Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 7:30 AM PST on 7 December 2021, AWS services in us-east-1 that communicate between AWS's internal network and its main network saw rising latency and errors. The AWS operations teams lost real-time monitoring data at once, and the first thing found in the logs was elevated internal DNS errors.

    Trigger

    At 7:30 AM PST an automated activity that scales the capacity of one AWS service hosted in the main AWS network triggered unexpected behaviour from a large number of clients inside the internal network.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The congestion immediately cut off real-time monitoring data for the AWS operations teams, who turned to logs and first identified elevated internal DNS errors.

    Remediation
    • Moved internal DNS traffic away from the congested network paths
    • Isolated the top sources of traffic onto dedicated network devices
    • Disabled some heavy network traffic services, including EventBridge event delivery
    • Brought additional networking capacity online
    • Disabled the automated scaling activities that triggered the event
    Action items
    • Keep the triggering scaling activities off until all remediations are deployed
    • Fix the latent issue that kept networking clients from backing off
    • Deploy network configuration that protects the affected networking devices in a similar congestion event
    • Keep API Gateway servers healthy when the internal network is unavailable and speed up their recycling
    • Release a new Service Health Dashboard that makes service impact easier to understand
    • Run the support system actively across multiple AWS regions
  2. Symptoms

    From 12:47 AM PDT on 21 April 2011, a subset of Amazon EBS volumes in one Availability Zone of the US East Region could no longer serve reads or writes, and EC2 instances that tried to use them got stuck as well. AWS called these "stuck" volumes. EBS API calls across the whole US East Region also returned high error rates and latencies during two periods on the first day.

    Trigger

    During a routine network change to upgrade the capacity of the primary EBS network in one Availability Zone, traffic was to be shifted off one of the redundant routers. The shift was executed incorrectly and sent the traffic onto the lower-capacity replication network instead of the other primary router, which could not carry it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Rolled back the incorrect traffic shift, which restored network connectivity
    • Disabled all new Create Volume requests in the affected Availability Zone at 2:40 AM PDT
    • Disabled all communication between the degraded EBS cluster and the EBS control plane from 8:20 AM PDT
    • Stopped EBS servers in the degraded cluster from futilely contacting other servers for free space
    • Changed the EBS control plane so new EBS-backed instance launches stopped failing
    • Moved spare server capacity physically from across the US East Region into the degraded cluster
    • Adjusted the negotiation throttles so the new servers could join without flooding the old ones
    • Built a separate EBS control plane partitioned to the affected zone and finer-grained throttles, then processed the backlog
    • Restored the remaining volumes from S3 snapshots taken early in the event
    • Restored volumes on failed machines that had no snapshot after forensic work
    • Intervened by hand on the RDS multi-AZ instances that did not fail over automatically
    Action items
    • Audit the change process and add automation to prevent the traffic shift mistake
    • Change capacity planning and alarming to keep the extra safety capacity needed for large recovery events
    • Change the retry logic in EBS nodes to back off harder and reconnect to previous replicas instead of searching for new nodes
    • Test and deploy the fix for the race condition that crashed EBS nodes
    • Fix the RDS bug that kept multi-AZ instances from failing over automatically
    • Improve the EBS control plane timeout logic to prevent thread exhaustion when one zone's cluster is slow
    • Make the EBS control plane aware of Availability Zones so it sheds load when over capacity
    • Move more EBS control plane functions into per-cluster services that run in the same zone as the cluster
    • Offer multiple Availability Zones to Amazon VPC customers
    • Provide better tools for building multi-AZ applications that survive the loss of a zone
    • Host free webinars and publish whitepapers on fault-tolerant architecture
    • Build the fine-grained control and throttling used in recovery into the EBS nodes and automate the recovery models
    • Look at changes that keep volumes working while a cluster is degraded, including the ability to take a snapshot of a stuck volume
    • Send more frequent and detailed customer updates and staff developer support more widely during events
    • Develop tools that show through the APIs whether instances are impaired
    Lessons

    AWS writes that with more spare capacity the cluster would have absorbed the re-mirroring requests without a storm, and that it now understands how much capacity large recovery events need. The event also showed that the EBS control plane let a failure in one Availability Zone affect the others, so more work is needed to make zones behave as if completely independent. AWS adds that some customers had critical components in a single zone, and that multi-AZ deployments need to become easier to design and run.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cloud block storage and Automated capacity manager. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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