Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases8 cases

1 to 5 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    From 3:30am to 7:08am PT, chatgpt.com and a small number of OpenAI APIs returned elevated error rates. The status page classed the incident as a full outage.

    Trigger

    A failure of Cosmos DB in ChatGPT, at OpenAI's service provider.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • the service provider recovered the affected Cosmos DB databases at 4:25am PT
    • fixed the web server's health checking logic, which ended the pod crash loop
    Action items
    • Change the web systems to degrade more gracefully when they fail, including concurrency control and better load shedding
    • Make the database layer more resilient to service provider outages (described as already underway)
    Lessons

    The database came back at 4:25am PT, yet users saw errors until 7:08am PT: the web tier's own health checks kept removing pods after the dependency had recovered. The planned changes target the web tier's behaviour under failure, with concurrency control and load shedding, rather than the database alone.

  2. Symptoms

    From 17 October 2024, packets through the vSwitch that joined Namespace's bare metal machines at one provider in the fra3 region were dropped at random. Retries in TCP, QUIC and the Namespace control plane hid most of it, but the SLO error budget for latency targets on key interactions began to burn.

    Trigger

    Random packet drops on the bare metal provider's vSwitch from 17 October 2024; for the second outage, a rate of Kubernetes changes that the slow NVMe on one control plane node could no longer keep up with.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    SLO-based monitoring of latency targets showed the error budget burning while retries hid the individual packet drops.

    Remediation
    • diverted all customer traffic from fra3 to other regions
    • connected each provider machine to the zrh1 cluster over Wireguard instead of the vSwitch
    • repaved every fra3 machine with a new identity, certificates and encryption-at-rest keys, dropping regional caches to recover faster
    • cloned existing datasets in a more distributed way to speed up repaving the machines
    • added machines back to the new region in batches and returned the region to the compute pool
    • redirected workloads away from zrh1 during the second outage
    • cloned the failing control plane node's key state to a higher-capacity node that took over its role and IP address
    Action items
    • Credit all instances that ran during the outages back to customers
    • Build up backup regions and solutions so a similar event has options that do not affect customers
    Lessons

    Running hot with a delayed hardware delivery left no room to take a region out, so fixing a provider network fault turned into a global capacity shortage. After one outage the team was anchored on its cause and first looked for network problems in the second outage, which had a different cause: a control plane node whose disk could not keep up with the Kubernetes change rate.

  3. Symptoms

    From about 10:30 UTC on 30 August 2023, customers had trouble accessing or using Azure, Microsoft 365 and Power Platform services in Australia East. The affected Azure services included Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) along with storage, SQL Database, Cosmos DB, virtual machines and Azure Resource Manager.

    Trigger

    At 08:41 UTC a lightning strike on electrical infrastructure about 18 miles away caused a utility voltage sag that shut down the cooling chillers of datacenters in one Australia East availability zone; 13 chillers failed to restart automatically and five could not be restarted, so two data halls overheated and their infrastructure was shut down.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Cosmos DB impact was detected by monitoring at 10:47 UTC, first automated communications went to Azure Service Health at 10:48 UTC, the public Azure Status page was updated at 11:30 UTC, and all subscriptions in Australia East were sent portal communications at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • shut down the remaining networking, compute and storage in the two affected data halls so the chilled water loop could cool down
    • restarted the five chillers manually at 12:12 UTC
    • restored power to all hardware by 15:10 UTC and brought infrastructure back in phases
    • restored AKS operations through the recovery of the SQL Database operation queue, with no other mitigation
    Action items
    • AKS: convert all operation queue SQL Database databases to be zone redundant (estimated September 2023)
    • AKS: replace all cross-region SQL Database queue usage with zone-redundant Service Bus queues (estimated September 2023)
    • Change the control timing logic of the Chiller Management System so chillers do not fail to restart after voltage fluctuations
    • Change the emergency procedure for manual restarts of simultaneous chiller failures from an adjacent sequence to a load-based sequence per data hall
    • Increase technician staffing at the datacenter as a temporary measure for manual chiller restarts
    • Storage: optimise the large-scale recovery process and update troubleshooting guides (estimated December 2023)
    • Azure Service Fabric: improve reliability of SQL Database tenant ring recovery (estimated December 2023)
    • SQL Database: review the trigger criteria of auto-failover groups (estimated October 2023)
    • SQL Database: upgrade internal tooling to enable mass migration of databases (estimated December 2023)
    • Cosmos DB: optimise Service Managed Failover for single-region-write accounts (estimated November 2023)
    • ARM: complete the migration of its storage layer to the zonally redundant architecture (estimated December 2023)
    • Incident management: harden readiness, process and playbook for power-down scenarios (estimated October 2023)
    Lessons

    A control plane spread across availability zones still fails with a zone when one of its dependencies, here the SQL Database operation queue, is not zone redundant. When a second region uses the same database, the failure crosses into that region as well. Workloads already running were not expected to be affected; what stopped was everything that needs the managed service's control plane, such as scaling and cluster changes.

  4. Symptoms

    A user of the LIS JupyterHub reported a "backoff after failed scale-up" error, and user servers would not start. An engineer opened incident #36, "LIS hub cannot scale", at 5:40 AM Pacific on 14 November 2022.

    Trigger

    At 10 AM UK time on 14 November 2022, the B zone of Google Cloud's europe-west2 region (London) ran out of resources to allocate. The LIS cluster's nodes were restricted to that zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A user reported the "backoff after failed scale-up" error; an engineer opened the incident at 5:40 AM Pacific, about three hours and forty minutes after the zone ran out of resources.

    Remediation
    • edited the node pool in the GCP console to allow node creation in the A and C zones of europe-west2, which were not exhausted
    Action items
    • Either restrict the node pool back to the B zone after the Black Friday event, or move the cluster and the NFS Filestore to the A zone (infrastructure issue #1944)
    • Investigate an enterprise plan that allows a regional NFS, at higher cost (infrastructure issue #1945)
    • Make sure PagerDuty notifications always get through to engineers (team-compass issue #574)
    Lessons

    A node pool pinned to one zone for storage performance cannot scale when the cloud provider runs out of capacity in that zone. The autoscaler's "backoff after failed scale-up" message usually points to quotas, and raising quotas does nothing here; the ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED error in the logs is what identifies a zone without capacity. The review found that one engineer wearing many hats (incident commander, comms and debugging), with pages not reaching the other responders, made the response harder; a team response would have given more support.

  5. Symptoms

    At 08:05 UTC on 2021-06-21 the API service's Apdex (the share of requests that finish within a target time) and Rails request queuing began trending the wrong way. At 09:01 the team found the API deployment unhealthy: it needed more pods for the day's growing traffic, but no new nodes could be added to give it pod capacity. Users saw slow responses; the review found no sign that error rates rose.

    Trigger

    Google Cloud ran out of SSD persistent disk stock in us-east1, the region GitLab.com runs in, while the API service needed more nodes for rising user traffic.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    There was no alert on resource availability. Apdex and Rails queuing began trending the wrong way at 08:05 UTC and an engineer declared the incident in Slack at 08:43; finding the cause took a lot of log digging: cluster autoscaler errors about node pools in backoff, then ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED at the instance-group level, and finally Google Cloud support naming SSD as the exhausted resource.

    Remediation
    • added a node pool that uses pd-standard disks
    • scaled the new node pool by hand across all three zones to relieve the API
    • brought more pd-standard node pools online for the other blocked workloads
    • stopped production deployments and opened a Google Cloud support case about the cluster autoscaler not working with the new node pools
    • changed node pools and nodeSelectors so the remaining workloads ran on pd-standard nodes
    • removed the SSD-backed node pools after a day without problems
    Action items
    • Move Kubernetes services to pd-standard disks (delivery#1837)
    • Capture resource exhaustion errors as a metric
    Lessons

    A cloud region can run out of one specific resource, here SSD persistent disks, and the only error may be a generic ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED that does not name it. GitLab could neither monitor nor reserve resource availability, so detection took 22 hours and the cause came from Google Cloud support. The workloads ran fine on pd-standard disks. A second problem found on the way, a cluster autoscaler that does not fall back to another matching node pool when one cannot scale, slowed the move to the new node pools.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve Application database and Cluster autoscaler. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Cloud provider outage8 cases

  1. IL-0119 ChatGPT web service pods crash-looped on failing health checks after a Cosmos DB failure, leaving too few healthy pods to serve the web layer
    OpenAI2025
  2. IL-0084 Packet drops on a bare metal provider's vSwitch forced Namespace to rebuild its fra3 region and left global capacity short, and the next day slow NVMe writes on a control plane node drove the Kubernetes API server to very high CPU
  3. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast
  4. IL-0096 A GKE node pool pinned to the europe-west2-b zone could not scale for 6.5 hours because Google ran out of resources in that zone (ZONE_RESOURCE_POOL_EXHAUSTED)
    2i2c2022
  5. IL-0205 The GKE cluster autoscaler could not add nodes to GitLab.com's production cluster because Google Cloud ran out of SSD persistent disks in us-east1
    GitLab2021
  6. IL-0172 An AWS Tokyo data centre cooling failure took down 6 of 60 CockroachDB nodes on Kubernetes within 22 minutes, and ranges lost quorum because the Helm-deployed cluster had no availability zone locality configured
  7. IL-0193 A GCP persistent disk degradation took down a Cassandra StatefulSet whose OrderedReady policy blocked recovery, and Metrictank could not reconnect to the recreated pods, causing a 23-hour Graphite query outage
  8. IL-0014 A GKE upgrade to a withdrawn version stalled on slow drains and a stuck node pool, then broke an ingress and confused the HPA