Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 21:38 UTC on 21 March 2025, Cloudflare R2 object storage returned errors for 1 hour and 7 minutes: all object writes failed and about 35% of object reads failed globally. R2 global availability alerts fired at 21:45 UTC, at a 2% error budget burn rate.

    Trigger

    During a routine rotation of the credentials the R2 Gateway Worker uses to authenticate with the storage infrastructure, the new credentials were deployed to the Worker of the default environment instead of the production Worker, and the old credentials were then removed from the storage infrastructure at 20:37 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    R2 global availability alerts fired at 21:45 UTC, seven minutes after impact began, at a 2% error budget burn rate, and the R2 engineering team turned to operational dashboards and logs.

    Remediation
    • Deployed the new credentials to the production R2 Gateway Worker, which restored R2 availability
    Action items
    • Add logging tags with the suffix of the credential ID the R2 Gateway Worker uses
    • Require confirmation that the new token ID suffix matches storage infrastructure logs before deleting the old token
    • Run key rotation through the hotfix release tooling, which enforces the environment, instead of manual wrangler commands
    • Write the two-person validation of these changes into the standard operating procedures
    • Extend the closed loop health check system to test new keys, report their status through alerting and confirm global propagation before releasing the gateway Worker
    • Add observability views of upstream success rates that bypass caching
    Lessons

    Because the deletion of the old credentials took effect gradually, availability metrics were a poor way to confirm the change. Cloudflare said the team should have checked directly which token the R2 Gateway service was using to authenticate with the storage infrastructure instead of relying on those metrics.

  2. Symptoms

    At 12:10 AM ET on Tuesday, February 12, 2019, Squarespace's monitoring alerted the on-call engineer for the CDN origin fleet that the fleet had fallen below a safe number of healthy nodes. Requests to static.squarespace.com and static1.squarespace.com failed, so images, scripts and style sheets did not load for some sites, and the status page later reported elevated error rates serving media and stylesheets.

    Trigger

    At 10:30 PM ET on February 11, an engineer started a maintenance operation across the CDN origin fleet. The operation kept running in the background after the engineer believed it had been terminated.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The monitoring system alerted the CDN origin fleet's on-call engineer at 12:10 AM ET when the fleet fell below a safe number of healthy nodes.

    Remediation
    • Restored the CDN origin fleet, partially by 2:15 AM ET and to normal behaviour at 2:20 AM ET
    Action items
    • Revise the incident-response playbooks with checks and actions for this fleet, starting with an assessment of customer impact and the immediate involvement of an Incident Commander
    • Improve external monitoring to assess customer impact of issues with the CDN partners and origin services more quickly
    • Revise operational policies and add safeguards for issuing maintenance commands, including limiting the share of the fleet a command can operate on
    • Reduce the need for direct manual maintenance operations
    • Create independent failure domains and route requests automatically around unhealthy parts of the system
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve CDN and edge network and Object storage. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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