Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From the evening of 27 September 2026 (UTC), InfluxDB Cloud customers in Azure West Europe saw slow queries and query timeouts, and a query queue depth alert fired at 22:58 UTC. Writes were accepted the whole time, but new data on some partitions could not be queried right away.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A query queue depth alert fired at 22:58 UTC on 27 September and an incident was opened.

    Remediation
    • Doubled query-layer capacity
    • Restarted stuck storage pods one at a time
    • Raised the readiness probe timeout and rolled it out fleet-wide
    • Doubled recovery concurrency after a restart
    • Raised the cleanup timeout to 24 hours, which stopped the forced restarts
    • Raised each storage pod's resource request so each host held fewer pods, doubling page cache memory and disk throughput per pod
    Action items
    • Add warning alerts for page-fault rate, cache coverage, disk reads on storage volumes and query abandonment
    • List major page faults in the runbooks as a leading indicator of storage performance degradation, with the relief valves that can be tuned
    • Keep tracking down the storage-engine reference leak
    • Move the disk check out of the health path
    Lessons

    Because the storage process uses little memory and the page cache takes what is left, a page cache too small for the data being queried does not show up as memory pressure on the usual memory metrics. InfluxData now treats major page faults as a leading indicator of storage performance degradation and alerts on cache pressure before customers see it.

  2. Symptoms

    Between 23:30 UTC on 1 November and 1:10 UTC on 2 November 2025, both the Healthchecks.io website (healthchecks.io) and the ping endpoints (hc-ping.com) had intermittent connectivity problems: some requests took several seconds to finish and others timed out entirely. The load balancers were running out of connection slots and rejecting legitimate requests, and Healthchecks.io users received false monitoring alerts.

    Trigger

    A misconfigured client flooded the ping endpoint, raising requests for a single UUID from 10 to a sustained 300 requests per second.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Monitoring notifications woke the operator at 00:11 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Identified the offending client addresses, a single IPv4 address and a /64 IPv6 subnet
    • Changed the load balancer configuration to reject TCP requests from those addresses
    Action items
    • Rate-limit with HTTP 429 returned immediately (the "Deny" method) instead of the "tarpit" method
    • Add the missing timeout http-request 5s to the HAProxy configuration to guard against Slowloris attacks
    • Increase the maxconn parameter in the HAProxy configuration
    • Apply the load balancer rate-limiting rules to the hchk.io endpoints as well as hc-ping.com
    • Add a Netdata alert when active HAProxy frontend sessions pass thresholds well below maxconn
    • Change the HAProxy logging format to make the logs easier to use
    Lessons

    The tarpit rate-limiting method only slows clients that make requests one after another; a client sending many requests in parallel is not slowed, and the sockets held during the wait can exhaust the load balancer's connection slots. The operator called it one more lesson learned and switched rate-limited requests to the "Deny" method.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Database replication. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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