Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    From 10:03 UTC on 29 September 2026, requests to Azure OpenAI Service, Foundry Agent Service, Foundry Models and Azure AI services in Sweden Central failed intermittently, took longer, or returned HTTP 500 and 503 errors. At 10:17 UTC service monitoring raised an alert on elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region.

    Trigger

    At about 09:38 UTC a planned deployment of an internal service in Sweden Central cleared that service's caches during the region's peak traffic hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Service monitoring detected elevated failure rates for Azure OpenAI Service requests in the region at 10:17 UTC and alerted the engineering teams; engineers were engaged at 10:28 UTC.

    Remediation
    • reconfigured the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depended on remote connectivity, which stopped the restart loop
    Action items
    • Reconfigure the backend service's automated health check so it no longer depends on connectivity to its database layer
    • Add monitoring and alerting on the load and latency of the caching layer used by the backend service
    • Update troubleshooting and procedural guidance for connection exhaustion scenarios for on-call engineers
    • Add throttling and rate limiting to protect the backend service from sudden traffic increases (estimated October 2026)
    • Increase the resource capacity of the caching layer used by the backend service across regions (estimated October 2026)
    • Improve diagnostic metrics and automated detection to identify such issues more quickly (estimated October 2026)
    • Partition the caching layer used by the backend service to increase its throughput (estimated December 2026)
    Lessons

    A health check that depends on a remote dependency turns a dependency problem into a restart loop: instances that cannot reach the database are killed, the remaining ones take more load and retries, and adding instances or resources does not help until the check itself is changed. Clearing a cache during peak traffic can multiply load on the backend behind it, especially when cache-read defects let lookups bypass the cache. Connection exhaustion was hard to see because the existing network and diagnostic metrics did not show it.

  2. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  3. Symptoms

    Between 2:10 PM and 3:05 PM PDT on July 9, 2025, success rates of the gpt-4.1-mini model in the API dropped for about 20 minutes, and ChatGPT search returned many more errors than usual for about 35 minutes.

    Trigger

    A faulty code change was deployed to a control plane cluster whose main job is managing low-priority workloads.

    Root cause
    Component
    –
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • rolled back the faulty code change
    Action items
    • Add safeguards that prevent production inference workloads from being managed by the low-priority control plane cluster
    • Strengthen testing for deploying high-impact control plane changes
    • Move all existing production inference workloads under the production control plane cluster
    • Build a circuit breaker that stops large-scale unintended changes
Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve In-memory cache and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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