Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
IL-0127Llama 3 405B pre-training on 16K H100 GPUs was interrupted 419 times unexpectedly in 54 days, mostly by faulty GPUs, HBM3 memory and other hardwareMeta2024- Symptoms
Over a 54-day snapshot of Llama 3 405B pre-training the training job was interrupted 466 times. 47 interruptions were planned: automated maintenance such as firmware upgrades, or operator actions such as configuration or dataset updates. The other 419 were unexpected. Because training is synchronous, a failure on a single GPU can force a restart of the whole job.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The communication library's state is monitored and a stalled collective is timed out automatically; on an NCCLX watchdog or heartbeat timeout the PyTorch NCCL flight recorder dumps its tracing data, including collective metadata and stack traces.
- Remediation
- handled almost every interruption through automation, with significant manual intervention only three times in 54 days
- Action items
- Reduce job startup and checkpointing time
- Use the PyTorch NCCL flight recorder to record every communication event and collective duration and to dump traces on NCCLX watchdog or heartbeat timeouts
- Turn on heavier tracing and metadata collection in production through online configuration changes, without a code release or job restart
- Give PyTorch access to NCCLX internal state so stalls are detected and localised faster, with a snapshot of the failing collective's finished and pending transfers
- Lessons
Training on 16K GPUs has more failure modes than Meta's much larger CPU clusters, and because training is synchronous a single GPU failure can force a restart of the whole job. Meta raised effective training time by cutting job startup and checkpoint time and by building tools for fast diagnosis, and kept it above 90% while automated firmware and kernel maintenance caused at least one interruption a day.
IL-0135A power source switch during UPS maintenance cut power to a row of GPU servers and shut down Crusoe Cloud VMs in us-northcentral1Crusoe Cloud2023- Symptoms
At 20:31 UTC on 15 November 2023, some GPU virtual machines in us-northcentral1-a became unavailable. One row of servers in a Crusoe Cloud data center in the us-northcentral1 region had lost power, and every server in the row powered off together with the VMs running on it.
- Trigger
While the row's UPS was in bypass mode for routine maintenance, power switched from the primary source to a backup source for reasons unrelated to the maintenance.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The power failure happened at 20:31 UTC. The first status post, at 21:07 UTC, said certain VMs in us-northcentral1-a were unavailable, and at 21:31 UTC the status page said the affected VMs had been identified.
- Remediation
- identified the VMs on the row that lost power
- restarted the affected VMs after power was restored
- Action items
- Review the standard operating procedures for UPS maintenance to minimise customer impact during future maintenance
- Build future data centers with redundant UPSs
- Improve recovery procedures to reduce mean time to resolution
- Lessons
When the only UPS for a row is in bypass for maintenance, the row is exposed to any power event during that window, even one unrelated to the work. Crusoe Cloud's response is redundant UPSs in future data centers, a review of maintenance procedures, and faster recovery of VMs after power returns.
These 2 cases involve Data center power and cooling and GPU hardware and memory. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause2
Hardware failure1 case
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
Dependency failure1 case
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation