Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 17:12 UTC on 12 May 2026, error rates rose at the same time across GitLab.com's web, Git, API and CI runner services. Users got frequent 500 errors, failed or stuck CI pipelines, authentication failures and unreliable Git access, and a Prometheus Alertmanager alert opened the incident at 17:15.

    Trigger

    Earlier on 12 May, as a mitigation for a previous incident, INC-10084, a Sidekiq queueing apdex SLO violation on shard catchall-b, jobs of AuditEvents::AuditEventStreamingWorker were deferred. The deferred audit event jobs then piled up in the Redis Sidekiq cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Prometheus Alertmanager alert reported the incident at 17:15:10 UTC, three minutes after impact began. A follow-up asks why the redis-sidekiq memory alert did not page, and the review says some signals did not reach the right on-call people.

    Remediation
    • Restarted and force-reset the two unresponsive Redis Sidekiq nodes
    • Stopped each Redis Sidekiq VM in turn and resized it to c2-standard-16, doubling memory and CPU
    • Re-enabled AuditEventStreamingWorker instead of deferring it
    Action items
    • Investigate why the redis-sidekiq memory alert did not page
    • Establish the root cause, failure mode and remediation status of the WebHookWorker poison pill
    • Give mitigations that disable safety limits an explicit owner and a deadline for re-evaluating them
    • Stop AuditEvents::AuditEventStreamingWorker from causing recurring incidents
    • Create a runbook for AuditEventStreamingWorker
    • Address PG connection pool saturation
    Lessons

    Broad degradation across web, Git, authentication, CI runners, Sidekiq and the internal API made it hard to settle on one cause and explain it clearly. The customer symptom of pipelines stuck in created was hard to measure in real time, and the dashboards that would have answered it were not obvious to on-call responders. Some alerts did not reach the right on-call people, and hosts that hung on login slowed diagnosis and made changes riskier. Redis-sidekiq under memory saturation forces choices between availability and data loss that are hard to make during an incident and call for guardrails and design changes.

  2. Symptoms

    On 17 and 18 November 2017 nodes of Discord's 'sessions' cluster on Google Cloud Platform lost network connectivity for short periods, 16 times in all. Engineers saw a service impact, a node whose service had died and restarted, and pages for low memory on other sessions nodes; twice the failure cascaded and Discord was completely offline for about 30 minutes.

    Trigger

    A software change that Google rolled out to the Google Cloud Platform networking stack on Friday introduced a bug that made VMs in Discord's sessions cluster lose network connectivity for short periods.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 11:52 PST on 17 November engineers noticed a service impact and escalated it in the incident chat. Later affected nodes showed up as pages to the on-call engineer for low memory on sessions nodes, and on 18 November as a page for a networking incident on sessions-1-11 together with issue reports that the customer experience team escalated from support channels.

    Remediation
    • Forcefully terminated sessions nodes whose Erlang distribution port had failed
    • Escalated the Google support ticket to P1 and notified the Technical Account Manager
    • Restarted several core Discord services on 17 November, making clients reconnect over about 20 minutes
    • Began terminating and rebooting the entire sessions cluster after seeing that rebooted machines did not fail again
    • Disabled message sending globally on 18 November to help the service recover
    • Restarted all members of the sessions cluster
    • Re-enabled message sending after the initial all clear
    • Google rolled back the software change made to its networking stack
    Action items
    • Continue the project to improve how Discord's Erlang clusters handle node failure
    • Expand how upgrades to these services are load tested so the rollout can be completed safely
    • Replace the HTTP library used by Discord's Elixir/Erlang services
    • Fix the instability seen in Erlang's net_kernel component
    • Replace the pieces of the service discovery component that degraded with more performant implementations
    • Work with Google on the issues Discord met while working with Google on this incident
    • Expand the internal procedure for communicating with Google so the progress of P1 issues is tracked
    Lessons

    Discord concluded that performance and stability issues in its own system, in Erlang's net_kernel, the service discovery component and the HTTP library, were what turned short network losses on part of the fleet from isolated issues for some users into two full system outages.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve In-memory cache and Service discovery. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause2