Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 30 September 2026, between about 07:35 and 07:40 UTC, new connections to every domain hosted on Railway, both custom domains and *.up.railway.app domains, got HTTP 404 in all regions. Internal alerting paged the on-call team as soon as route lookups started to fail.

    Trigger

    At 07:29 UTC an engineer merged a change to the routing control plane that contained a database schema update and a new version of the routing service. At about 07:35 the deployment system rolled the new routing service out to every region before the schema update had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal alerting engaged the on-call response team as soon as route lookups began to fail at about 07:35 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Let the CI system finish the schema update, after which the routing service's retried lookups succeeded and routing recovered without a rollback
    Action items
    • Force the migration rollout to run in serial order and unify the deployment pipeline so deploy order and blast radius are checked before merge
    • Block the routing service's blue/green rollout until the database schema matching its version is in place
    • Add shard based rollouts per region to the distributed control plane to isolate impact
  2. Symptoms

    From 9 February 2026, InfluxDB Cloud customers on the AWS us-east-1 cluster prod101-us-east-1 found that some recent data did not show up in query responses. The first support ticket about data availability came in on 9 February, the day a compaction change was deployed, and more tickets followed on 10 February.

    Trigger

    On 9 February 2026 InfluxData deployed to prod101-us-east-1 a compaction change that runs several compaction jobs in parallel on one partition, each on a subset of the data chosen by org id prefix.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Tickets about data availability were raised, the first on 9 February and more on 10 February, when the status page reported that some recent data was not showing up in query responses.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the compaction change
    • Restored recent data first, rebuilt from the Kafka logs
    • Changed the restoration process to make historical data recovery more efficient
    • Restored historical data from the weekly TSM snapshots
    • Kept the cluster online and restored data incrementally so ingest and queries could continue
    Action items
    • Expand test coverage for changes to critical storage components such as the compactor, with scenarios closer to production-scale workloads
    • Strengthen safeguards around compaction so failures are detected and handled safely
    • Review restoration workflows and procedures to reduce elevated TTBR and slow queries during large restores
    • Revisit the backup and restore strategy to speed up cluster-wide restorations
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and CI system. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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