Cases16 cases

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1. IL-0052 A cryptocurrency miner ran on every node of the development and staging clusters through a public, unauthenticated Weave Scope dashboard

   JW Player2019

   Symptoms

   Datadog alerted the DevOps team to a high normalised load average, first on the staging cluster (Day 0, 21:06 EST) and the next day on the development cluster (Day 1, 16:53 EST). The load was first put down to a legitimate service that kept scaling up and down in both environments, and because of the volume of identical alerts they were muted until things settled.

   Sustained high node CPUUnauthorised access or a foreign workload

   Trigger

   An automated crawler found the Weave Scope dashboard on a public load balancer that required no authentication. Weave Scope can open a shell in running containers, and its scope-agent containers ran privileged, as root and with the host's root filesystem mounted, so a command started there could run on the host.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Cluster dashboardCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Ignored early signalUnreviewed defaultsExcessive blast radiusMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   Datadog alerts on high normalised load average, muted at first as noise from a legitimate service; on Day 3 an engineer ran top on a node and found the gcc process at 100% CPU.

   Remediation

   • stopped Weave Scope and removed its deployment from all Kubernetes clusters
   • checked access logs for unauthorised access to the instances
   • confirmed the miner's outbound connections went only to a mining pool
   • isolated one affected node for later investigation
   • rotated out every node in each cluster so all affected hosts were destroyed and rebuilt

   Action items

   • Audit all Kubernetes and deployment YAML files and security groups for services that are unintentionally public or misconfigured
   • Replace load-average alerts with more meaningful monitors and tune them to signal a real anomaly
   • Research tools such as falcon or sysdig for behavioural monitoring and anomaly and intrusion detection
   • Evaluate Istio and Linkerd for observing and controlling end-to-end network traffic
   • Analyse the cost of scanning Docker images and containers for known vulnerabilities
   • Set aside time in architecture discussions to revisit older choices such as running containers as root
   • Share knowledge of large projects, such as Kubernetes version migrations, across the whole team

   Lessons

   Load average was not a useful signal for spotting a problem in the clusters, and muted noisy alerts nearly hid the miner. A load balancer that Kubernetes creates belongs to Kubernetes: a manual security group edit in the AWS console is reverted, so internal exposure must be declared in the Kubernetes YAML. A dashboard that can open shells, in front of privileged agents that mount the host's root filesystem, gives whoever reaches it root on every node.

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2. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe

   NRE Labs2018

   Symptoms

   The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

   Control plane unresponsiveProbe failuresService outage

   Trigger

   Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

   Root cause

   unknown

   Component

   etcdkubeletKubernetes API server

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureUnreviewed defaultsHarmful manual actionIgnored early signalMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

   Remediation

   • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts

   Action items

   • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
   • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages

   Lessons

   Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

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3. IL-0040 Parallel Helm installs saturated small gp2 root volumes on a kops cluster and left all three workers NotReady with the kubelet or Docker down

   Saltside2017

   Symptoms

   While running the CI process on a local machine to test an application Helm chart, the SRE lead watched the pods with watch kubectl get pods. All pods reached Running, and then some went back to Pending. Two hours later the problem had grown and some pods showed the phase Unknown.

   Pods PendingImage pull failuresNode NotReadyService outage

   Trigger

   A CI run installed the application's Helm charts for all four markets (Efritin.com, Tonaton.com, Ikman.lk and Bikroy.com) on the nonproduction cluster at the same time.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node root diskkubeletContainer runtimeHelm

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsMonitoring blind spotIgnored early signalSingle point of failure

   Detection

   The SRE lead saw pods go from Running back to Pending while watching kubectl get pods during the CI run; no monitoring raised an alert, even when all three workers were not ready.

   Remediation

   • terminated the three worker nodes and let the auto scaling group replace them

   Action items

   • Fix the Datadog integration for the nonproduction AWS account and repeat the installs with telemetry
   • Increase the worker root EBS volumes from 20GB to 120GB
   • Keep common base images pulled on every node with a DaemonSet until kops supports user hooks
   • Configure different allocation limits for the different layers in Kubernetes
   • Discuss a highly available Tiller with the Helm team
   • Find a way to throttle the number of newly created pods

   Lessons

   An ordinary deploy of the application could collapse the cluster, because the default 20GB gp2 root volumes could not keep up with parallel image pulls and container starts. Without node metrics and pod phase metrics, three NotReady workers raised no alert. A single Tiller replica can block the deploy that would fix an outage.

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