Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 29 January 2026 AssemblyAI's Async Transcription API and LLM Gateway on the NA API endpoints went down for 25 minutes, returning 500 errors, and then ran degraded for two hours. The status page first reported the investigation at 17:54 UTC.

    Trigger

    An influx of batch transcription jobs higher than usual made autoscaling add workers until spot instances ran out, on-demand instances were used, and the AWS Elastic Network Interface limit was reached.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Worked through the backlog of requests until turnaround times were back to normal
    Action items
    • Add alerts on ENI utilisation
    • Run the authentication service on dedicated capacity, separate from batch workers
    • Fix the Lambda function that rate-limited the AWS API during recovery
    • Run everything in multiple regions
    Lessons

    AssemblyAI calls the outage preventable: ENI utilisation was not monitored, and because the authentication service shared resources with batch workers, a traffic spike in one starved the other. The warning signs were there but were not connected, and a tool built for recovery ended up blocking recovery.

  2. Symptoms

    From 13:30 UTC on 21 May 2021, CircleCI jobs on Docker, the Machine executor (including Windows, Mac, Arm and GPU) and remote Docker were delayed or blocked. Engineers had been paged at 13:00 for excessive delays in starting jobs, and the alerts showed CircleCI could not provision some types and classes of VM because it was hitting its CPU quotas in GCP.

    Trigger

    The upgrade of the RabbitMQ cluster from 3.8.9 to 3.8.16 on 20 May 2021, which brought in a 15 minute consumer acknowledgement timeout for all queue types.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers were paged at 13:00 UTC on 21 May for excessive delays in starting jobs. Earlier, a 02:31 notification that a VM destroyer queue had no consumers was handled by restarting pods, and a 10:11 alert that a VM destroy queue was backing up notified once at its threshold and did not page.

    Remediation
    • Blocked Linux machine jobs from entering the work queue
    • Had GCP raise the CPU quotas
    • Deleted old VMs by hand
    • Cancelled some workflows to free resources
    • Reset the VM services deployment so the VM destroy queues had consumers again
    • Scaled up the RDS database instance, at 18:20 and again at 19:15
    • Turned down VM provisioning and blocked remote-docker jobs to shed load
    • Scaled down all pods that created and destroyed VMs
    • Deployed a revised distribution backend that kept remote-docker jobs out of the provisioning queues
    • Brought provisioning and distribution back one component at a time and reversed the mitigation code changes
    Action items
    • Make VM provisioning more robust to changes in load so it can recover from thundering herds
    • Make VM provisioning independent so its failure does not affect Docker jobs
    • Review and improve observability of RabbitMQ and the production queues
    • Batch requests to avoid hitting GCP API rate limits
    • Improve incident response for long-running incidents
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Amazon ECS. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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