE maintenance windows required across the fleet to control when upgrades roll out
    • Track Google's issue and wait for a patched Ubuntu image
    Lessons

    A managed node upgrade can break kube-proxy in a way that leaves pods and nodes looking healthy while the load balancer sends nothing, because the load balancer health check depends on kube-proxy. kube-proxy's own logs showed the cause. Altinity recommends that GKE users on ubuntu_containerd restore traffic by switching to externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster, which disables the kube-proxy health check in the load balancer, move production workloads to cos_containerd, and pause auto-upgrades where possible until a patched image has been confirmed and tested.

  5. Symptoms

    On 24 October 2024 every BSEE SaaS customer instance showed the Environment Unavailable message, and the SaaS Uptime Over Time metric dropped sharply at 04:45. The Technology Team learned of the outage when the Growth team posted about it at 08:07 and a member of the Product team told the Technology Team verbally at 08:15.

    Trigger

    AWS made Bottlerocket v1.26.0 the latest Bottlerocket AMI in eu-west-1 between 02:00 and 04:30, and at 04:00 Karpenter saw the new version and started replacing the EC2 nodes of the production EKS cluster with it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The Growth team reported the outage in the BSEE cloud onboarding issues channel at 08:07, and a member of the Product team told the Technology Team verbally at 08:15. The SaaS Uptime Over Time metric had already dropped at 04:45.

    Remediation
    • Reverted all EC2 instances in the SaaS production account to Bottlerocket v1.25.0
    • Deployed Bottlerocket 1.25.0 across all EKS clusters and rolled out new EKS nodes
    Action items
    • Change the Karpenter resources to deploy a specific versioned Bottlerocket AMI instead of the latest released AMI
    • Add the Bottlerocket release ATOM feed to an internal tooling release dashboard
    • Set up a public status page to communicate with customers
Check your cluster for this

These 12 cases involve Admission webhook and Ingress controller. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Breaking change in an upgrade12 cases

  1. IL-0092 Upgrading ingress-nginx from 1.12.0 to 1.14.3 brought a newer ModSecurity and OWASP Core Rule Set whose false positives blocked HMPPS Auth, so users could not sign in to their applications
  2. IL-0405 An expired AWS Load Balancer Controller webhook certificate left no healthy targets and took BSEE SaaS down
  3. IL-0101 After Google forced a GKE control plane upgrade to 1.33.2 at a deprecation deadline, no new node could initialise, so autoscaling and spot node replacement stopped for 15 hours
  4. IL-0079 A GKE node auto-upgrade to an ubuntu_containerd image with a kernel regression left kube-proxy unable to apply its ip6tables rules, so load balancer health checks failed and several clusters lost all ingress traffic
  5. IL-0404 All BSEE SaaS customer pods on EKS crash-looped after Karpenter moved nodes to Bottlerocket v1.26.0, which broke Java
  6. IL-0203 A routine Kubernetes cluster system update made the AWS Load Balancer Controller fail, so new pods were never registered with the ALB and Honeycomb's EU1 ingest and UI went down once the last old pods were replaced
  7. IL-0180 A GKE control plane auto-upgrade from 1.22 to 1.23 removed the v1beta1 Ingress and ValidatingWebhookConfiguration APIs that Istio 1.7.4 still used, and Istio stopped working in production
  8. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023
  9. IL-0230 kube-proxy sync failures during a Kubernetes upgrade corrupted node iptables, and CircleCI jobs stopped starting
  10. IL-0198 An automatic Ubuntu security update restarted systemd-networkd, which flushed the IP rules Cilium relied on and cut more than 60 percent of Datadog's Kubernetes nodes off the network across regions and cloud providers
  11. IL-0501 Every node of the UToronto Kubernetes cluster on Azure went NotReady and the JupyterHub became unreachable
    2i2c2022
  12. IL-0522 An ingress-nginx chart upgrade deleted the jenkins.io Ingress and Fastly served HTTP/503 errors for hours