Incident Library
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Cases12 cases

5 to 9 of 12

  1. Symptoms

    Between 5:42 AM and 7:16 AM PT on 8 November 2023 a large share of requests to OpenAI failed with 502 or 503 errors. Every model and API endpoint saw significant failures.

    Trigger

    A morning with dramatically more completions than any previous day pushed the routing layer nodes, which already had a chronic memory problem, past their memory limits.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • limited incoming traffic
    • redeployed the routing service en masse
    • ramped traffic back up slowly
    Action items
    • Pre-allocate the responseBuffer and reuse it instead of allocating a new one in a loop (3X improvement in memory and CPU usage)
    • Adjust the configured memory limits to an appropriate level so the service has significant headroom
    • Add rate limit controls to shed traffic more gracefully
    • Increase the service's capacity
    • Change alerting to catch the underlying memory behaviour before it escalates into service issues
    • Configure autoscaling for the service, which was not possible before because added capacity could hurt an upstream service
  2. Symptoms

    From 10:10 US/Pacific on 2 June 2022, Vertex AI Online Prediction returned errors for 30% up to 100% of requests per region, depending on how each customer used the service.

    Trigger

    A faulty resource cleanup process marked Vertex Prediction Endpoints as deleted, globally.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first public status update was posted at 13:58 US/Pacific and gave the start as 10:20 US/Pacific; the later mini incident report gives 10:10.

    Remediation
    • restored the Vertex Prediction Endpoints that had been marked as deleted
  3. Symptoms

    At 08:00 UTC on 2021-09-06 every service in DFDS's Kubernetes cluster answered with 404. Investigation started five minutes later.

    Trigger

    The automated Kubernetes node rollover on 2021-09-06 restarted all the Traefik v2 pods, five days after a malformed IngressRoute manifest had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    All services returned 404 from 08:00 UTC and root cause investigation started at 08:05. Time to detection was 5 minutes.

    Remediation
    • changed the ALB health check path, which made the targets healthy but did not stop the 404s
    • rolled back by hand to Traefik v1 as the main ingress controller
    • deleted the malformed IngressRoute by hand and confirmed the Traefik v2 bug
    • applied the changes upstream
    Action items
    • Upgrade Traefik to v2.5, where the bug is fixed, and verify that it removes the bug
    • Change the Traefik v2 health check path to something more robust
    • Set up an external liveness probe on the ingress controller
    • Consider workload segmentation to limit the blast zone
    • Look into monitoring the Traefik v2 API for rapid changes
    • Look into smoke testing during and after node rollover
    Lessons

    A malformed IngressRoute did nothing visible for five days and then took down all ingress when every Traefik v2 pod had restarted during a node rollover. Because Traefik v2 failed gracefully, the first signals pointed at the ALB health checks instead of at Traefik. On incident handling, the team concluded that appointing an incident manager could have helped, that the war room meeting should be recorded and a log book kept, that people not involved should only make suggestions in writing, and that a short first round of sharing thoughts and gut feelings is useful.

  4. Symptoms

    Right after an updated RedisFailover resource was rolled out, the large Redis database lost all its data and the service went down; the data had to be restored from a backup taken just before the change.

    Trigger

    A RedisFailover change that raised the number of Redis replicas from one to two and, in the same rollout, lowered the containers' memory requests and limits from 22 GB to 19 GB.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • restored the Redis data from the backup prepared before the rollout
    Action items
    • Report the readiness probe flaw to the Redis Operator project and test the developers' fix
    • Reconsider the use of the Spotahome Redis Operator
    • Clean up the Redis databases and fix the application code that created the excess keys
    • Consider Redis built-in clustering and sharding
    Lessons

    Changing the replica count and the pod resources in one rollout turned a seemingly harmless change into a rolling restart of the only pod with data while the new replica was still empty. A readiness probe that only checks that Redis answers a ping does not tell whether a replica has finished syncing. Operators for critical stateful components need to be evaluated for maturity before production use, and the dump.rdb file should be backed up before any change to the Redis cluster.

  5. Symptoms

    While thredUP's move to Kubernetes seemed to be going well, Datadog showed the number of open files on the nodes climbing steadily, with no obvious reason.

    Trigger

    Containers starting on a node, which in Kubernetes happens constantly with every deploy and every pod that moves between nodes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Datadog showed the number of open files on the nodes rising.

    Remediation
    • killed the affected node, brought up a new one and redeployed
    Action items
    • Move away from the log aggregation vendor
    Lessons

    Libraries and agents that worked with the EC2 deployment lifecycle may not cope with Kubernetes, where containers start, stop and move between nodes constantly. Each one needs to be checked against the new lifecycle instead of being trusted because it worked before.

Check your cluster for this

These 12 cases involve Kubernetes API server and Cluster autoscaler. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Software defect12 cases

  1. IL-0078 Enabling EKS secrets encryption with KMS through Terraform removed worker node IAM permissions and took down all ZenML Pro workspaces
    ZenML2025
  2. IL-0157 After a release, new nodes could not join Linode Kubernetes Engine clusters with IP ACL enabled, so autoscaling failed on about 20 to 25 clusters
    Linode2025
  3. IL-0138 A failed Nvidia driver build left broken kernel packages on the only Kubernetes master node, which hit a kernel panic on reboot after a power outage and took the homelab cluster down for six days
  4. IL-0024 Expensive cache-backed API calls and uncancelled database requests overloaded MongoDB and took the Hugging Face Hub down three times
  5. IL-0123 A response buffer allocated anew in a loop made OpenAI's routing layer nodes hit their memory limits and fail readiness checks on a morning with more completions than any day before, causing 502 and 503 errors across all models
    OpenAI2023
  6. IL-0132 A faulty resource cleanup process marked Vertex AI prediction endpoints as deleted worldwide, undeploying customers' models and failing predictions for 4 hours 20 minutes
  7. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021
  8. IL-0196 Adding a second Redis replica and lowering memory limits in one RedisFailover change restarted the only Redis pod that held data, and Sentinel promoted the empty new replica, erasing the data
    Palark2020
  9. IL-0051 A third-party log shipping client leaked file descriptors with every new container until nodes failed with too many open files
  10. IL-0074 All AirMap platform services down as worker nodes went NotReady and pods crash-looped on network and DNS failures
    AirMap2018
  11. IL-0072 High etcd write latency made the API servers return stale data, and the production cluster flipped between two views of its state
  12. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017