Cases6 cases

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1. IL-0060 Kubernetes 1.24 upgrade removed the master node label that Calico route reflectors selected on, dropping all pod routes and taking Reddit down for 314 minutes

   Reddit2023

   Symptoms

   About two minutes after an engineer started the Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24 upgrade of the cluster running Reddit's legacy stack, just after 19:00 UTC, the site stopped. The CDN edge request graph, which is kept separate from the cluster, showed traffic by status collapsing. Users saw the error page, a homepage with no posts, or plain errors.

   Service outageHigh error rateDNS resolution failuresMonitoring outagePods stuck in ContainerCreatingControl plane lag

   Trigger

   An in-place upgrade of the legacy cluster from Kubernetes 1.23 to 1.24; in 1.24 the node-role.kubernetes.io/master label is removed even from running clusters.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   CalicoKubernetes API serverAdmission webhooketcd

   Contributing factor

   Configuration not in codeUnrepresentative stagingUntested backupMonitoring blind spotSingle point of failure

   Detection

   The site broke about two minutes into the upgrade; an incident was opened immediately and responders were on the call within three minutes, working from CDN edge graphs because the cluster's own metrics were gone.

   Remediation

   • deleted the Open Policy Agent webhook configurations to stop API server timeouts
   • terminated all worker nodes of the cluster
   • restored the control plane from the pre-upgrade backup onto the first control plane node
   • switched off the cluster autoscaler until the control plane was stable
   • generated new TLS certificates so replacement control plane nodes could join etcd
   • brought traffic back in steps from 1% to 100%
   • restarted legacy services that had been stopped by hand

   Action items

   • Codify cluster configuration so every choice has a record, and document in detail what cannot be codified
   • Standardise components across clusters and replace bespoke configurations
   • Build tooling to manage the lifecycle of whole clusters so they can be recreated or replicated
   • Add pre-production clusters that can be tested with confidence
   • Improve the backup restore process and make cluster upgrades safe

   Lessons

   Configuration that exists only in a live cluster, edited by hand through a special tool, can be forgotten, as the route reflector setup was, and then break on an upgrade nobody connects it to. A Kubernetes upgrade cannot be reverted without a restore, so the restore procedure has to be kept current and practised. Consistent, codified clusters are what make upgrades testable; bespoke clusters keep producing outages.

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2. IL-0190 Cortex distributors kept a stuck connection to a dead etcd leader after a Kubernetes upgrade terminated its node, failing writes to Hosted Prometheus for 12 minutes

   Grafana Labs2020

   Symptoms

   About a minute after the etcd leader changed, two replicas of the Cortex distributor started logging "context deadline exceeded" when they tried to read keys from etcd. Writes from some customers that landed on those two replicas failed, while the other distributor replicas kept working, so the service saw an error rate of about 20% on writes to the London region of Hosted Prometheus.

   High error rateIntermittent timeouts

   Trigger

   A scheduled Kubernetes version upgrade abruptly terminated the node that ran the etcd leader at 11:19:00 UTC.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   etcdNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsNo safeguard on destructive change

   Detection

   An SLO-based alert paged the on-call engineer at 11:31, 11 minutes after the errors started. At a 20% error rate the monthly SLA would have taken about 18 hours to breach.

   Remediation

   • Restarted the two affected Cortex distributor replicas at 11:32, which stopped the errors

   Action items

   • Enable gRPC keepalive probes in the Cortex etcd client (DialKeepAliveTime 10s, DialKeepAliveTimeout, PermitWithoutStream)
   • Make the Kubernetes upgrade process terminate pods and machines gracefully, including the etcd pods managed by the etcd operator

   Lessons

   When a node dies abruptly, clients holding TCP connections to it are not told; without keepalive probes an etcd client can keep sending requests into a dead connection long after a new leader exists. A failover that works on the server side still needs clients that detect the dead peer. Node replacement during cluster upgrades should drain pods gracefully, including pods owned by operators that the upgrade scripts do not know about, and should give instances enough time to shut down.

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3. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API

   Civis Analytics2019

   Symptoms

   After Civis released its new script infrastructure on Kubernetes internally in September 2018, developers reported that kubectl commands were slow, and users intermittently could not start notebooks and services.

   Control plane lagControl plane unresponsiveHigh latencyHigh error rateDNS resolution failures

   Trigger

   Migrating clients' Python, R and container scripts from the in-house Bocce system to Kubernetes (the project called Croquet) pushed the cluster to about 290 EC2 instances under a large script load.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Kubernetes API serverTelemetry agentetcd

   Contributing factor

   Unknown limitUnverified assumptionMonitoring blind spotNo capacity planning

   Detection

   Developer reports of slow kubectl commands and user reports of notebooks and services failing to start, then high CPU on the master nodes.

   Remediation

   • moved internal users back to the old Bocce infrastructure
   • resized the three master nodes from m4.large to m4.4xlarge
   • changed the Datadog setup so per-node agents no longer polled the API server for service metadata
   • raised max-requests-inflight for non-mutating requests from 400 to 1200
   • grew the etcd EBS volumes from 20 to 100 GB (100 to 300 IOPS)
   • switched client scripts from the ClusterFirst DNS policy to Default

   Action items

   • Upgrade etcd from 2.2.1 to 3.x once Kops supports a safe migration
   • Solve the in-cluster DNS timeouts so client scripts can talk to other workloads in the cluster

   Lessons

   Kubernetes can reach thousands of nodes only after tuning, and third-party DaemonSets are a common cause of control plane load: an agent on every node that polls or watches the API server multiplies with the cluster size. Datadog, kube2iam and the fluentd metadata filter all showed this. A small configuration change often fixes it, but finding it took load testing and the API server access logs.

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4. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage

   Monzo2017

   Symptoms

   At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service that Monzo's current account needs to process payments, and every request to that service started to fail. Current account customers saw payment failures; the prepaid card was not affected at first because it does not use that service. The change was rolled back at 14:12, but the errors continued.

   High error rateStale endpoint routingService outage

   Trigger

   At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service needed to process current account payments. Two weeks earlier the etcd cluster had been upgraded and grown from three to nine nodes, and one day earlier another team had scaled a new service down to zero replicas while leaving its Kubernetes service in place.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   etcdKubernetes API serverLinkerdkubelet

   Contributing factor

   Ineffective rollbackHarmful manual actionOverlapping failuresMonitoring blind spotSingle point of failure

   Detection

   Payment failures began right after the 14:10 deploy. The team rolled back at 14:12 and declared an outage internally at 14:16. At 15:13, when no service could serve requests, practically all automated alerts fired.

   Remediation

   • Rolled back the payments service change (the errors continued)
   • Activated internal backup processes so most customers could still use their card
   • Restarted all linkerd instances (this made the outage worse)
   • Restarted the three Kubernetes API server processes so replacement linkerd instances could start
   • Began deploying a newer linkerd version with the fix for empty services
   • Deleted the Kubernetes service that had no endpoints, which let linkerd load service discovery again

   Action items

   • Fix the bug in Kubernetes that can trigger timeouts after a cluster reconfiguration
   • Roll out a new version of linkerd that fixes the parsing error
   • Create better health checks, dashboards and alerts for the affected components so they give clearer signals about what is wrong and prevent human error
   • Improve procedures to communicate outages internally and externally as clearly and quickly as possible

   Lessons

   A large failure in a distributed system can be very hard to understand, and well-meant human action can compound it, as restarting every linkerd instance did here by exposing a second incompatibility. Because Monzo deploys often and its network changes constantly, the deployment and request-routing systems have to be trustworthy. Monzo committed to publishing a similar post-mortem for any incident of this severity.

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