Incident Library
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Cases11 cases

8 to 11 of 11

  1. Symptoms

    At 14:41 CET on 4 November 2020 users reported timeouts when deploying to Hellman, the production Kubernetes cluster. The timeouts were confirmed at 15:04.

    Trigger

    During an Alcide workshop that began at 13:00 CET, an Alcide admission controller was applied to the production cluster at 13:13 in the belief that it would not disrupt anything.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported timeouts when deploying to the Hellman cluster at 14:41 CET; the timeouts were verified at 15:04.

    Remediation
    • toggled the Alcide admission controller to verify that it caused the timeouts
    • permanently deleted the Alcide admission controller
    Action items
    • Monitor Kubernetes deployments for timeouts
    • Monitor 5xx status codes from the Kubernetes API server
    Lessons

    New components are applied in sandbox clusters, not in production. The team needs enough Alcide knowledge to maintain the component until it is fully deprecated.

  2. Symptoms

    At 12:39 on 7 September 2020 the Cloud Platform team found that the Ingress API of the live-1 cluster was refusing every POST request. A user who provisioned a new service could not create an ingress into the cluster. The incident was declared at 12:54.

    Trigger

    Version 0.1.0 of the team's ingress controller module started creating a ValidatingWebhookConfiguration resource, and one new 0.1.0 ingress controller in the live-1 cluster failed to be created because of AWS resource limits.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The Ingress API was found refusing 100% of POST requests at 12:39; the incident was declared at 12:54.

    Remediation
    • removed by hand all the additional admission controllers created by module version 0.1.0
    • removed the admission webhook from the ingress controller module and released version 0.1.1
    • upgraded every ingress module on version 0.1.0 to 0.1.1
    Lessons

    Turning on the validating webhook in the shared ingress controller module made the webhook a single point of failure for every ingress controller pod in the ingress-controllers namespace: when one controller could not come up, no team could create an ingress.

  3. Symptoms

    Jetstack was upgrading the master of a development cluster that many teams use to test their apps during the working day, a regional Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) cluster in europe-west1. The upgrade ran through Jetstack's GKE Terraform pipeline and did not finish before the 20-minute Terraform timeout, while the GKE console still showed the cluster as upgrading.

    Trigger

    A planned master upgrade of the shared development cluster. The same upgrade had been done on another pre-production environment earlier that day, and no API downtime was expected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first sign was the master upgrade missing the 20-minute Terraform timeout; re-running the pipeline returned the kube-apiserver unhealthy error. The cause was identified with the help of Google Support.

    Remediation
    • Deleted the OPA ValidatingAdmissionWebhook resource during a window of API server access
    Action items
    • Limit the OPA webhook to the namespaces where the policy applies and development teams have access
    • Enable the webhook only for Ingress and Service resources, the only resources the policy validates
    • Add a liveness probe so OPA is restarted when it stops responding, and update the OPA documentation
    • Follow the open upstream Kubernetes issue about this behaviour
    Lessons

    With alerting on API server response times, the team might have seen CREATE and UPDATE requests slow down across the board as soon as the OPA-backed webhook was first deployed. Every workload needs probes: OPA looked so simple to deploy that the team skipped the Helm chart, which adds a livenessProbe for the admission controller containers among other adjustments to the tutorial configuration. Others had hit the same problem, and an upstream issue to improve it was still open.

  4. Symptoms

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting, with some sign that image pulls were involved. Many pods across the cluster were in error states related to image pulls, while applications that were already running were not affected.

    Trigger

    A change to the permissions on a storage bucket that one application needed to read. The application could no longer start, and its DaemonSet, running on roughly a thousand nodes of the cluster, went into a crash loop with imagePullPolicy: Always, so every restart pulled the image again although it was already on the node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting; monitoring had not caught it first.

    Remediation
    • replaced the affected NAT instances so registry traffic came from new source IPs
    • reconfigured the static IPs and firewall rules so applications could reach the Cloud SQL database again
    Action items
    • Add an admission webhook that rejects floating image tags, starting with latest
    • Apply the image tag webhook to workload objects only, not to pods, after it blocked pods created by in-cluster controllers
    Lessons

    The speakers' takeaway is to be very careful with DaemonSets in large clusters: they say they had broken everything DaemonSets depend on, including DNS, Vault and the image repository, and that it is very easy to break things when managing them by the thousand. imagePullPolicy: Always made every crash-loop restart pull the image again. Sending all registry traffic through three NAT instances put the whole region behind three source IPs, which the registry rate-limited, and changing those IPs cut the connections to a critical database reached over the internet through them. An admission webhook on pods rejects the pods that controllers in the cluster create, where no user sees the error.

Check your cluster for this

These 11 cases involve Admission webhook and Ingress controller. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause7

Software defect2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0053 Unauthenticated ingress-nginx admission webhook let anyone on the pod network run code and read every Secret in the cluster (IngressNightmare, CVE-2025-1974)
    Wiz2025
  2. IL-0032 Mutating admission controller generated broken JSON patches, silently blocking deploys for a week until a production service ran down to two pods
    Airbnb2020

Dependency failure1 case

  1. IL-0103 During an EKS node AMI update, Istio sidecars crash-looped because hundreds of pods restarting at once overloaded the external certificate authority behind istiod

Breaking change in an upgrade3 cases

  1. IL-0180 A GKE control plane auto-upgrade from 1.22 to 1.23 removed the v1beta1 Ingress and ValidatingWebhookConfiguration APIs that Istio 1.7.4 still used, and Istio stopped working in production
  2. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes
    Reddit2023
  3. IL-0090 After an upgrade of the ModSec ingress controller module, its validating webhook served a certificate for the wrong service name and blocked every Ingress create and change

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0107 Kyverno stuck in a crash loop behind a webhook with failurePolicy fail blocked every change to Kubernetes Service objects for 88 minutes
    DFDS2022

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0108 An Alcide admission controller applied to the production cluster during a workshop made create and update requests on Deployments time out
    DFDS2020
  2. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node

Faulty deployment1 case

Contributing factor
  1. IL-0088 A validating admission webhook added by a new ingress controller module version made the live-1 cluster reject every new Ingress with an x509 error

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances