Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
IL-0561DigitalOcean's Cloud Control Panel and Public API returned up to 25% errors in two windows as authorization timed outDigitalOcean2026- Symptoms
From 16:56 UTC on 24 August 2026, requests to DigitalOcean's Cloud Control Panel, Public API and the product management systems that depend on them failed at elevated rates. Automated monitoring flagged abnormal error rates and latency at 16:58. Running Droplets, network routing and block storage Volumes kept working.
- Trigger
A planned migration of the database layer behind DigitalOcean's identity, authentication and authorization services made one critical authorization query run much slower than its historical baseline.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Automated monitoring detected abnormal error rates and latency at 16:58 UTC, two minutes after the authorization query slowed down.
- Remediation
- Rerouted authorization traffic onto a single healthy processing path
- Temporarily disabled hedged retries for the primary callers
- Disabled the retry and amplification behaviour across the remaining affected services
- Added read capacity for the slow authorization query
- Action items
- Deploy circuit breakers in upstream services that detect a degraded downstream dependency and suppress hedged requests and retries
- Audit the architecture so retry suppression and circuit breaking are enforced the same way in every control plane service
- Add fast-fail load shedding so request queues do not saturate while a dependency is slow
- Add telemetry alerts that spot queues backing up before customers are affected
- Let critical authorization components run in a degraded mode on asynchronous, eventually consistent database replicas when the primary database is slow
IL-0225An IGP purge command made every Microsoft WAN router recompute routes, causing global latency, timeouts and packet lossMicrosoft Azure2023- Symptoms
From 07:08 UTC on 25 January 2023, customers saw long network latency and timeouts when connecting to resources in Azure regions and to other Microsoft services such as Microsoft 365 and Power Platform. Microsoft's monitoring detected DNS and WAN issues from 07:11 UTC.
- Trigger
A network engineer adding capacity to the global WAN in Madrid ran a step of a recently changed standard operating procedure that purged the IGP database; on the router manufacturer involved, that command runs on all IGP-joined routers instead of only the local one.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Monitoring detected DNS and WAN issues from 07:11 UTC and alerted the on-call engineers within 5 minutes of the command being run. The team reviewed all recent changes and identified the command by 08:20 UTC. The engineer making the change was not informed of the alerts because of the unqualified changes to the SOP.
- Remediation
- Restarted by hand the paused WAN health and traffic engineering systems, which ended the remaining packet loss
- Action items
- Audit and block similar widespread-impact commands across all three vendors for all WAN router roles
- Give on-call engineers real-time visibility of approved and unqualified activity on network devices
- Run regular mandatory operational training and attestation of following all SOPs
- Have the Change Advisory Board review all SOPs still pending qualification within 30 days
These 2 cases involve Backbone network (WAN) and BGP routing. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Configuration change2 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation