Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 10:03 UTC on 29 September 2026, requests to Azure OpenAI Service, Foundry Agent Service, Foundry Models and Azure AI services in Sweden Central failed intermittently, took longer, or returned HTTP 500 and 503 errors. At 10:17 UTC service monitoring raised an alert on elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region.

    Trigger

    At about 09:38 UTC a planned deployment of an internal service in Sweden Central cleared that service's caches during the region's peak traffic hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Service monitoring detected elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region at 10:17 UTC and alerted the engineering teams; engineers were engaged at 10:28 UTC.

    Remediation
    • reconfigured the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depended on remote connectivity, which stopped the restart loop
    Action items
    • Reconfigure the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depends on connectivity to its database layer
    • Add monitoring and alerting on the load and latency of the caching layer used by the backend service
    • Update troubleshooting and procedural guidance for connection exhaustion scenarios for on-call engineers
    • Add throttling and rate limiting to protect the backend service from sudden traffic increases (estimated October 2026)
    • Increase the resource capacity of the caching layer used by the backend service across regions (estimated October 2026)
    • Improve diagnostic metrics and automated detection to identify such issues more quickly (estimated October 2026)
    • Partition the caching layer used by the backend service to increase its throughput (estimated December 2026)
    Lessons

    A health check that depends on a remote dependency turns a dependency problem into a restart loop: instances that cannot reach the database are killed, the remaining ones take more load and retries, and adding instances or resources does not help until the check itself is changed. Clearing a cache during peak traffic can multiply load on the backend behind it, especially when cache-read defects let lookups bypass the cache. Connection exhaustion was hard to see because the existing network and diagnostic metrics did not show it.

  2. Symptoms

    From 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, Azure VMs running Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic) with unattended-upgrades enabled began failing DNS resolution and losing network connectivity. Several Azure teams, among them the AKS and Azure Container Apps teams, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the update packages were published.

    Trigger

    Unattended-upgrades on Ubuntu 18.04 VMs installed a Canonical security update published at 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, including systemd version 237-3ubuntu10.54.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Several Azure teams, including AKS and Azure Container Apps, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the packages were published; incoming support cases then confirmed which Ubuntu versions were affected.

    Remediation
    • pointed customers to Canonical's description of the systemd bug and its fix
    • recommended rebooting affected VMs or running a template script that repairs DNS resolution
    • built automatic detection and remediation for AKS nodes and rolled it out across all regions
    • mitigated the remaining AKS customers manually through support
    Action items
    • Review the process that lets critical security updates bypass Safe Deployment Practices
    • Improve monitoring of the AKS data plane to alert on an uptick of errors
    • Review AKS monitoring algorithms so that similar VM errors are detected and alerted on
    • Establish an improved escalation path to Canonical during outages and add it to internal Technical Service Guides
    • AKS takes full control of the node security patch mechanism, with additional testing and controlled release of patches (estimated December 2022)
    • Work with Canonical to run dedicated tests on proposed packages before they are published for Azure IaaS VMs
    • Establish a process with Canonical to close the testing gap for the upgrade scenario (estimated March 2023)
    • Give AKS customers maintenance window control and environment staging for these patches (estimated December 2023)
    Lessons

    Security patches applied automatically by unattended-upgrades, once a day by default, and outside Azure's Safe Deployment Practices reached Ubuntu 18.04 VMs in every Azure region, so one systemd regression became a DNS outage across Azure. On AKS, lost node DNS showed up as image pull failures such as ImagePullBackoff, because kubelet could not resolve the registry. Azure plans to put node security patching under AKS's control with testing and controlled release; customers can use automatic node image upgrade for AKS, or automatic VM guest patching for VMs, instead of unattended-upgrades.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve In-memory cache and Application database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause2