Incident Library
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  • Root cause
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  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases12 cases

2 to 6 of 12

  1. Symptoms

    From 21:08 on 28 May 2025, about 60 indices of Wikimedia's OpenSearch clusters for CirrusSearch were in red, unwritable state. At 21:27 CirrusStreamingUpdaterFlinkJobUnstable alerts began to fire because the search update pipeline could not write to those indices.

    Trigger

    A Puppet patch that removed cluster access for the hosts elastic/cirrussearch10[53-67] while some of them still held primary shards.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    CirrusStreamingUpdaterFlinkJobUnstable alerts fired from 21:27; the review records the detection as human, by the engineer who started troubleshooting the next morning, and many other alerts were suppressed for maintenance.

    Remediation
    • Deleted the red indices, which brought the cluster back to green
    • Restored the broken indices
    Action items
    • Re-enable the snapshot repositories in production CirrusSearch
    • Create an operations-focused OpenSearch dashboard
    • Verify or fix the Logstash pipeline for Search Platform-owned OpenSearch clusters
    Lessons

    Banning nodes before removing them is a best-effort action and did not work as expected. A large operation such as decommissioning many servers at once had no maintenance plan or runbook, and the snapshots, dashboards and logging that recovery needed were not available or not documented well enough.

  2. Symptoms

    At 02:58 UTC on 31 March 2025, the sessionstore service in both Wikimedia data centres began returning 500 errors and edits failed. MediaWikiEditFailures (session loss) fired as critical at 03:03, and SessionStoreErrorRateHigh paged at 03:04.

    Trigger

    A rise in session writes, made up of session overwrites at a high rate, filled the storage of the sessionstore Cassandra nodes. The review says the rollout of SUL3 correlates strongly with it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    MediaWikiEditFailures (session loss) fired as critical at 03:03 UTC, and SessionStoreErrorRateHigh, a high 5xx rate alert, paged the batphone at 03:04. Users also reported the problem in task T390512.

    Remediation
    • Wiped the sessionstore storage, removing all sessions, and restarted Cassandra
    Action items
    • Page when the disk utilisation trend becomes unreasonable
    • Increase sessionstore storage capacity
    • Add namespacing to sessionstore
    • Add observability of the sessionstore workload
    • Identify the cause of the high rate of storage growth in sessionstore Cassandra
    • Consider an alert, without paging, on the Cassandra error rate
    • Consider paging or alerting when Cassandra nodes enter a down state
    Lessons

    The storage growth before the node failures made their timing predictable, so an alert on high storage utilisation well in advance would have given a chance to act before users were affected, and an alert on Cassandra node failures would have told responders more than an HTTP error rate alert. A cluster seen as heavily over-provisioned can still grow quickly and unsustainably under an unusual workload.

  3. Symptoms

    On 2025-03-12 from 10:58 UTC, alerts for high backend response times came in, and the MediaWiki deployments mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner, which serve MediaWiki for non-user-facing purposes, showed high latency and database errors. The External Storage cluster, whose hosts store the compressed text of wiki page revisions, had a sharp rise in load and connections. The same happened again on 2025-03-13 from 11:15 UTC.

    Trigger

    At 10:44 UTC on 12 March a Scap deployment of the PHP 8.1 rollout for mw-api-int, mw-parsoid and mw-jobrunner was run with the flag -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False; the rollout was deployed with Scap again at 11:15 UTC on 13 March.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts for high backend response times started at 10:58 UTC on 12 March, 14 minutes after the Scap deployment; 2 on-call engineers were paged. The MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate alert that pointed at the cause fired only briefly because its log pipeline was overloaded.

    Remediation
    • Deployed a patch to cirrus-streaming-updater that reduced SUP parallelism
    • Reduced the concurrency of the categoryMembershipChange job in changeprop-jobqueue
    • On 12 March, reverted 1126607 and 1126650 and re-ran Scap
    • On 13 March, rolling-restarted changeprop-jobqueue
    • Rolling-restarted mw-api-int
    • Disabled the categorymembership job in changeprop-jobqueue
    • Reverted 1127476 and 1127478
    • Redeployed mw-api-int to pick up the revert
    • Increased the number of mw-api-int replicas
    • Redeployed mw-jobrunner to pick up the revert
    • Redeployed mw-parsoid to pick up the revert
    Action items
    • Reduce the number of messages sent through channel:Memcached during failures
    • Add helm rollback functionality to Scap
    • Decide whether Scap should update helmfile-defaults when -Dbuild_mw_container_image:False is set
    • Consider removing envvars.inc from MediaWiki images
    • Consider "Why" dashboards that give an overview of a group of related components together with relevant links to follow
    • Coordinate incident responders better
    • Be able to work with MediaWiki developers during incidents
    Lessons

    The write-up puts the weight not on the technical root cause but on why the team could not see, even after the 12 March incident, that three MediaWiki deployments were running without Memcached. Alert dashboards showed what was happening, such as many busy PHP workers, but not why; dashboards linking components that affect each other, such as SQLBlobStore keys and External Storage, would have helped. The alert that pointed in the right direction did not stay firing and would probably have been lost among 78 others. The incident coordinator could not tell who was working on what or who had joined or left, the channels were noisy, the external impact was judged more critical than it was, and trace.wikimedia.org was not used although it might have helped.

  4. Symptoms

    At 05:01 UTC on 9 October 2024 a page fired for GatewayBackendErrorsHigh, elevated 5xx errors from page-analytics_cluster in codfw, followed by a growing number of KubernetesCalicoDown alerts for WikiKube nodes not running the calico-node pod and by MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate. For about an hour uncached MediaWiki requests, such as those of logged-in users, edits and API calls, saw high latency or errors.

    Trigger

    An operator used the new mwscript-k8s utility to run a batch of video transcode maintenance, the TimedMediaHandler requeueTranscodes.php script. mwscript-k8s deploys a whole helm release for every script invocation, so the batch created close to 2k Calico NetworkPolicies along with many other resources over several hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the issue and paged the on-call SRE: GatewayBackendErrorsHigh at 05:01:36 UTC, 16 KubernetesCalicoDown alerts at 05:03:32 UTC and MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate at 05:04:15 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Raised the resource limits of the Calico and Typha pods and applied the change with helmfile, which redeployed all Calico pods
    Action items
    • Stop mwscript-k8s from creating so many resources
    Lessons

    The incident came close to a full outage. Automated monitoring caught it and many responders found the cause, but end users were affected and responders were unsure whether they could switch over to eqiad. The problem was noticed just before the hand-off from Americas to EMEA SRE shifts, a period with a long-known lack of coverage, and it helped that the transcodes were not queued on a Friday evening in the US.

  5. Symptoms

    On 18 September 2024, while a cookbook was reconfiguring Wikimedia's core MariaDB databases from one-way eqiad -> codfw replication to circular replication ahead of a datacenter switchover, replication in the codfw -> eqiad direction broke on the x1 and es6 sections. Engineers watching the run noticed at 21:28 UTC that the x1 primary was not replicating.

    Trigger

    Running the cookbook sre.switchdc.databases.prepare, which set up codfw -> eqiad replication and started pt-heartbeat, on the row-based x1 and es sections.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers watching the first run of the automation saw on orchestrator that the x1 primary was not replicating, because monitoring of circular replication was not yet enabled. The break in the eqiad -> codfw direction was reported by Icinga.

    Remediation
    • Skipped replication of the heartbeat tables with Replication_wild_ignore_table='heartbeat.%'
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the es hosts
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the x1 codfw hosts and removed the ignore rule
    Action items
    • Avoid the same issue again, probably by inserting the missing row when it is detected
    • Add a post-maintenance health check that replication works in both directions
    • Add options to run the maintenance in another order or on each section individually
    • Update the Phabricator task for each section rather than only at the end
    • Fix the monitoring gaps for circular replication
    • Made pt-heartbeat-wikimedia use STATEMENT format for its session on the x1 and row-based read-write es hosts, fixed in a later deploy
    Lessons

    Circular replication is not a normal working mode, so the first fix only moved the break to the other side; TRUNCATE would have worked better than DELETE because it always replicates as a statement, but it was not considered because it is more dangerous. Running sql_skip_slave_counter was avoided, since it could have made things worse or lost data. The check of the replication channel should also run once all tasks are complete, not only right after setup. The combination of row-based replication, pt-heartbeat and differing heartbeat rows was not described in earlier maintenance or documentation.

Check your cluster for this

These 12 cases involve Database and Helm. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause7

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Contributing factor
  1. IL-0236 After an Istio 1.15 to 1.24 upgrade, half of Wikimedia's ML model servers returned 5XX for about a day

Configuration change5 cases

  1. IL-0299 About 60 indices of Wikimedia's CirrusSearch OpenSearch clusters went red and unwritable during a host decommission
  2. IL-0392 MariaDB replication of section x1 between eqiad and codfw broke on a missing heartbeat row during a cookbook run
  3. IL-0459 MediaWiki on Kubernetes terminated TLS with a wrong certificate after a deployment, and 1% of requests failed
  4. IL-0266 Eqiad routers looped traffic between each other after a BGP MED change and could not reach other sites' public IPs
  5. IL-0458 Toolforge Kubernetes API server failed to start after a restart, logging "etcd cluster is unavailable or misconfigured"

Capacity exhaustion2 cases

  1. IL-0298 Wikimedia edits failed for 38 minutes when sessionstore Cassandra nodes in both data centres crashed on full disks
  2. IL-0232 Calico pods in the codfw WikiKube cluster hit their resource limits and crash-looped, taking nodes out one by one

Faulty deployment1 case

  1. IL-0324 Three MediaWiki deployments lost Memcached after a PHP 8.1 rollout and overloaded the External Storage database cluster

Software defect1 case

  1. IL-0216 Wikimedia on-wiki search was slow or rejected after a datacenter switchover overloaded one Elasticsearch node in codfw

Dependency failure1 case

  1. IL-0267 Wikimedia's eqsin cache site went unreachable when both of its transport links to the core data centers were down

Hardware failure1 case

  1. IL-0323 A RAID battery backup unit failure crashed db1075, the MariaDB primary of section s3, and every s3 wiki went read-only