Incident Library
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Cases8 cases

3 to 7 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    For about six months, applications on Omio's Google Kubernetes Engine clusters stalled at random: they got stuck, stopped answering health check requests or lost network connections, and nothing the team looked at explained why.

    Trigger

    Multi-threaded workloads running with CPU limits on nodes whose kernel did not yet have the fix for a known CFS quota bug that causes unnecessary throttling.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Months of random stalls and failed health checks led the team to read the cgroup cpu.stat throttling counters inside the pods, which showed far more throttling than the limits should allow.

    Remediation
    • removed CPU limits until the kernel with the CFS bug fix was deployed across all clusters
    Action items
    • Deploy the kernel with the CFS quota bug fix across all clusters
    • Monitor utilisation, saturation and error metrics, API latency and error rates to confirm the change behaves as expected
    Lessons

    A CPU limit is a time quota per 100 ms period, not a share of cores, so a multi-threaded container can be stopped for most of each period long before it uses the cores it was given, and a kernel bug can make that worse. Throttling is invisible in standard Kubernetes metrics and has to be read from the cgroup counters. Removing limits trades away protection against a container that takes a whole node, which is only acceptable when runtimes are tuned.

  2. Symptoms

    Jetstack was upgrading the master of a development cluster that many teams use to test their apps during the working day, a regional Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) cluster in europe-west1. The upgrade ran through Jetstack's GKE Terraform pipeline and did not finish before the 20-minute Terraform timeout, while the GKE console still showed the cluster as upgrading.

    Trigger

    A planned master upgrade of the shared development cluster. The same upgrade had been done on another pre-production environment earlier that day, and no API downtime was expected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first sign was the master upgrade missing the 20-minute Terraform timeout; re-running the pipeline returned the kube-apiserver unhealthy error. The cause was identified with the help of Google Support.

    Remediation
    • Deleted the OPA ValidatingAdmissionWebhook resource during a window of API server access
    Action items
    • Limit the OPA webhook to the namespaces where the policy applies and development teams have access
    • Enable the webhook only for Ingress and Service resources, the only resources the policy validates
    • Add a liveness probe so OPA is restarted when it stops responding, and update the OPA documentation
    • Follow the open upstream Kubernetes issue about this behaviour
    Lessons

    With alerting on API server response times, the team might have seen CREATE and UPDATE requests slow down across the board as soon as the OPA-backed webhook was first deployed. Every workload needs probes: OPA looked so simple to deploy that the team skipped the Helm chart, which adds a livenessProbe for the admission controller containers among other adjustments to the tutorial configuration. Others had hit the same problem, and an upstream issue to improve it was still open.

  3. Symptoms

    The NU.nl development team got reports that several services on one of its Kubernetes clusters behaved erratically: occasional error pages, slow responses and timeouts. The affected services were mostly internal tools and dashboards.

    Trigger

    A new ElastAlert rule, deployed shortly before from the command line, that fired if the Cloudfront-* Elasticsearch indexes stopped receiving documents; those indexes take a few million requests per hour, and the rule made ElastAlert's memory grow without bound.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported error pages, slow responses and timeouts from several services; no alert fired.

    Remediation
    • terminated the NotReady nodes one by one so the auto-scaling group replaced them (the new nodes also went NotReady, but Prometheus and Grafana landed on a stable node)
    • found the ElastAlert pods' memory growth on the Grafana pod memory dashboard
    • fixed the ElastAlert problem that caused the memory growth
    Action items
    • Define alerts on resource usage such as CPU, memory and disk space
    • Keep researching an alerting strategy that combines Elasticsearch, Prometheus Alertmanager and New Relic
    • Consider exporting metrics out of the cluster and running Grafana outside it, on EC2 or a separate Kubernetes cluster
    • Either visualise the important metrics in the ELK stack or make Prometheus and Grafana more available, and improve the metrics strategy
    • Set resource limits for ElastAlert through the Helm values
    • Configure namespaces with default memory requests and limits
    • Isolate customer-facing workloads from build, logging and monitoring workloads (a dedicated node group, or later a separate tools cluster)
    • Deploy everything through automation such as Jenkins pipelines, and consider a GitOps approach
    • Deploy through a pipeline that includes a smoke test step
    • Make Kubernetes and cloud infrastructure work part of the team's sprints, picked up by all team members while pairing with more experienced members, and hold workshops that go deep into specific topics
    Lessons

    Fixing the root cause covers only a small part of what an incident can teach; the chain of smaller failures around it is where most of the learning is. A pod without a memory limit can take whole nodes down, so limits need defaults at the namespace level. Monitoring that runs inside the cluster it watches goes blind with it. Changes installed by hand from the command line leave the rest of the team without a record of what changed.

  4. Symptoms

    The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

    Trigger

    Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

    Remediation
    • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts
    Action items
    • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
    • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages
    Lessons

    Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

  5. Symptoms

    At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service that Monzo's current account needs to process payments, and every request to that service started to fail. Current account customers saw payment failures; the prepaid card was not affected at first because it does not use that service. The change was rolled back at 14:12, but the errors continued.

    Trigger

    At 14:10 an engineer deployed a change to a service needed to process current account payments. Two weeks earlier the etcd cluster had been upgraded and grown from three to nine nodes, and one day earlier another team had scaled a new service down to zero replicas while leaving its Kubernetes service in place.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Payment failures began right after the 14:10 deploy. The team rolled back at 14:12 and declared an outage internally at 14:16. At 15:13, when no service could serve requests, practically all automated alerts fired.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the payments service change (the errors continued)
    • Activated internal backup processes so most customers could still use their card
    • Restarted all linkerd instances (this made the outage worse)
    • Restarted the three Kubernetes API server processes so replacement linkerd instances could start
    • Began deploying a newer linkerd version with the fix for empty services
    • Deleted the Kubernetes service that had no endpoints, which let linkerd load service discovery again
    Action items
    • Fix the bug in Kubernetes that can trigger timeouts after a cluster reconfiguration
    • Roll out a new version of linkerd that fixes the parsing error
    • Create better health checks, dashboards and alerts for the affected components so they give clearer signals about what is wrong and prevent human error
    • Improve procedures to communicate outages internally and externally as clearly and quickly as possible
    Lessons

    A large failure in a distributed system can be very hard to understand, and well-meant human action can compound it, as restarting every linkerd instance did here by exposing a second incompatibility. Because Monzo deploys often and its network changes constantly, the deployment and request-routing systems have to be trustworthy. Monzo committed to publishing a similar post-mortem for any incident of this severity.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve kubelet and Kubernetes API server. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Capacity exhaustion2 cases

  1. IL-0071 Worker node running out of inodes while disk space looked fine, because containerd kept a full node_modules tree in each of several image layer snapshots
  2. IL-0040 Parallel Helm installs saturated small gp2 root volumes on a kops cluster and left all three workers NotReady with the kubelet or Docker down

Software defect3 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0112 The daily node rollover put DFDS's EKS nodes on an AMI later recalled for a kernel issue, causing "PLEG is not healthy" NodeNotReady flaps and pod network timeouts
    DFDS2022
  2. IL-0012 CPU limits and an unpatched kernel CFS quota bug throttled multi-threaded services into stalls, failed health checks and timeouts
    Omio2020
  3. IL-0003 linkerd lost Kubernetes service discovery after an etcd reconfiguration, and restarting every linkerd instance turned failed payments into a full platform outage
    Monzo2017

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node
  2. IL-0035 Worker nodes went NotReady after a new ElastAlert rule without memory limits used up node memory
    NU.nl2019

unknown1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe