Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases5 cases

1 to 5 of 5

  1. Symptoms

    This is a vulnerability report, not an outage, so nothing failed visibly. A cluster is exposed if it runs Ingress NGINX Controller older than 1.12.1 or 1.11.5 with its validating admission webhook enabled. Wiz suggests `kubectl get pods --all-namespaces --selector app.kubernetes.io/name=ingress-nginx` to find it. The webhook accepts AdmissionReview requests over HTTP without authentication from any pod, and Wiz found more than 6,500 clusters exposing it to the public internet.

    Trigger

    Wiz Research reviewed the code of the Ingress NGINX admission controller and reported the first findings to Kubernetes on 31 December 2024.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Found by Wiz Research in a code review of the admission controller, not by an operator.

    Remediation
    • Kubernetes patched the injection flaws CVE-2025-1097, CVE-2025-1098 and CVE-2025-24514
    • Kubernetes removed NGINX configuration testing from the ingress-nginx admission controller, resolving CVE-2025-1974
    • released Ingress NGINX Controller 1.12.1 and 1.11.5
    Lessons

    Admission webhooks often run as web servers inside the cluster without authentication and with relatively high privileges, so any pod can reach them, and the flaws pair well with SSRF in an application. Wiz concludes that `nginx -t` should be considered harmful when it processes unsanitized user input. Wiz recommends upgrading, keeping the webhook off the internet and allowing only the API server to reach it with network policies. If upgrading must wait, disable the webhook (Helm: controller.admissionWebhooks.enabled=false; manual installs: delete the ValidatingWebhookConfiguration ingress-nginx-admission and remove --validating-webhook from the controller) and enable it again after the upgrade.

  2. Symptoms

    This is a vulnerability report, not an outage, so nothing failed visibly. What an engineer can check is whether the Argo CD Redis server accepts connections without a password from a pod in another namespace, on port 6379 at the address kube-dns returns. In the default installation it did.

    Trigger

    Cycode Labs installed Argo CD with the default configuration on a new Amazon EKS cluster and connected to its Redis server from a low-privilege pod in another namespace, simulating a compromised pod.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Found by Cycode Labs security research, not by an operator.

    Remediation
    • Argo CD released 2.11.1, 2.10.10, 2.9.15 and 2.8.19 with an initialized password for the Redis server
    Lessons

    The hash that checks the cached manifests is computed without a secret key, so anyone who can write to Redis can recompute it and make Argo CD deploy an altered manifest. Cycode recommends upgrading to the fixed versions, checking that the argocd-redis-network-policy NetworkPolicy exists and that a CNI enforces it, using controller-based secret management instead of injecting secrets through Argo CD plugins so secrets never reach Redis, and running Argo CD on a dedicated cluster.

  3. Symptoms

    From 10:10 US/Pacific on 2 June 2022, Vertex AI Online Prediction returned errors for 30% up to 100% of requests per region, depending on how each customer used the service.

    Trigger

    A faulty resource cleanup process marked Vertex Prediction Endpoints as deleted, globally.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first public status update was posted at 13:58 US/Pacific and gave the start as 10:20 US/Pacific; the later mini incident report gives 10:10.

    Remediation
    • restored the Vertex Prediction Endpoints that had been marked as deleted
  4. Symptoms

    At 08:00 UTC on 2021-09-06 every service in DFDS's Kubernetes cluster answered with 404. Investigation started five minutes later.

    Trigger

    The automated Kubernetes node rollover on 2021-09-06 restarted all the Traefik v2 pods, five days after a malformed IngressRoute manifest had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    All services returned 404 from 08:00 UTC and root cause investigation started at 08:05. Time to detection was 5 minutes.

    Remediation
    • changed the ALB health check path, which made the targets healthy but did not stop the 404s
    • rolled back by hand to Traefik v1 as the main ingress controller
    • deleted the malformed IngressRoute by hand and confirmed the Traefik v2 bug
    • applied the changes upstream
    Action items
    • Upgrade Traefik to v2.5, where the bug is fixed, and verify that it removes the bug
    • Change the Traefik v2 health check path to something more robust
    • Set up an external liveness probe on the ingress controller
    • Consider workload segmentation to limit the blast zone
    • Look into monitoring the Traefik v2 API for rapid changes
    • Look into smoke testing during and after node rollover
    Lessons

    A malformed IngressRoute did nothing visible for five days and then took down all ingress when every Traefik v2 pod had restarted during a node rollover. Because Traefik v2 failed gracefully, the first signals pointed at the ALB health checks instead of at Traefik. On incident handling, the team concluded that appointing an incident manager could have helped, that the war room meeting should be recorded and a log book kept, that people not involved should only make suggestions in writing, and that a short first round of sharing thoughts and gut feelings is useful.

  5. Symptoms

    During a rolling update of a kubelet change in one of Oath's on-premises production clusters, nodes started going NotReady, and soon all nodes in the cluster were NotReady.

    Trigger

    A change to kubelet was rolled out across the nodes of one cluster; on restart, kubelet cleans up transient cgroup files, and a Kubernetes bug in that step left kubelet stuck instead of starting.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Nodes reported NotReady and the eviction graphs climbed while the kubelet rollout was in progress.

    Remediation
    • failed the affected data center over so users were routed to the next available data center
    Action items
    • Run a functional test of kubelet after each upgrade batch and certify it before the next 30% of nodes are updated
    Lessons

    Check kubelet after upgrading it before moving to the next batch; a simple curl against the kubelet API would have caught this. The node controller's eviction throttling and full disruption mode, which the speakers note is not well documented, kept a cluster-wide kubelet failure from evicting every pod.

Check your cluster for this

These 5 cases involve Ingress controller and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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