Incident Library
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Cases10 cases

6 to 10 of 10

  1. Symptoms

    After the switch to Traefik v2, functional tests indicated that everything was fine, and this was reported on Slack at 08:44 UTC. The first sign of trouble came at 09:26 UTC, when a developer reported a high count of HTTP 307 redirects, especially on the Okta service. At 09:32 UTC the team learned that the online booking system was down.

    Trigger

    At 08:22 UTC the AWS load balancers were updated to send requests to the new Traefik v2 reverse proxy as part of the migration away from Traefik v1.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A developer reported a high count of HTTP 307 redirects, in particular on the Okta service, at 09:26 UTC, 64 minutes after the change; six minutes later the team was told the online booking system was down. The functional tests run after the switch had not caught it.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the switch to Traefik v2, putting rollback ahead of investigation because of how critical the booking system is
    Action items
    • Consider how critical announcements can be made more visible
    • Consider whether the ALBs used for testing should have been shared with the teams so they could test their own scenarios
    Lessons

    Cloud Engineering cannot test every application scenario on its own, even after testing its own applications for weeks. A header that changes value behind a new ingress controller, here x-forwarded-proto going from https to http, can break an authentication flow while basic functional tests still pass. DFDS asks whether diffing request headers before and after the migration would have shown the problem in advance.

  2. Symptoms

    At 14:41 CET on 4 November 2020 users reported timeouts when deploying to Hellman, the production Kubernetes cluster. The timeouts were confirmed at 15:04.

    Trigger

    During an Alcide workshop that began at 13:00 CET, an Alcide admission controller was applied to the production cluster at 13:13 in the belief that it would not disrupt anything.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported timeouts when deploying to the Hellman cluster at 14:41 CET; the timeouts were verified at 15:04.

    Remediation
    • toggled the Alcide admission controller to verify that it caused the timeouts
    • permanently deleted the Alcide admission controller
    Action items
    • Monitor Kubernetes deployments for timeouts
    • Monitor 5xx status codes from the Kubernetes API server
    Lessons

    New components are applied in sandbox clusters, not in production. The team needs enough Alcide knowledge to maintain the component until it is fully deprecated.

  3. Symptoms

    Jetstack was upgrading the master of a development cluster that many teams use to test their apps during the working day, a regional Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) cluster in europe-west1. The upgrade ran through Jetstack's GKE Terraform pipeline and did not finish before the 20-minute Terraform timeout, while the GKE console still showed the cluster as upgrading.

    Trigger

    A planned master upgrade of the shared development cluster. The same upgrade had been done on another pre-production environment earlier that day, and no API downtime was expected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first sign was the master upgrade missing the 20-minute Terraform timeout; re-running the pipeline returned the kube-apiserver unhealthy error. The cause was identified with the help of Google Support.

    Remediation
    • Deleted the OPA ValidatingAdmissionWebhook resource during a window of API server access
    Action items
    • Limit the OPA webhook to the namespaces where the policy applies and development teams have access
    • Enable the webhook only for Ingress and Service resources, the only resources the policy validates
    • Add a liveness probe so OPA is restarted when it stops responding, and update the OPA documentation
    • Follow the open upstream Kubernetes issue about this behaviour
    Lessons

    With alerting on API server response times, the team might have seen CREATE and UPDATE requests slow down across the board as soon as the OPA-backed webhook was first deployed. Every workload needs probes: OPA looked so simple to deploy that the team skipped the Helm chart, which adds a livenessProbe for the admission controller containers among other adjustments to the tutorial configuration. Others had hit the same problem, and an upstream issue to improve it was still open.

  4. Symptoms

    Datadog alerted the DevOps team to a high normalised load average, first on the staging cluster (Day 0, 21:06 EST) and the next day on the development cluster (Day 1, 16:53 EST). The load was first put down to a legitimate service that kept scaling up and down in both environments, and because of the volume of identical alerts they were muted until things settled.

    Trigger

    An automated crawler found the Weave Scope dashboard on a public load balancer that required no authentication. Weave Scope can open a shell in running containers, and its scope-agent containers ran privileged, as root and with the host's root filesystem mounted, so a command started there could run on the host.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Datadog alerts on high normalised load average, muted at first as noise from a legitimate service; on Day 3 an engineer ran top on a node and found the gcc process at 100% CPU.

