Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases5 cases

1 to 5 of 5

  1. Symptoms

    From 10:03 UTC on 29 September 2026, requests to Azure OpenAI Service, Foundry Agent Service, Foundry Models and Azure AI services in Sweden Central failed intermittently, took longer, or returned HTTP 500 and 503 errors. At 10:17 UTC service monitoring raised an alert on elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region.

    Trigger

    At about 09:38 UTC a planned deployment of an internal service in Sweden Central cleared that service's caches during the region's peak traffic hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Service monitoring detected elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region at 10:17 UTC and alerted the engineering teams; engineers were engaged at 10:28 UTC.

    Remediation
    • reconfigured the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depended on remote connectivity, which stopped the restart loop
    Action items
    • Reconfigure the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depends on connectivity to its database layer
    • Add monitoring and alerting on the load and latency of the caching layer used by the backend service
    • Update troubleshooting and procedural guidance for connection exhaustion scenarios for on-call engineers
    • Add throttling and rate limiting to protect the backend service from sudden traffic increases (estimated October 2026)
    • Increase the resource capacity of the caching layer used by the backend service across regions (estimated October 2026)
    • Improve diagnostic metrics and automated detection to identify such issues more quickly (estimated October 2026)
    • Partition the caching layer used by the backend service to increase its throughput (estimated December 2026)
    Lessons

    A health check that depends on a remote dependency turns a dependency problem into a restart loop: instances that cannot reach the database are killed, the remaining ones take more load and retries, and adding instances or resources does not help until the check itself is changed. Clearing a cache during peak traffic can multiply load on the backend behind it, especially when cache-read defects let lookups bypass the cache. Connection exhaustion was hard to see because the existing network and diagnostic metrics did not show it.

  2. Symptoms

    From about 10:30 UTC on 30 August 2023, customers had trouble accessing or using Azure, Microsoft 365 and Power Platform services in Australia East. The affected Azure services included Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) along with storage, SQL Database, Cosmos DB, virtual machines and Azure Resource Manager.

    Trigger

    At 08:41 UTC a lightning strike on electrical infrastructure about 18 miles away caused a utility voltage sag that shut down the cooling chillers of datacenters in one Australia East availability zone; 13 chillers failed to restart automatically and five could not be restarted, so two data halls overheated and their infrastructure was shut down.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Cosmos DB impact was detected by monitoring at 10:47 UTC, first automated communications went to Azure Service Health at 10:48 UTC, the public Azure Status page was updated at 11:30 UTC, and all subscriptions in Australia East were sent portal communications at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • shut down the remaining networking, compute and storage in the two affected data halls so the chilled water loop could cool down
    • restarted the five chillers manually at 12:12 UTC
    • restored power to all hardware by 15:10 UTC and brought infrastructure back in phases
    • restored AKS operations through the recovery of the SQL Database operation queue, with no other mitigation
    Action items
    • AKS: convert all operation queue SQL Database databases to be zone redundant (estimated September 2023)
    • AKS: replace all cross-region SQL Database queue usage with zone-redundant Service Bus queues (estimated September 2023)
    • Change the control timing logic of the Chiller Management System so chillers do not fail to restart after voltage fluctuations
    • Change the emergency procedure for manual restarts of simultaneous chiller failures from an adjacent sequence to a load-based sequence per data hall
    • Increase technician staffing at the datacenter as a temporary measure for manual chiller restarts
    • Storage: optimise the large-scale recovery process and update troubleshooting guides (estimated December 2023)
    • Azure Service Fabric: improve reliability of SQL Database tenant ring recovery (estimated December 2023)
    • SQL Database: review the trigger criteria of auto-failover groups (estimated October 2023)
    • SQL Database: upgrade internal tooling to enable mass migration of databases (estimated December 2023)
    • Cosmos DB: optimise Service Managed Failover for single-region-write accounts (estimated November 2023)
    • ARM: complete the migration of its storage layer to the zonally redundant architecture (estimated December 2023)
    • Incident management: harden readiness, process and playbook for power-down scenarios (estimated October 2023)
    Lessons

    A control plane spread across availability zones still fails with a zone when one of its dependencies, here the SQL Database operation queue, is not zone redundant. When a second region uses the same database, the failure crosses into that region as well. Workloads already running were not expected to be affected; what stopped was everything that needs the managed service's control plane, such as scaling and cluster changes.

  3. Symptoms

    From 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, Azure VMs running Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic) with unattended-upgrades enabled began failing DNS resolution and losing network connectivity. Several Azure teams, among them the AKS and Azure Container Apps teams, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the update packages were published.

