Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases4 cases

1 to 4 of 4

  1. Symptoms

    From 10:03 UTC on 29 September 2026, requests to Azure OpenAI Service, Foundry Agent Service, Foundry Models and Azure AI services in Sweden Central failed intermittently, took longer, or returned HTTP 500 and 503 errors. At 10:17 UTC service monitoring raised an alert on elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region.

    Trigger

    At about 09:38 UTC a planned deployment of an internal service in Sweden Central cleared that service's caches during the region's peak traffic hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Service monitoring detected elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region at 10:17 UTC and alerted the engineering teams; engineers were engaged at 10:28 UTC.

    Remediation
    • reconfigured the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depended on remote connectivity, which stopped the restart loop
    Action items
    • Reconfigure the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depends on connectivity to its database layer
    • Add monitoring and alerting on the load and latency of the caching layer used by the backend service
    • Update troubleshooting and procedural guidance for connection exhaustion scenarios for on-call engineers
    • Add throttling and rate limiting to protect the backend service from sudden traffic increases (estimated October 2026)
    • Increase the resource capacity of the caching layer used by the backend service across regions (estimated October 2026)
    • Improve diagnostic metrics and automated detection to identify such issues more quickly (estimated October 2026)
    • Partition the caching layer used by the backend service to increase its throughput (estimated December 2026)
    Lessons

    A health check that depends on a remote dependency turns a dependency problem into a restart loop: instances that cannot reach the database are killed, the remaining ones take more load and retries, and adding instances or resources does not help until the check itself is changed. Clearing a cache during peak traffic can multiply load on the backend behind it, especially when cache-read defects let lookups bypass the cache. Connection exhaustion was hard to see because the existing network and diagnostic metrics did not show it.

  2. Symptoms

    On 2022-10-31 a planned upgrade of the vpc-cni EKS add-on, started from the deployment pipeline at 13:45 UTC, timed out at 14:10. Only about 10 of the 45 aws-node pods had upgraded, 5 were stuck in Terminating and the other 30 had not been attempted.

    Trigger

    At 07:30 UTC on 2022-10-31 the daily node rollover replaced the existing nodes with nodes built from AMI v20221027, the latest AWS EKS node AMI, released on 2022-10-29 and later recalled because of a kernel issue.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed nodes flapping between NodeNotReady and NodeReady ("KubeletNotReady PLEG is not healthy") at 14:30 UTC while watching the stalled vpc-cni upgrade, about seven hours after the rollover. Time to detection was 7 hours. Alerting did not catch the NodeNotReady events or the socket growth.

    Remediation
    • cordoned, drained and deleted 15 stuck nodes one at a time to complete the vpc-cni upgrade
    • changed the Terraform infrastructure-modules so a specific AMI could be set
    • rolled the EC2 Auto Scaling group launch configuration back to the previous known good AMI through the pipeline
    Action items
    • Reach out to teams with suggestions about readiness and liveness probes
    • Create a dashboard for readiness and liveness probe coverage
    • Write a wiki article on readiness and liveness probes and their usefulness
    • Modify infrastructure-modules to allow specifying a particular AMI
    • Schedule a discussion on whether to take the latest AMI immediately and how to test new AMIs before they are deployed
    • Implement alerting on abnormal NodeNotReady events and on increased socket use
    • Create a learning path for Kubernetes within the team
    • Collect logs from nodes centrally
    • Create a Prometheus exporter that retrieves the latest available AMI, with a dashboard and alerts
    Lessons

    When a new node AMI has just been rolled out, upgrading other cluster components on the same day makes it hard to tell which change is causing trouble; here the vpc-cni upgrade on the same day confused matters. Taking the latest AMI automatically with no way to pin one meant a rollback first needed a Terraform change. The team also concluded that it needs better communication paths with application teams during incidents.

  3. Symptoms

    For about six months, applications on Omio's Google Kubernetes Engine clusters stalled at random: they got stuck, stopped answering health check requests or lost network connections, and nothing the team looked at explained why.

    Trigger

    Multi-threaded workloads running with CPU limits on nodes whose kernel did not yet have the fix for a known CFS quota bug that causes unnecessary throttling.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Months of random stalls and failed health checks led the team to read the cgroup cpu.stat throttling counters inside the pods, which showed far more throttling than the limits should allow.

    Remediation
    • removed CPU limits until the kernel with the CFS bug fix was deployed across all clusters
    Action items
    • Deploy the kernel with the CFS quota bug fix across all clusters
    • Monitor utilisation, saturation and error metrics, API latency and error rates to confirm the change behaves as expected
    Lessons

    A CPU limit is a time quota per 100 ms period, not a share of cores, so a multi-threaded container can be stopped for most of each period long before it uses the cores it was given, and a kernel bug can make that worse. Throttling is invisible in standard Kubernetes metrics and has to be read from the cgroup counters. Removing limits trades away protection against a container that takes a whole node, which is only acceptable when runtimes are tuned.

  4. Symptoms

    The NU.nl development team got reports that several services on one of its Kubernetes clusters behaved erratically: occasional error pages, slow responses and timeouts. The affected services were mostly internal tools and dashboards.

    Trigger

    A new ElastAlert rule, deployed shortly before from the command line, that fired if the Cloudfront-* Elasticsearch indexes stopped receiving documents; those indexes take a few million requests per hour, and the rule made ElastAlert's memory grow without bound.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported error pages, slow responses and timeouts from several services; no alert fired.

    Remediation
    • terminated the NotReady nodes one by one so the auto-scaling group replaced them (the new nodes also went NotReady, but Prometheus and Grafana landed on a stable node)
    • found the ElastAlert pods' memory growth on the Grafana pod memory dashboard
    • fixed the ElastAlert problem that caused the memory growth
    Action items
    • Define alerts on resource usage such as CPU, memory and disk space
    • Keep researching an alerting strategy that combines Elasticsearch, Prometheus Alertmanager and New Relic
    • Consider exporting metrics out of the cluster and running Grafana outside it, on EC2 or a separate Kubernetes cluster
    • Either visualise the important metrics in the ELK stack or make Prometheus and Grafana more available, and improve the metrics strategy
    • Set resource limits for ElastAlert through the Helm values
    • Configure namespaces with default memory requests and limits
    • Isolate customer-facing workloads from build, logging and monitoring workloads (a dedicated node group, or later a separate tools cluster)
    • Deploy everything through automation such as Jenkins pipelines, and consider a GitOps approach
    • Deploy through a pipeline that includes a smoke test step
    • Make Kubernetes and cloud infrastructure work part of the team's sprints, picked up by all team members while pairing with more experienced members, and hold workshops that go deep into specific topics
    Lessons

    Fixing the root cause covers only a small part of what an incident can teach; the chain of smaller failures around it is where most of the learning is. A pod without a memory limit can take whole nodes down, so limits need defaults at the namespace level. Monitoring that runs inside the cluster it watches goes blind with it. Changes installed by hand from the command line leave the rest of the team without a record of what changed.

Check your cluster for this

These 4 cases involve kubelet and Linux kernel. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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