    Remediation
    • stopped Weave Scope and removed its deployment from all Kubernetes clusters
    • checked access logs for unauthorised access to the instances
    • confirmed the miner's outbound connections went only to a mining pool
    • isolated one affected node for later investigation
    • rotated out every node in each cluster so all affected hosts were destroyed and rebuilt
    Action items
    • Audit all Kubernetes and deployment YAML files and security groups for services that are unintentionally public or misconfigured
    • Replace load-average alerts with more meaningful monitors and tune them to signal a real anomaly
    • Research tools such as falcon or sysdig for behavioural monitoring and anomaly and intrusion detection
    • Evaluate Istio and Linkerd for observing and controlling end-to-end network traffic
    • Analyse the cost of scanning Docker images and containers for known vulnerabilities
    • Set aside time in architecture discussions to revisit older choices such as running containers as root
    • Share knowledge of large projects, such as Kubernetes version migrations, across the whole team
    Lessons

    Load average was not a useful signal for spotting a problem in the clusters, and muted noisy alerts nearly hid the miner. A load balancer that Kubernetes creates belongs to Kubernetes: a manual security group edit in the AWS console is reverted, so internal exposure must be declared in the Kubernetes YAML. A dashboard that can open shells, in front of privileged agents that mount the host's root filesystem, gives whoever reaches it root on every node.

  5. Symptoms

    The NU.nl development team got reports that several services on one of its Kubernetes clusters behaved erratically: occasional error pages, slow responses and timeouts. The affected services were mostly internal tools and dashboards.

    Trigger

    A new ElastAlert rule, deployed shortly before from the command line, that fired if the Cloudfront-* Elasticsearch indexes stopped receiving documents; those indexes take a few million requests per hour, and the rule made ElastAlert's memory grow without bound.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported error pages, slow responses and timeouts from several services; no alert fired.

    Remediation
    • terminated the NotReady nodes one by one so the auto-scaling group replaced them (the new nodes also went NotReady, but Prometheus and Grafana landed on a stable node)
    • found the ElastAlert pods' memory growth on the Grafana pod memory dashboard
    • fixed the ElastAlert problem that caused the memory growth
    Action items
    • Define alerts on resource usage such as CPU, memory and disk space
    • Keep researching an alerting strategy that combines Elasticsearch, Prometheus Alertmanager and New Relic
    • Consider exporting metrics out of the cluster and running Grafana outside it, on EC2 or a separate Kubernetes cluster
    • Either visualise the important metrics in the ELK stack or make Prometheus and Grafana more available, and improve the metrics strategy
    • Set resource limits for ElastAlert through the Helm values
    • Configure namespaces with default memory requests and limits
    • Isolate customer-facing workloads from build, logging and monitoring workloads (a dedicated node group, or later a separate tools cluster)
    • Deploy everything through automation such as Jenkins pipelines, and consider a GitOps approach
    • Deploy through a pipeline that includes a smoke test step
    • Make Kubernetes and cloud infrastructure work part of the team's sprints, picked up by all team members while pairing with more experienced members, and hold workshops that go deep into specific topics
    Lessons

    Fixing the root cause covers only a small part of what an incident can teach; the chain of smaller failures around it is where most of the learning is. A pod without a memory limit can take whole nodes down, so limits need defaults at the namespace level. Monitoring that runs inside the cluster it watches goes blind with it. Changes installed by hand from the command line leave the rest of the team without a record of what changed.

Check your cluster for this

These 10 cases involve Kubernetes API server and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Configuration change10 cases

  1. IL-0200 Newly provisioned Kubernetes nodes ran an incompatible etcd version and broke cluster consensus in several GitHub production clusters, causing 5XX errors on Git operations and page loads
    GitHub2026
  2. IL-0005 A new telemetry service overloaded the Kubernetes API servers of large clusters and broke DNS-based service discovery for all OpenAI services
    OpenAI2024
  3. IL-0068 Anonymous access to the Kubernetes API server used to plant a ClusterRoleBinding backdoor and a cryptominer DaemonSet
  4. IL-0116 A CNI configuration change incompatible with a hardware variant that exists only in production cut network connectivity in an OpenAI GPU cluster and took text-davinci-003 fully down
    OpenAI2023
  5. IL-0009 A duplicated generated name made Argo CD replace the InfluxDB Cloud production Application and delete the whole production environment
  6. IL-0111 Switching the main Kubernetes ingress controller from Traefik v1 to v2 stopped X-Forwarded headers being passed, which broke the Okta login flow for every service using Okta and stopped DFDS online bookings for over an hour
    DFDS2021
  7. IL-0108 An Alcide admission controller applied to the production cluster during a workshop made create and update requests on Deployments time out
    DFDS2020
  8. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node
  9. IL-0052 A cryptocurrency miner ran on every node of the development and staging clusters through a public, unauthenticated Weave Scope dashboard
  10. IL-0035 Worker nodes went NotReady after a new ElastAlert rule without memory limits used up node memory
    NU.nl2019