Incident Library
Applied filters ComponentKubernetes API serverFactorMonitoring blind spotClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases9 cases

7 to 9 of 9

  1. Symptoms

    After Civis released its new script infrastructure on Kubernetes internally in September 2018, developers reported that kubectl commands were slow, and users intermittently could not start notebooks and services.

    Trigger

    Migrating clients' Python, R and container scripts from the in-house Bocce system to Kubernetes (the project called Croquet) pushed the cluster to about 290 EC2 instances under a large script load.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Developer reports of slow kubectl commands and user reports of notebooks and services failing to start, then high CPU on the master nodes.

    Remediation
    • moved internal users back to the old Bocce infrastructure
    • resized the three master nodes from m4.large to m4.4xlarge
    • changed the Datadog setup so per-node agents no longer polled the API server for service metadata
    • raised max-requests-inflight for non-mutating requests from 400 to 1200
    • grew the etcd EBS volumes from 20 to 100 GB (100 to 300 IOPS)
    • switched client scripts from the ClusterFirst DNS policy to Default
    Action items
    • Upgrade etcd from 2.2.1 to 3.x once Kops supports a safe migration
    • Solve the in-cluster DNS timeouts so client scripts can talk to other workloads in the cluster
    Lessons

    Kubernetes can reach thousands of nodes only after tuning, and third-party DaemonSets are a common cause of control plane load: an agent on every node that polls or watches the API server multiplies with the cluster size. Datadog, kube2iam and the fluentd metadata filter all showed this. A small configuration change often fixes it, but finding it took load testing and the API server access logs.

  2. Symptoms

    The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

    Trigger

    Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

    Remediation
    • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts
    Action items
    • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
    • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages
    Lessons

    Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

  3. Symptoms

    At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service that Monzo's current account needs to process payments, and every request to that service started to fail. Current account customers saw payment failures; the prepaid card was not affected at first because it does not use that service. The change was rolled back at 14:12, but the errors continued.

    Trigger

    At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service needed to process current account payments. Two weeks earlier the etcd cluster had been upgraded and grown from three to nine nodes, and one day earlier another team had scaled a new service down to zero replicas while leaving its Kubernetes service in place.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Payment failures began right after the 14:10 deploy. The team rolled back at 14:12 and declared an outage internally at 14:16. At 15:13, when no service could serve requests, practically all automated alerts fired.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the payments service change (the errors continued)
    • Activated internal backup processes so most customers could still use their card
    • Restarted all linkerd instances (this made the outage worse)
    • Restarted the three Kubernetes API server processes so replacement linkerd instances could start
    • Began deploying a newer linkerd version with the fix for empty services
    • Deleted the Kubernetes service that had no endpoints, which let linkerd load service discovery again
    Action items
    • Fix the bug in Kubernetes that can trigger timeouts after a cluster reconfiguration
    • Roll out a new version of linkerd that fixes the parsing error
    • Create better health checks, dashboards and alerts for the affected components so they give clearer signals about what is wrong and prevent human error
    • Improve procedures to communicate outages internally and externally as clearly and quickly as possible
    Lessons

    A large failure in a distributed system can be very hard to understand, and well-meant human action can compound it, as restarting every linkerd instance did here by exposing a second incompatibility. Because Monzo deploys often and its network changes constantly, the deployment and request-routing systems have to be trustworthy. Monzo committed to publishing a similar post-mortem for any incident of this severity.

Check your cluster for this

These 9 cases involve Kubernetes API server and etcd. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0138 A failed Nvidia driver build left broken kernel packages on the only Kubernetes master node, which hit a kernel panic on reboot after a power outage and took the homelab cluster down for six days
  2. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017

Configuration change4 cases

  1. IL-0005 A new telemetry service overloaded the Kubernetes API servers of large clusters and broke DNS-based service discovery for all OpenAI services
    OpenAI2024
  2. IL-0068 Anonymous access to the Kubernetes API server used to plant a ClusterRoleBinding backdoor and a cryptominer DaemonSet
  3. IL-0108 An Alcide admission controller applied to the production cluster during a workshop made create and update requests on Deployments time out
    DFDS2020
  4. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API

unknown1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe