Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
IL-0473Jenkins infrastructure went fully down after a pod IP range fix deleted every AKS node pool and could not recreate themJenkins project2023- Symptoms
On 7 July 2023 from 11:05 to 15:25 UTC many public Jenkins infrastructure services were completely down, including get.jenkins.io, plugins.jenkins.io, accounts.jenkins.io, javadoc.jenkins.io and incrementals.jenkins.io, while ci.jenkins.io, issues.jenkins.io, repo.jenkins-ci.org and www.jenkins.io were partly or completely disrupted.
- Trigger
After the upgrade to Kubernetes 1.25 changed the range of the pods' originating IP and LDAP access was blocked, a fix (Azure PR 431) deployed at 10:55 UTC to set a proper set of pod IP ranges removed all node pools of the cluster.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
After the upgrade, at 10:30 UTC, the team noticed that services inside the cluster, such as accounts.jenkins.io, could not reach the LDAP service.
- Remediation
- Created the cluster again from scratch with a fixed network setup
- Set a custom pod CIDR in a range separate from the virtual network
- Moved the services and their DNS records to new public IPs
- Pushed a pull request that recorded the manual rebuild, including the IP setup, in code
- Action items
- Protect the public IPs from deletion with a Management Lock
- Keep the public IPs in a separate resource group and point the Kubernetes-managed load balancers to it with the service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-resource-group annotation
- Improve network diagrams and documentation so possible overlaps are visible when preparing operations
- Avoid changing the configuration of all AKS node pools at once
- Lessons
The team said that changing one node pool at a time would have shown the problem after the first pool and avoided a full outage, and that the public IPs should change as little as possible because users behind corporate firewalls with allow-lists depend on them. The team also noted that it could rebuild, in under 4 hours, the cluster that hosts almost all public services.
IL-0225An IGP purge command made every Microsoft WAN router recompute routes, causing global latency, timeouts and packet lossMicrosoft Azure2023- Symptoms
From 07:08 UTC on 25 January 2023, customers saw long network latency and timeouts when connecting to resources in Azure regions and to other Microsoft services such as Microsoft 365 and Power Platform. Microsoft's monitoring detected DNS and WAN issues from 07:11 UTC.
- Trigger
A network engineer adding capacity to the global WAN in Madrid ran a step of a recently changed standard operating procedure that purged the IGP database; on the router manufacturer involved, that command runs on all IGP-joined routers instead of only the local one.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Monitoring detected DNS and WAN issues from 07:11 UTC and alerted the on-call engineers within 5 minutes of the command being run. The team reviewed all recent changes and identified the command by 08:20 UTC. The engineer making the change was not informed of the alerts because of the unqualified changes to the SOP.
- Remediation
- Restarted by hand the paused WAN health and traffic engineering systems, which ended the remaining packet loss
- Action items
- Audit and block similar widespread-impact commands across all three vendors for all WAN router roles
- Give on-call engineers real-time visibility of approved and unqualified activity on network devices
- Run regular mandatory operational training and attestation of following all SOPs
- Have the Change Advisory Board review all SOPs still pending qualification within 30 days
These 2 cases involve Backbone network (WAN) and BGP routing. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Configuration change2 cases
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