Cases2 cases

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1. IL-0170 During a Lunar New Year event, traffic more than three times normal filled the nf_conntrack table on the EKS node running the Istio ingress gateway, dropping packets and taking down Backpackr's web and app services

   Backpackr2025

   Symptoms

   During a Lunar New Year event in January 2024, a developer posted a message in Slack suspecting an outage. While several people were checking it, the problem grew into a full outage of Backpackr's web and app services, and the company decided to stop the event.

   Service outage

   Trigger

   An unexpected traffic surge, more than three times normal, during the Lunar New Year event in January 2024.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   conntrack tableIngress controllerIstio

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureUnreviewed defaultsMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   A developer reported a suspected outage in Slack; the outage became total while several people were still confirming it.

   Remediation

   • stopped the Lunar New Year event

   Action items

   • Raise net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max on all nodes to memory bytes/16384/2, and three times that on Istio nodes, applied by the nodeOptimizer DaemonSet
   • Configure Istio mesh networking so sidecars communicate directly instead of through the ingressGateway
   • Upgrade the Istio nodes from c6.xlarge (12.5 Gbps) to n-type instances with up to 25 Gbps of network bandwidth
   • Strengthen monitoring with ENA network bandwidth and packet drops, detailed Istio ingressGateway and sidecar metrics, and CPU, memory and saturation

   Lessons

   When every request in a cluster goes through one ingress gateway node, that node's connection tracking table and network bandwidth set the limit for the whole service. The default nf_conntrack table size was too small for three times normal traffic, and once it filled, packets were dropped. After the outage Backpackr strengthened its monitoring of network bandwidth, packet drops and the Istio components.

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2. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down

   Backpackr2025

   Symptoms

   Services on the production Amazon EKS cluster behind the idus marketplace threw intermittent errors whose cause was hard to pin down. Calls to external services such as RDS and Redis failed now and then, and whenever DNS traffic spiked, domain lookups answered slowly or failed outright.

   DNS resolution failuresIntermittent connection failuresHigh latencyOOMKilledService outage

   Trigger

   All CoreDNS pods were scheduled onto the same node, and that node's memory usage spiked until it ran out of memory.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cachekubeletContainer memory limitNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsSingle point of failureNo caching

   Detection

   The write-up does not say how the full outage was noticed. The earlier DNS trouble showed up as intermittent service errors, and investigating failed calls to RDS and Redis led to DNS resolution failures.

   Remediation

   • deployed NodeLocal DNSCache as a DaemonSet in front of CoreDNS
   • added a PodDisruptionBudget (maxUnavailable 1) and topologySpreadConstraints across zones for CoreDNS
   • lowered ndots from 5 to 2 with dnsConfig in the Deployments

   Lessons

   The CoreDNS setup that EKS creates by default (two pods) can be enough for a small or development cluster but becomes a bottleneck in a large production cluster, and DNS is a single point of failure that needs high availability and room to scale. Tuning the CoreDNS cache and buffer size only relieved the symptoms; the real load came from the extra queries that ndots:5 generates for external names. A CoreDNS pod without a memory limit can share a node's fate with everything else on it.

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