Cases4 cases
1 to 4 of 4
IL-0192A Crossplane composition merge-policy change for a TLS policy update switched Kubernetes Services from LoadBalancer to ClusterIP and deleted the load balancers behind about 25% of Grafana Cloud servicesGrafana Labs2025- Symptoms
At 08:41 UTC on 18 February 2025, several Grafana Labs application teams noticed that some of their endpoints were no longer available. The investigation quickly found that the load balancers for those endpoints were gone.
- Trigger
A change to the merge policy of a Crossplane composition, made so that the default TLS policy of the load balancers could be overridden, was applied to development, staging and production at the same time.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Application teams noticed at 08:41 UTC that some of their endpoints were no longer available.
- Remediation
- rolled back the Crossplane composition change
- recreated the affected Kubernetes Services so that Kubernetes recreated their load balancers
- Action items
- Add a CI check that blocks a deployment to more than one wave, so any exception to the dev, staging, canary, production order is caught
- Give higher priority to a more sophisticated wave design that was already under discussion
- Enable deletion protection on the load balancers, one layer below Crossplane
- Enable deletion protection on other critical cloud provider resources
- Develop the Crossplane Managed Resources exporter for change validation and visibility, now in beta testing within Platform engineering; simulated against the change that caused this outage, it shows a clear diff
- Complete and test support for reconfiguring the TLS policy so application teams can deploy it
- Lessons
A change that looked small and low-risk had a side effect that only a full end-to-end test through Crossplane and the cloud provider's load balancer controller would have shown; seeing the intended override work was not that test. Staged rollout and blast-radius limits that exist only as process can be skipped, so Grafana Labs moved to enforce waves in CI and to add deletion protection on the load balancers themselves, beneath the Crossplane layer.
- Symptoms
At 10:23 on 6 June 2023 a user of the Cloud Platform reported that all of their production pods had been deleted at the same moment. Several users received Pingdom alerts that their applications were down for a few minutes.
- Trigger
The team changed the instance type of the cluster's worker nodes through Terraform.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Users reported that their production pods had been deleted at once and that Pingdom alerts showed their applications down; the incident was declared at 11:00.
- Action items
- Ask AWS, through a support ticket, for the steps to change the node instance type without an outage
- Plan how to make instance type changes through Terraform without downtime and add a runbook with the steps for changing the node instance type
IL-0010A templating change that dropped its {{ }} delimiters made Argo CD delete all 478 Skyscanner services in every regionSkyscanner2021- Symptoms
On 25 August 2021, skyscanner.net was unavailable and the Skyscanner mobile apps could not work, for travellers and business partners everywhere at the same time. The full global outage lasted four and a half hours.
- Trigger
A peer-reviewed change to a rarely changed root-level file of the cells templating configuration, intended as a no-op, that left out the {{ }} delimiters; it was submitted around 15:30 GMT, merged to master and rolled out automatically to every region at once.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Remediation
- restored the correct configuration for each cluster and let Argo CD reconcile the cluster back to it
- restored services through the backup and restoration process
- brought one region back first with the critical services and served all traffic from it from around 20:30 GMT
- restored and verified the remaining regions and non-critical services over Thursday and Friday
- Action items
- Avoid global configuration deploys, including rare change paths like this one
- Treat templated configuration as code and add testing and linting
- Plan and wargame more drastic failure scenarios in runbooks
- Verify backup and restore processes, including access to the backups and the loss of a region
- Refactor runbooks so they are clear and, where appropriate, idempotent for a stressed engineer in the early morning
- Reconsider how much configuration is templated across regions, weighing configuration drift against automated global rollout
- Lessons
Global configuration changes had been prevented in many cases, but not in this rarely used path. Configuration that gains templating and logic has become code and needs tests and at least linting. The failure scenarios and runbooks were not pessimistic enough, a backup only counts once it has been restored, and runbooks need care so they work for a stressed engineer at night. Automation that templates configuration across regions trades drift for the risk of rolling one mistake out everywhere. An experienced incident commander who kept the response calm and blameless made a large difference.
IL-0008An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every nodeJetstack2019- Symptoms
Jetstack was upgrading the master of a development cluster that many teams use to test their apps during the working day, a regional Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) cluster in europe-west1. The upgrade ran through Jetstack's GKE Terraform pipeline and did not finish before the 20-minute Terraform timeout, while the GKE console still showed the cluster as upgrading.
- Trigger
A planned master upgrade of the shared development cluster. The same upgrade had been done on another pre-production environment earlier that day, and no API downtime was expected.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The first sign was the master upgrade missing the 20-minute Terraform timeout; re-running the pipeline returned the kube-apiserver unhealthy error. The cause was identified with the help of Google Support.
- Remediation
- Deleted the OPA ValidatingAdmissionWebhook resource during a window of API server access
- Action items
- Limit the OPA webhook to the namespaces where the policy applies and development teams have access
- Enable the webhook only for Ingress and Service resources, the only resources the policy validates
- Add a liveness probe so OPA is restarted when it stops responding, and update the OPA documentation
- Follow the open upstream Kubernetes issue about this behaviour
- Lessons
With alerting on API server response times, the team might have seen CREATE and UPDATE requests slow down across the board as soon as the OPA-backed webhook was first deployed. Every workload needs probes: OPA looked so simple to deploy that the team skipped the Helm chart, which adds a livenessProbe for the admission controller containers among other adjustments to the tutorial configuration. Others had hit the same problem, and an upstream issue to improve it was still open.
These 4 cases involve Configuration templating and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Configuration change4 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
IL-0192A Crossplane composition merge-policy change for a TLS policy update switched Kubernetes Services from LoadBalancer to ClusterIP and deleted the load balancers behind about 25% of Grafana Cloud servicesGrafana Labs2025IL-0091Changing the worker node instance type through Terraform recycled all nodes at once and deleted users' production pods togetherIL-0010A templating change that dropped its {{ }} delimiters made Argo CD delete all 478 Skyscanner services in every regionSkyscanner2021IL-0008An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every nodeJetstack2019