Cases4 cases

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1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries

   PostHog2025

   Symptoms

   On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

   Sustained high node CPUHigh error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopDatabase overload

   Trigger

   On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node poolPod scheduling and placementIn-memory cacheApplication database

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitRetry stormIneffective rollbackSingle point of failureNo staged rolloutUnrepresentative staging

   Detection

   On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

   Remediation

   • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
   • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
   • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
   • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
   • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
   • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
   • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
   • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call

   Action items

   • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
   • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
   • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
   • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
   • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
   • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
   • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
   • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
   • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
   • Build a production-scale load testing framework
   • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
   • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms

   Lessons

   Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

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2. IL-0202 A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recover

   Honeycomb2023sev1

   Symptoms

   Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

   High error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopService outageDatabase overload

   Trigger

   An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Application databaseIn-memory cache

   Contributing factor

   Retry stormAutomation amplification

   Detection

   Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

   Remediation

   • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
   • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
   • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided

   Action items

   • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
   • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths

   Lessons

   Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

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3. IL-0140 The GKE API in us-central1 returned errors and high latency for 3 hours 19 minutes after an unexpected rise in backend traffic that client retries made worse

   Google Cloud2022

   Symptoms

   From 03:03 US/Pacific on 14 June 2022, calls to the GKE API in us-central1 through gcloud and the Google Cloud Console were slow and returned errors. Retrying sometimes succeeded.

   High error rateHigh latencyControl plane lag

   Trigger

   An unexpected increase in backend traffic to the GKE API in us-central1.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   GKE control plane

   Contributing factor

   Retry storm

   Remediation

   • scaled up the GKE control plane to handle the increased traffic

   Lessons

   Client retries against an overloaded management API add to the overload. When the cloud provider's control plane is degraded, running workloads may be fine while cluster operations fail, and the status page offered no workaround beyond advising customers to use another region if they could.

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4. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries

   Zalando2019

   Symptoms

   Customers of the Zalando Fashion Store got a high rate of errors on all web product pages and outfit pages for more than an hour. The errors came from the main data aggregation layer service, which runs in one of Zalando's Kubernetes clusters.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresOOMKilledMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   Calls from the aggregation layer to a single, not very important downstream service started timing out. The aggregation layer returned 404s for them, clients retried, and the resulting spike in requests became a spike in DNS queries to CoreDNS.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSContainer memory limitClient-side DNS resolver and cache

   Contributing factor

   Unknown limitNo cachingRetry stormUnreviewed defaultsExcessive blast radiusMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The on-call engineer for the aggregation layer phoned the on-call Kubernetes engineer. Automatic paging did not happen because the cluster's monitoring and alerting ran inside the cluster and failed along with DNS. The Kubernetes engineer then saw that the CoreDNS pods were being OOM-killed.

   Remediation

   • Raised the CoreDNS memory requests and limits by hand from 100Mi to 2000Mi

   Action items

   • Introduce a more resilient DNS setup: CoreDNS fronted by dnsmasq on every node
   • Improve high-level alerting from outside the clusters, so that a cluster problem is known before or at the same time as applications are affected
   • Improve incident response processes and tooling so that any on-call engineer can escalate directly to other teams when automatic paging fails, for example through a chat bot

   Lessons

   The Kubernetes DNS setup was far from resilient enough: a single application could take down DNS for everything in the cluster. The blast radius of one application sending more DNS queries should be limited to one node at most, ideally to single pods. Known Kubernetes DNS problems, such as Linux kernel races in conntrack handling and the ndots 5 problem, were familiar to the team and partly mitigated, but their combined effect on the DNS infrastructure was worse than the team had understood. Monitoring that runs inside the cluster was not robust enough: when the cluster's DNS broke, it could not page anyone, and recovery took longer than it should have.

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