Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases13 cases

1 to 5 of 13

  1. Symptoms

    A Kubernetes worker node paged with NodeFilesystemFilesFillingUp, the node_exporter mixin alert that predicts a filesystem will run out of inodes. The engineer checked disk space first: df -h showed the root filesystem 83% used, 103G used and 22G available. df -i showed inodes 67% used, 11M used and 5.3M free.

    Trigger

    Several versions of a single-stage Node.js image, each shipping more than 40,000 files, were held on the node; containerd unpacked every layer with a distinct digest into its own snapshot, each with a full copy of node_modules.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The NodeFilesystemFilesFillingUp alert from the node_exporter mixin fired on the predicted inode trend while inode use was at 67%.

    Action items
    • Build the image in multiple stages so the final image contains only the compiled assets
    • Add a flat alert on root filesystem inode use above 80% for 30 minutes alongside the predictive alert
    • Put a Prometheus query on a dashboard that shows, per node, inode usage minus disk usage, sorted from the highest
    • Remove unused images from nodes with crictl rmi --prune to free old snapshots
    Lessons

    kubelet's background cleanup works on bytes only. A workload heavy in small files gets no early intervention for inodes, and the first thing kubelet does at 5% free inodes is evict pods. Watch inode use on nodes separately from disk use, and keep dependency trees out of runtime images.

  2. Symptoms

    From 22:47 UTC on 25 August 2026 the Buildkite web interface, REST API, Agent API, job queue and notifications stopped working for every customer. No one could create a build from the UI or the REST API, job dispatch was delayed, and some builds that were already running when the outage began stayed stuck until the services recovered.

    Trigger

    At 22:44 UTC an application deploy created a surge of new pods, which used up the free capacity on the existing nodes and made the EKS cluster scale out. Background worker pools with unusually high maximum replica counts were scaling out at the same time and kept asking for more pods while new nodes were still being provisioned. Together they produced an unusually high rate of change in applications, network endpoints and nodes, and with it a sudden rise in demand on CoreDNS.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first status post, at 22:55 UTC, eight minutes after the outage began, said something had gone wrong, and at 23:05 UTC the status page said a sitewide outage was being investigated. CoreDNS query duration had been rising as the cluster grew, but a defect in a key monitoring query and too little monitoring of query volume meant this went unnoticed before the outage.

    Remediation
    • paused further application deploys
    • scaled CoreDNS from three to twelve pods
    • raised each CoreDNS pod's memory limit from 512 MiB to 2 GiB
    • expanded the system node pool that runs CoreDNS
    Action items
    • Increase immediate CoreDNS headroom: twelve pods instead of three, a 2 GiB memory limit instead of 512 MiB, and a larger system node pool
    • Enable EKS-managed CoreDNS autoscaling with a tested minimum replica count and enough capacity to spread the replicas across nodes and availability zones
    • Add direct alerts on CoreDNS query duration, query volume, goroutine growth, memory pressure, OOM restarts and available replicas, and track longer-term trends in capacity planning
    • Find other cluster-critical services that lack tested capacity, direct alerting, spread across failure domains, and either safe autoscaling or documented static headroom, and fix them
    Lessons

    A CoreDNS deployment sized once and left at a fixed size can carry a growing cluster for months and then fail on the first burst of churn it cannot absorb. When query processing slows, pending queries take up memory, the pods hit their limits and restart, and client retries keep the service down after the restart. Server-side DNS query duration and volume need their own alerts: here client-side latency was masked by unrelated application speed-ups, and a broken monitoring query hid the server-side trend. Maximum replica counts raised as a temporary measure remove the cap that normally stops runaway scaling when new nodes are slow to arrive.

  3. Symptoms

    The 60-node NVIDIA B200 training configuration for the Solar Open pre-training run showed no major problem during initial validation on 2 to 4 nodes. Once the job ran at its full size of 60 nodes, training initialisation, which reads from the VAST Data storage and should have finished within minutes, took more than 8 hours, and storage throughput stayed far below the theoretical limit.

    Trigger

    Scaling the training job from 2 to 4 nodes in validation to the full 60-node configuration.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The problem showed up as training initialisation taking hours after the job was scaled to 60 nodes; application logs showed only the delayed initialisation.

    Remediation
    • Sharded the Arrow training data files by rank on the application side
    • Switched the storage to asynchronous deletion instead of synchronous rm/unlink
    • Tuned readahead
    Lessons

    Storage behaviour measured on 2 to 4 nodes did not predict behaviour on 60 nodes: a metadata bottleneck of this kind appears only at production scale, so small pre-tests cannot find it. Per-node network rates can look normal while the combined access pattern of all nodes overwhelms the storage metadata path. Finding the cause took metrics from the application, scheduler, network and storage on one shared timeline; monitoring by any single team was not enough. The report concludes that GPU capacity has to be provisioned together with a matching storage path.

  4. Symptoms

    An e-commerce platform suddenly became slow to respond, worst on the product lookup page, and users began reporting that the page would not open.

    Trigger

    A post on the external community Ppomppu linked to the platform and brought a large number of users in a short time, who called the product lookup API heavily.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that the product page would not open. The dashboard showed all pods Running, and the namespace CPU usage near 100% and the CPU usage metrics pointed to throttling.

    Remediation
    • raised the HPA minReplicas from 5 to 10
    • raised the container CPU limit from 1 core to 2 cores
    Action items
    • Keep adjusting the CPU limit to a suitable level through monitoring
    Lessons

    CPU throttling is hard to notice: pods stay Running, nothing restarts and the logs show no clear error, so a pod list does not reveal it and CPU usage metrics do. Settings that had handled expected event traffic became the bottleneck as soon as one external post multiplied the traffic. The author concludes that the team needs more preparation for traffic pattern changes and more thought about resource settings.

  5. Symptoms

    During a Lunar New Year event in January 2024, a developer posted a message in Slack suspecting an outage. While several people were checking it, the problem grew into a full outage of Backpackr's web and app services, and the company decided to stop the event.

    Trigger

    An unexpected traffic surge, more than three times normal, during the Lunar New Year event in January 2024.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A developer reported a suspected outage in Slack; the outage became total while several people were still confirming it.

    Remediation
    • stopped the Lunar New Year event
    Action items
    • Raise net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max on all nodes to memory bytes/16384/2, and three times that on Istio nodes, applied by the nodeOptimizer DaemonSet
    • Configure Istio mesh networking so sidecars communicate directly instead of through the ingressGateway
    • Upgrade the Istio nodes from c6.xlarge (12.5 Gbps) to n-type instances with up to 25 Gbps of network bandwidth
    • Strengthen monitoring with ENA network bandwidth and packet drops, detailed Istio ingressGateway and sidecar metrics, and CPU, memory and saturation
    Lessons

    When every request in a cluster goes through one ingress gateway node, that node's connection tracking table and network bandwidth set the limit for the whole service. The default nf_conntrack table size was too small for three times normal traffic, and once it filled, packets were dropped. After the outage Backpackr strengthened its monitoring of network bandwidth, packet drops and the Istio components.

Check your cluster for this

These 13 cases involve Container memory limit and Telemetry agent. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Capacity exhaustion13 cases

  1. IL-0071 Worker node running out of inodes while disk space looked fine, because containerd kept a full node_modules tree in each of several image layer snapshots
  2. IL-0102 CoreDNS pods on a production EKS cluster ran out of memory under a burst of new pods, endpoints and nodes, taking down the Buildkite web UI, APIs and job dispatch
  3. IL-0137 Training initialisation on a 60-node NVIDIA B200 cluster took more than 8 hours instead of minutes because fragmented small random I/O from all nodes saturated the metadata service of the VAST Data NFS storage
  4. IL-0181 A traffic spike from an external community post pushed product API pods into CPU throttling under a 1-core limit, and an e-commerce product page slowed down while every pod stayed Running
    Kevin2026
  5. IL-0170 During a Lunar New Year event, traffic more than three times normal filled the nf_conntrack table on the EKS node running the Istio ingress gateway, dropping packets and taking down Backpackr's web and app services
  6. IL-0085 A control plane node of Magic Pages' Kubernetes cluster on Hetzner Cloud ran out of memory, the cluster's own calls then used up the Hetzner API rate limit, and all customer websites were down for about 7.5 hours
  7. IL-0110 A Grafana Agent pod's high memory use and crash-looping Hangfire pods drove a Kubernetes node into system OOM and NotReady, twice in one day
    DFDS2024
  8. IL-0043 Application logs missing in Kibana after a newer Fluent Bit version changed its chunk drop strategy
  9. IL-0028 Temporal History service latency rose because its pods were CPU-throttled while CPU usage read below 60 percent
  10. IL-0070 Critical pods on core nodes evicted when Prometheus began scraping about 200 nodes after a dask-gateway scale-up
    2i2c2023
  11. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API
  12. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries
  13. IL-0040 Parallel Helm installs saturated small gp2 root volumes on a kops cluster and left all three workers NotReady with the kubelet or Docker down