Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 2026-06-11 https://gitlab.com returned widespread, intermittent HTTP 503 errors across all major services in two bursts of about 5 to 10 minutes, 06:16 to 06:22 UTC and 07:03 to 07:12 UTC. A Pingdom alert reported the first burst in triage at 06:16:12, about four minutes after impact began at 06:12, and each burst ended on its own.

    Trigger

    A GCP storage incident degraded the IO of a disk in the `us-east1-b` zone that backed GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Pingdom alert on the user-facing 503 errors was reported in triage at 06:16:12 UTC. No alert existed for disk IO saturation, pgBouncer pool saturation or LWLock contention.

    Remediation
    • Escalated to Database Operations experts
    • Paused deployments
    • Opened a GCP support case and engaged the GCP TAM, and GCP confirmed the storage incident
    • Prepared a Patroni primary switchover to node 04 in us-east1-d as a contingency, without executing it
    • Held a 3-hour pause-and-review window and resolved the incident after no recurrence
    Action items
    • Add disk IO saturation and queue-depth alerting for primary Patroni database nodes
    • Write a Patroni primary switchover runbook with explicit trigger thresholds
    • Clarify incident state-transition guidance for intermittent, self-resolving issues
    • Decide whether the primary should fail over automatically during disk IO degradation
    • Find a short-term mitigation that limits the blast radius of a single degraded disk until Cells do so
    • Make application database load balancing fail fast or reroute when the primary stops responding
    • Consider alerting on pgBouncer pool saturation and LWLock contention as leading indicators
    Lessons

    A single degraded disk was enough to take down GitLab.com because all primary database traffic goes through one node and requests waited for the Rack timeout instead of failing fast. The leading indicators, disk IO queue depth, pgBouncer pool saturation and LWLock contention, rose before full impact but had no alerts. Without decision criteria for a switchover, responders spent much of an intermittent incident waiting, and it was hard to decide when to move the incident to Fixing or Monitoring.

  2. Symptoms

    GitLab.com showed widespread, erratic behaviour and more 500 errors for about 30 minutes while its redis-sidekiq Redis was down. Alerts in the #production channel began with Redis client errors and spread to error SLO violations on several services, such as the Webservice and API load balancer and Puma.

    Trigger

    The VM of the primary node, redis-sidekiq-03-db-gprd, failed on a GCP host error and was reset and moved to another node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Several alerts in the #production channel, first Redis client errors and then error SLO violations on several services, such as the Webservice and API load balancer and Puma.

    Remediation
    • Restarted the failed Redis node so Sentinel had enough nodes to elect a primary
    Action items
    • Alert when the Sentinel service is down
    • Make merge requests robust to Redis Sidekiq outages
    Lessons

    An alert on a down Sentinel node would have kept enough nodes up to form a quorum when failover was needed, and could have avoided the incident entirely. Removing a noisy alert earlier may have let the down node go unnoticed.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cloud block storage and In-memory cache. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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