Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases13 cases

1 to 5 of 13

  1. Symptoms

    From 10:03 UTC on 29 September 2026, requests to Azure OpenAI Service, Foundry Agent Service, Foundry Models and Azure AI services in Sweden Central failed intermittently, took longer, or returned HTTP 500 and 503 errors. At 10:17 UTC service monitoring raised an alert on elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region.

    Trigger

    At about 09:38 UTC a planned deployment of an internal service in Sweden Central cleared that service's caches during the region's peak traffic hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Service monitoring detected elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region at 10:17 UTC and alerted the engineering teams; engineers were engaged at 10:28 UTC.

    Remediation
    • reconfigured the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depended on remote connectivity, which stopped the restart loop
    Action items
    • Reconfigure the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depends on connectivity to its database layer
    • Add monitoring and alerting on the load and latency of the caching layer used by the backend service
    • Update troubleshooting and procedural guidance for connection exhaustion scenarios for on-call engineers
    • Add throttling and rate limiting to protect the backend service from sudden traffic increases (estimated October 2026)
    • Increase the resource capacity of the caching layer used by the backend service across regions (estimated October 2026)
    • Improve diagnostic metrics and automated detection to identify such issues more quickly (estimated October 2026)
    • Partition the caching layer used by the backend service to increase its throughput (estimated December 2026)
    Lessons

    A health check that depends on a remote dependency turns a dependency problem into a restart loop: instances that cannot reach the database are killed, the remaining ones take more load and retries, and adding instances or resources does not help until the check itself is changed. Clearing a cache during peak traffic can multiply load on the backend behind it, especially when cache-read defects let lookups bypass the cache. Connection exhaustion was hard to see because the existing network and diagnostic metrics did not show it.

  2. Symptoms

    From 01:36 UTC on 12 March 2026, GitHub.com returned elevated error rates for Git operations, web requests and related services. At 01:54 UTC the GitHub status page said it was investigating reports of impacted performance for some services.

    Trigger

    During a planned infrastructure upgrade, a configuration issue made newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes run an incompatible version of etcd.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The status page opened the incident at 01:54 UTC, 18 minutes after errors began, citing reports of impacted performance.

    Remediation
    • paused deployments for the duration of the incident
    • identified the newly provisioned nodes running the incompatible etcd version and removed them, which restored cluster consensus
    • ran a validation deploy that confirmed all systems were healthy before resuming normal operations
    Action items
    • Enforce version compatibility programmatically during node replacements
    • Add monitoring that detects split-brain conditions earlier
    • Update the recovery tooling to reduce restoration time
  3. Symptoms

    Between about 4:26 PM and 4:56 PM PST on 4 March 2026, some OpenAI API requests to several models failed or took longer than usual, and some Codex traffic was affected too. The overall API success rate dropped temporarily.

    Trigger

    A protective circuit breaker that had paused some scheduling operations was released, and the infrastructure actions queued during the pause were executed at the same time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • manually reassigned infrastructure resources to the affected models
    • brought the removed inference engines back online and reassigned them until error rates returned to normal
    Action items
    • Improve safeguards in the automated capacity management systems so they detect and respond to state drift
    • Improve observability of circuit breakers and scheduling systems so their status and effects are easier to identify
    • Add safeguards so queued actions cannot run in large batches after long pauses
    • Improve monitoring and alerting around capacity reconciliation problems
    Lessons

    Pausing one automated system does not stop the systems that feed it. Changes queued during the pause reflect the state at the time they were queued, and releasing the queue all at once applies those stale decisions together. The fixes OpenAI names are detecting state drift, making circuit breaker status visible, and preventing large batches from executing after a long pause.

  4. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  5. Symptoms

    Alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST on 11 December 2024, and from 3:16 PM every OpenAI service was significantly degraded or completely unavailable, including ChatGPT, the API and Sora. The status page reported API calls returning errors and difficulties logging in to platform.openai.com and ChatGPT. Customer impact peaked at 3:40 PM.

    Trigger

    At 2:23 PM PST a change introducing a new telemetry service, which collects detailed Kubernetes control plane metrics, was merged and the deployment pipeline started. Between 2:51 PM and 3:20 PM the change was applied to all clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    OpenAI's detection tools worked: alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST, a few minutes before customer impact began at 3:16 PM, and the root cause was identified at 3:16 PM.

    Remediation
    • Scaled clusters down to reduce the total Kubernetes API load
    • Blocked network access to the Kubernetes admin APIs so no new expensive requests arrived
    • Scaled up the Kubernetes API servers
    • Removed the telemetry service once enough control was back
    • Moved traffic from impacted clusters to healthy ones
    • Intervened manually in clusters where simultaneous resource downloads saturated resource limits
    Action items
    • Put every infrastructure configuration change through a phased rollout with continuous monitoring of both the service workloads and the clusters, including the Kubernetes control plane
    • Run fault injection tests in which the data plane runs without the control plane for longer, and tests that roll out bad changes on purpose to check detection and rollback
    • Build break-glass mechanisms so engineers can reach the Kubernetes API servers in any circumstances
    • Decouple the Kubernetes data plane from the control plane so that service discovery for critical workloads does not depend on the control plane
    • Speed up recovery with better caching and dynamic rate limiters for resources needed at cluster startup, and regular drills that rapidly replace an entire cluster
    Lessons

    Several systems and processes failed at once and interacted in unexpected ways: tests did not catch the change's effect on the Kubernetes control plane, DNS caching put a delay between the change and the failures, and being locked out of the control plane made remediation very slow. Because service discovery used Kubernetes DNS, the control plane was carrying load for product traffic even though the data plane was meant to be independent of it.

Check your cluster for this

These 13 cases involve etcd and Kubernetes API server. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Faulty deployment2 cases

  1. IL-0136 A deployment that cleared an internal service's caches at peak traffic sent 20 times the normal load to the Azure OpenAI metadata backend in Sweden Central, and health checks that depended on its database restarted instances in a loop for almost six hours
  2. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy

Configuration change4 cases

  1. IL-0200 Newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes ran an incompatible etcd version and broke cluster consensus in several GitHub production clusters, causing 5XX errors on Git operations and page loads
    GitHub2026
  2. IL-0005 A new telemetry service overloaded the Kubernetes API servers of large clusters and broke DNS-based service discovery for all OpenAI services
    OpenAI2024
  3. IL-0009 A duplicated generated name made Argo CD replace the InfluxDB Cloud production Application and delete the whole production environment
  4. IL-0035 Worker nodes went NotReady after a new ElastAlert rule without memory limits used up node memory
    NU.nl2019

Software defect4 cases

  1. IL-0124 Capacity changes queued while a circuit breaker was engaged ran all at once when it was released, taking multiple OpenAI inference engines out of service and raising API error rates
    OpenAI2026
  2. IL-0032 Mutating admission controller generated broken JSON patches, silently blocking deploys for a week until a production service ran down to two pods
    Airbnb2020
  3. IL-0012 CPU limits and an unpatched kernel CFS quota bug throttled multi-threaded services into stalls, failed health checks and timeouts
    Omio2020
  4. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023

Capacity exhaustion2 cases

  1. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API
  2. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries