Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
- Symptoms
On 2026-06-11 https://gitlab.com returned widespread, intermittent HTTP 503 errors across all major services in two bursts of about 5 to 10 minutes, 06:16 to 06:22 UTC and 07:03 to 07:12 UTC. A Pingdom alert reported the first burst in triage at 06:16:12, about four minutes after impact began at 06:12, and each burst ended on its own.
- Trigger
A GCP storage incident degraded the IO of a disk in the `us-east1-b` zone that backed GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL node.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
A Pingdom alert on the user-facing 503 errors was reported in triage at 06:16:12 UTC. No alert existed for disk IO saturation, pgBouncer pool saturation or LWLock contention.
- Remediation
- Escalated to Database Operations experts
- Paused deployments
- Opened a GCP support case and engaged the GCP TAM, and GCP confirmed the storage incident
- Prepared a Patroni primary switchover to node 04 in us-east1-d as a contingency, without executing it
- Held a 3-hour pause-and-review window and resolved the incident after no recurrence
- Action items
- Add disk IO saturation and queue-depth alerting for primary Patroni database nodes
- Write a Patroni primary switchover runbook with explicit trigger thresholds
- Clarify incident state-transition guidance for intermittent, self-resolving issues
- Decide whether the primary should fail over automatically during disk IO degradation
- Find a short-term mitigation that limits the blast radius of a single degraded disk until Cells do so
- Make application database load balancing fail fast or reroute when the primary stops responding
- Consider alerting on pgBouncer pool saturation and LWLock contention as leading indicators
- Lessons
A single degraded disk was enough to take down GitLab.com because all primary database traffic goes through one node and requests waited for the Rack timeout instead of failing fast. The leading indicators, disk IO queue depth, pgBouncer pool saturation and LWLock contention, rose before full impact but had no alerts. Without decision criteria for a switchover, responders spent much of an intermittent incident waiting, and it was hard to decide when to move the incident to Fixing or Monitoring.
- Symptoms
On 11 July 2022 users reported in the #ask-cloud-platform Slack channel that their applications on the Ministry of Justice Cloud Platform were slow some of the time. About 25% of ingress traffic was affected: after an AWS incident the day before, one of the three network interfaces of the 'default' ingress controllers performed slowly, and clients timed out when they tried to connect to one of the Elastic IPs of the Network Load Balancer (NLB) in front of them.
- Trigger
Some instances of the AWS NLB health checking subsystem were restarted, which set off a latent software race condition in that subsystem.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- –
- Detection
Users reported slow performance of their applications in the #ask-cloud-platform Slack channel.
- Remediation
- AWS restarted the NLB health checking subsystem, which refreshed its list of targets and recovered the NLB in the affected Availability Zone
- Action items
- Raised mitigation tickets after a post-incident review, filed as post-aws-incident issues in the ministryofjustice/cloud-platform repository
These 2 cases involve Cloud block storage and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Cloud provider outage2 cases
- Contributing factor
- Organisation