Cases3 cases
1 to 3 of 3
IL-0095An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour2i2c2025- Symptoms
At 5:00 PM BST on 12 August 2025 a 2i2c engineer declared an incident. While deploying a new cluster called temple and running into NFS issues, the engineer had deleted the prod namespace; the deletion hung, and listing the pods showed many users from a different cluster. The engineer's first message suggested that the kubeconfig had somehow been mutated or corrupted and that some other cluster was being torn down.
- Trigger
While working around a bug in the NFS deployment process for a new hub, an engineer ran a delete of the prod namespace with the kubeconfig context pointing at the LEAP cluster.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
The engineer who ran the deletion noticed when it hung and the pod list showed users of another cluster, and declared the incident at 5:00 PM BST, before the uptime check on leap.2i2c.cloud failed at 5:32 PM.
- Remediation
- deleted the single remaining user pod in prod so the namespace deletion completed
- killed the nfs-share-creator job that was blocking the deployment
- redeployed the prod hub with the updated NFS server IP address
- deleted the prod ingress during the deployment so that users could not start servers mid-deployment
- Action items
- Write an incident report
- Write a short incident response document for the case "I deleted prod, what next?"
- Upgrade jupyterhub-home-nfs and remove the nfs-share-creator job
- Add opt-in hardening against nested kubeconfig contexts to the deployer system
- Change the engineer's shell configuration to show distinct kubeconfig contexts more clearly
- Lessons
Provisioning persistent storage outside Kubernetes with Terraform meant a deleted namespace cost an hour of downtime and no data. The engineer had no visible cue for which kubeconfig context was active, which turned a workaround on a new cluster into a deletion on a production one. The engineer knew the fix but did not feel confident redeploying without first confirming with the tech lead, in another time zone, that there was no risk of losing persistent data, and reaching the tech lead took time.
IL-0096A GKE node pool pinned to the europe-west2-b zone could not scale for 6.5 hours because Google ran out of resources in that zone (ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED)2i2c2022- Symptoms
A user of the LIS JupyterHub reported a "backoff after failed scale-up" error, and user servers would not start. An engineer opened incident #36, "LIS hub cannot scale", at 5:40 AM Pacific on 14 November 2022.
- Trigger
At 10 AM UK time on 14 November 2022, the B zone of Google Cloud's europe-west2 region (London) ran out of resources to allocate. The LIS cluster's nodes were restricted to that zone.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
A user reported the "backoff after failed scale-up" error; an engineer opened the incident at 5:40 AM Pacific, about three hours and forty minutes after the zone ran out of resources.
- Remediation
- edited the node pool in the GCP console to allow node creation in the A and C zones of europe-west2, which were not exhausted
- Action items
- Either restrict the node pool back to the B zone after the Black Friday event, or move the cluster and the NFS Filestore to the A zone (infrastructure issue #1944)
- Investigate an enterprise plan that allows a regional NFS, at higher cost (infrastructure issue #1945)
- Make sure PagerDuty notifications always get through to engineers (team-compass issue #574)
- Lessons
A node pool pinned to one zone for storage performance cannot scale when the cloud provider runs out of capacity in that zone. The autoscaler's "backoff after failed scale-up" message usually points to quotas, and raising quotas does nothing here; the ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED error in the logs is what identifies a zone without capacity. The review found that one engineer wearing many hats (incident commander, comms and debugging), with pages not reaching the other responders, made the response harder; a team response would have given more support.
IL-0094Student pods filled the shared nodes of a JupyterHub cluster and starved the hub's core pods, freezing the hub2i2c2020- Symptoms
At 08:52 PM IST a report came in from WER that many students could not access the JupyterHub and that it was frozen; pages were stuck and nothing was usable. A rise in activity was visible by 09:02 PM, but the usual fixes, such as opening an incognito window and restarting servers, did not help.
- Trigger
WER students' pods used a good chunk of their memory limit (tests had shown they almost always use just under 1G of their 2G limit, against a 512M guarantee) on nodes shared with the hub's core pods.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
WER reported stuck pages and students unable to reach the hub in a GitHub issue (2i2c-org/docs#27).
- Remediation
- removed memory overcommit for the WER students
- raised resource guarantees for all core pods, which restarted them and moved some to a new node
- Action items
- Put user pods in a separate pool so they do not create pressure on the core pods (infrastructure#89)
- Set limits on the support infrastructure (Prometheus, Grafana, ingress) as well (infrastructure#90)
- Document and think about overcommit ratios for memory usage (infrastructure#91)
- Set up better Grafana dashboards to monitor resource usage (infrastructure#92)
- Document how people can get kubectl access to the cluster so others can look into issues too (infrastructure#87)
- Lessons
Core pods without resource guarantees get whatever is left on a node, so when user pods on the same nodes fill the CPU and memory, the hub that serves everyone freezes. The memory overcommit ratio has to come from measured use: WER students used just under 1G against a 512M guarantee, which a 4x overcommit could not hold.
These 3 cases involve Node pool and Cluster autoscaler. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause3
Operator error1 case
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
Cloud provider outage1 case
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
Capacity exhaustion1 case
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation