Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

1. IL-0222 Google Cloud US regions had heavy packet loss and some went unreachable after the network control plane was descheduled

   Google Cloud2019

   Symptoms

   On Sunday 2 June 2019, with user impact beginning between 11:47 and 11:49 US/Pacific, Google Cloud projects in several US regions saw elevated packet loss from network congestion, and some regions became unreachable. Customers saw higher latency, intermittent errors and lost connectivity to instances in us-central1, us-east1, us-east4, us-west2, northamerica-northeast1 and southamerica-east1, while us-west1, Europe and Asia had no regional congestion.

   Packet lossNetwork unreachableHigh latencyHigh error rateMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   At 11:45 US/Pacific a relatively rare type of datacenter maintenance event started in one physical location, and the automation that runs it descheduled logical clusters that also held network control plane jobs in other physical locations.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Network control plane (SDN)BGP routingBackbone network (WAN)

   Contributing factor

   Excessive blast radiusCircular dependencyLimited debug accessIneffective rollback

   Detection

   Google engineers were alerted to the failure two minutes after it began and started the incident process used for the most serious production incidents. The first customer notice appeared on the status page at 12:53 US/Pacific.

   Remediation

   • Lowered the priority of less critical network traffic classes to reduce congestion
   • Halted the datacenter automation software responsible for the maintenance event
   • Rescheduled the network control plane and its supporting infrastructure in each location
   • Rebuilt and redistributed the lost network control plane configuration, rolling it out from 14:03
   • Directed service traffic away from the affected regions
   • Moved the Cloud VPN control plane in three regions out of its fail-safe state

   Action items

   • Keep the maintenance automation off until safeguards stop it descheduling jobs in several physical locations at once
   • Harden the cluster management software to reject such requests whatever their origin
   • Reconfigure the network control plane to reject maintenance requests of the type involved
   • Make the network control plane in each location persist its configuration
   • Let the network stay in fail static mode longer when the control plane is lost
   • Review, update and test emergency response tooling and procedures, including customer communication tooling, for such network failures
   • Extend continuous disaster recovery testing to this and similarly catastrophic failures

   View case
2. IL-0338 Google Cloud HTTP(S) and TCP/SSL Proxy load balancers returned 502s or reset connections on 33% to 87% of requests

   Google Cloud2018

   Symptoms

   From 12:17 to 12:49 PDT on 17 July 2018, Google Cloud HTTP(S) Load Balancers answered a share of requests with 502 return codes, and connections to TCP/SSL Proxy Load Balancers were reset. The share of failed requests moved between 33% and 87% during those 32 minutes, and automated monitoring alerted Google engineers at 12:19.

   High error rateConnection resetsHigh latency

   Trigger

   A configuration change in the production environment intermittently set off a bug in a new feature of the second-layer Google Front Ends.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Cloud load balancerCDN and edge network

   Contributing factor

   Gap in automated testsExcessive blast radius

   Detection

   Automated monitoring alerted Google's engineering team at 12:19 PDT, two minutes after the 502s began.

   Remediation

   • Reverted the configuration change at 12:44 PDT, which stopped the GFE restarts

   Action items

   • Add safeguards that disable features not yet in service
   • Harden the GFE testing stack against latent bugs in production binaries that make a task restart
   • Isolate the shards of GFE pools further from each other to reduce the scope of failures
   • Build a consolidated dashboard of all configuration changes for GFE pools

   View case
3. IL-0292 App Engine Memcache was down in all regions for 1 hour 50 minutes when its global datacenter mapping could not be read

   Google Cloud2017

   Symptoms

   From 12:33 US/Pacific on 6 November 2017, the App Engine Memcache service was unavailable to applications in all regions. Google received an automated alert at 12:34, and the status page said all projects using Memcache were affected.

   Service outageDatabase overloadHigh latencyHigh error rate

   Trigger

   A configuration update, after which the database entity holding the mapping of applications to datacenters could no longer be read or written.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   In-memory cacheDatabase

   Contributing factor

   Ineffective rollbackExcessive blast radius

   Detection

   Google received an automated alert at 12:34 US/Pacific, one minute after the start.

   Remediation

   • Sent the configuration update with a long enough deadline, which synchronised the database replicas and let clients read the mapping
   • Ramped Memcache traffic back up gradually while the error rate fell

   Action items

   • Reduce the number of readers of the global configuration to avoid contention during writes
   • Regionalise the configuration to limit the blast radius of similar failures

   View case

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