Incident Library
Applied filters SymptomService outageFactorExcessive blast radiusClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases14 cases

12 to 14 of 14

  1. Symptoms

    Jetstack was upgrading the master of a development cluster that many teams use to test their apps during the working day, a regional Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) cluster in europe-west1. The upgrade ran through Jetstack's GKE Terraform pipeline and did not finish before the 20-minute Terraform timeout, while the GKE console still showed the cluster as upgrading.

    Trigger

    A planned master upgrade of the shared development cluster. The same upgrade had been done on another pre-production environment earlier that day, and no API downtime was expected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first sign was the master upgrade missing the 20-minute Terraform timeout; re-running the pipeline returned the kube-apiserver unhealthy error. The cause was identified with the help of Google Support.

    Remediation
    • Deleted the OPA ValidatingAdmissionWebhook resource during a window of API server access
    Action items
    • Limit the OPA webhook to the namespaces where the policy applies and development teams have access
    • Enable the webhook only for Ingress and Service resources, the only resources the policy validates
    • Add a liveness probe so OPA is restarted when it stops responding, and update the OPA documentation
    • Follow the open upstream Kubernetes issue about this behaviour
    Lessons

    With alerting on API server response times, the team might have seen CREATE and UPDATE requests slow down across the board as soon as the OPA-backed webhook was first deployed. Every workload needs probes: OPA looked so simple to deploy that the team skipped the Helm chart, which adds a livenessProbe for the admission controller containers among other adjustments to the tutorial configuration. Others had hit the same problem, and an upstream issue to improve it was still open.

  2. Symptoms

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting, with some sign that image pulls were involved. Many pods across the cluster were in error states related to image pulls, while applications that were already running were not affected.

    Trigger

    A change to the permissions on a storage bucket that one application needed to read. The application could no longer start, and its DaemonSet, running on roughly a thousand nodes of the cluster, went into a crash loop with imagePullPolicy: Always, so every restart pulled the image again although it was already on the node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting; monitoring had not caught it first.

    Remediation
    • replaced the affected NAT instances so registry traffic came from new source IPs
    • reconfigured the static IPs and firewall rules so applications could reach the Cloud SQL database again
    Action items
    • Add an admission webhook that rejects floating image tags, starting with latest
    • Apply the image tag webhook to workload objects only, not to pods, after it blocked pods created by in-cluster controllers
    Lessons

    The speakers' takeaway is to be very careful with DaemonSets in large clusters: they say they had broken everything DaemonSets depend on, including DNS, Vault and the image repository, and that it is very easy to break things when managing them by the thousand. imagePullPolicy: Always made every crash-loop restart pull the image again. Sending all registry traffic through three NAT instances put the whole region behind three source IPs, which the registry rate-limited, and changing those IPs cut the connections to a critical database reached over the internet through them. An admission webhook on pods rejects the pods that controllers in the cluster create, where no user sees the error.

  3. Symptoms

    Shortly after a search reindex job was started, problems with the Kubernetes cluster hit Universe's reporting and search APIs and the Kubernetes cluster UI itself. The status page opened an investigation into reports of search and reporting being unavailable at 14:37 EDT on 2017-07-21.

    Trigger

    A change to the search index definition, which removed some fields from full-text indexing, was shipped, and a reindex job was started as a Kubernetes Job to apply it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team saw problems with the Kubernetes cluster shortly after starting the job, and the status page cites reports of search and reporting being unavailable.

    Remediation
    • removed the reindex Job from the scheduler
    • let the nodes auto-heal back to healthy
    Lessons

    restartPolicy: Never on the pod template does not stop a Kubernetes Job from retrying: a Job replaces failed pods and may run more than once, so a job that can exhaust a node will keep moving to new nodes.

Check your cluster for this

These 14 cases involve Application database and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Dependency failure1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0187 A brief Spring Cloud Config Server downtime failed every client application's liveness probe, because the actuator health check included the config server, and Kubernetes restarted the pods in a kill loop

Configuration change4 cases

  1. IL-0192 A Crossplane composition merge-policy change for a TLS policy update switched Kubernetes Services from LoadBalancer to ClusterIP and deleted the load balancers behind about 25% of Grafana Cloud services
  2. IL-0091 Changing the worker node instance type through Terraform recycled all nodes at once and deleted users' production pods together
  3. IL-0010 A templating change that dropped its {{ }} delimiters made Argo CD delete all 478 Skyscanner services in every region
  4. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node

Cloud provider outage2 cases

  1. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast
  2. IL-0172 An AWS Tokyo data centre cooling failure took down 6 of 60 CockroachDB nodes on Kubernetes within 22 minutes, and ranges lost quorum because the Helm-deployed cluster had no availability zone locality configured

Software defect2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0132 A faulty resource cleanup process marked Vertex AI prediction endpoints as deleted worldwide, undeploying customers' models and failing predictions for 4 hours 20 minutes
  2. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021

Faulty deployment2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0086 A deployment meant for a CircleCI test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from the production cluster, taking down the CircleCI UI and runner.circleci.com
  2. IL-0034 A crashing stats agent sidecar marked every pod unready and the service mesh pulled all services out of traffic
    Airbnb2019

Capacity exhaustion3 cases

  1. IL-0094 Student pods filled the shared nodes of a JupyterHub cluster and starved the hub's core pods, freezing the hub
    2i2c2020
  2. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances
  3. IL-0036 A reindex Job that kept failing exhausted one node after another until the whole cluster was down