    Trigger

    Unattended-upgrades on Ubuntu 18.04 VMs installed a Canonical security update published at 06:00 UTC on 30 August 2022, including systemd version 237-3ubuntu10.54.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Several Azure teams, including AKS and Azure Container Apps, were alerted by production alerts shortly after the packages were published; incoming support cases then confirmed which Ubuntu versions were affected.

    Remediation
    • pointed customers to Canonical's description of the systemd bug and its fix
    • recommended rebooting affected VMs or running a template script that repairs DNS resolution
    • built automatic detection and remediation for AKS nodes and rolled it out across all regions
    • mitigated the remaining AKS customers manually through support
    Action items
    • Review the process that lets critical security updates bypass Safe Deployment Practices
    • Improve monitoring of the AKS data plane to alert on an uptick of errors
    • Review AKS monitoring algorithms so that similar VM errors are detected and alerted on
    • Establish an improved escalation path to Canonical during outages and add it to internal Technical Service Guides
    • AKS takes full control of the node security patch mechanism, with additional testing and controlled release of patches (estimated December 2022)
    • Work with Canonical to run dedicated tests on proposed packages before they are published for Azure IaaS VMs
    • Establish a process with Canonical to close the testing gap for the upgrade scenario (estimated March 2023)
    • Give AKS customers maintenance window control and environment staging for these patches (estimated December 2023)
    Lessons

    Security patches applied automatically by unattended-upgrades, once a day by default, and outside Azure's Safe Deployment Practices reached Ubuntu 18.04 VMs in every Azure region, so one systemd regression became a DNS outage across Azure. On AKS, lost node DNS showed up as image pull failures such as ImagePullBackoff, because kubelet could not resolve the registry. Azure plans to put node security patching under AKS's control with testing and controlled release; customers can use automatic node image upgrade for AKS, or automatic VM guest patching for VMs, instead of unattended-upgrades.

  4. Symptoms

    In newly created AKS clusters using Azure CNI in Central India, kubectl exec and kubectl logs could time out, and pod-to-pod or pod-to-node traffic could time out. The cluster diagnostics page showed tunnel exec issues. Clusters using kubenet were not affected.

    Trigger

    VMs in Central India started being assigned MAC addresses in a much higher range than before (06 prefix rather than the usual 00).

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Remediation
    • told owners of affected scale-set clusters to run a node image upgrade, or any Kubernetes upgrade such as a patch version, to get the Azure CNI that does not use a bridge
    • told owners of availability-set clusters to scale out and delete the VMs with a high-range MAC address in bridge mode
    • advised recreating affected clusters that were brand new
    Action items
    • Roll out a hotfix that makes transparent mode the default in all regions
    Lessons

    A change in how the platform assigns MAC addresses can wake a long-dormant bug in the network plugin. Knowing which CNI mode the nodes run (bridge or transparent) and keeping node images current decides whether such a bug reaches you.

  5. Symptoms

    From 07:20 UTC on 28 September 2019, customers running Azure Kubernetes Service clusters on Virtual Machine Scale Sets (VMSS) got failures when they tried any cluster upgrade. The error read: "The platform image 'microsoft-aks:aks:aks-ubuntu-1604-201909:2019.08.21' is not available. Verify that all fields in the storage profile are correct." The issue title calls the error PlatformImageNotFound.

    Trigger

    A recent service update affected instances of a backend service, which became unhealthy and stopped requests from completing.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    Customers received failure messages when they tried to upgrade their clusters.

    Remediation
    • published az vmss update commands that set the scale set's image version to 2019.09.25 and SKU to aks-ubuntu-1604-201909, after which the upgrade could be run again
    • mitigated affected clusters by hand (AKS and VMSS teams)
    • rolled out hot fixes to all regions, completed by 15 October 2019
Check your cluster for this

These 5 cases involve Node operating system image and Application database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Faulty deployment2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0136 A deployment that cleared an internal service's caches at peak traffic sent 20 times the normal load to the Azure OpenAI metadata backend in Sweden Central, and health checks that depended on its database restarted instances in a loop for almost six hours
  2. IL-0149 Upgrades of AKS clusters on Virtual Machine Scale Sets failed with a 'platform image is not available' error after a service update left a backend service unhealthy

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0144 A systemd security update installed by unattended-upgrades lost the DNS configuration of Ubuntu 18.04 VMs, so AKS kubelets could not resolve registry names and pods failed with ImagePullBackOff

Software defect1 case

Contributing factor
–
Organisation
  1. IL-0146 New AKS clusters with Azure CNI in Central India lost tunnel connectivity because VMs began getting MAC addresses with a 06 prefix, which exposed a dormant bug in bridge-mode Azure CNI