Incident Library
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Cases7 cases

4 to 7 of 7

  1. Symptoms

    On 13 March 2018 at 12:14 UTC every table in travis-ci.com's production PostgreSQL database was truncated. Alerts fired right away, and customers reported missing account data; people who signed in saw blank user profiles.

    Trigger

    At 12:04 UTC a developer ran a test suite in an old tmux shell that still had a DATABASEURL environment variable pointing at the production database, and the Database Cleaner gem sent a truncate query to it. The query was blocked for about 10 minutes and executed at 12:14 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts fired immediately after the truncation, and customers reported missing account data.

    Remediation
    • Took all applications offline
    • Provisioned a replacement database from a snapshot taken that morning
    • Reattached the restored database and brought platform services back up
    • Worked through the backlog of builds until it cleared
    • Revoked all affected login tokens by 14:22 UTC on 14 March
    • Contacted affected customers and advised them to rotate stored credentials and check build logs
    Action items
    • Revoke the truncate permission on the databases
    • Make the internal spechelpers check for the DATABASEURL environment variable
    • Make the developer shell prompt warn when a DATABASE_URL is set
    • Submit a pull request to the Database Cleaner gem guarding against a remote DATABASE_URL
    • Create an alias for the follower database so it is easy to connect to for work against production data
    • Automate database failover and maintenance to cut manual recovery steps
    Lessons

    Developers connected to the production primary with write access because the tooling made the read-only follower hard to reach. While responding, Travis CI left user-facing applications running, which created duplicate user ids, and did not turn some alerts back on, which hid the stopped cron scheduler. Even the most experienced developers can make an inadvertent mistake that causes a large outage. The whole production database was recovered with only about 15 minutes of data loss.

  2. Symptoms

    At about 1 AM on 9 February 2017, UC Berkeley's DataHub was reported down: users trying to log in got a proxy error. The hub pod was running, but its log was full of sqlite errors.

    Trigger

    While debugging, an operator ran `.save jupyterhub.sqlite` in sqlite3 inside the hub pod without having attached the database, which replaced the JupyterHub database file with an empty one.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DataHub was reported down at about 1 AM, when users got a proxy error at login. At 1:12 AM a user reported that he could log in but all his notebooks were gone.

    Remediation
    • Scaled the hub to 0 replicas
    • Rebuilt the JupyterHub sqlite database by matching Kubernetes PVC names back to user ids
    • Set cookie_id to null instead of a dummy value and attached the rebuilt database to the hub
    • Changed the cookie secret in the hub pod and restarted it to log all users out
    • Deleted all user pods to log everyone out
    • Ran a script that filled in cookie_id for all users, restarted the hub and deleted all user pods again
    • Dropped the new users with a '.' in their name and renamed the older users from '-' to '.'
    Action items
    • Report upstream that JupyterHub uses only part of the cookie secret and discards the rest
    • Report upstream that the cookie_id column of the users table should have UNIQUE and NOT NULL constraints
    • Ask KubeSpawner to support username hashes in PVC and pod names so the names stay the same when the database is deleted
    • Ask OAuthenticator to support using the id from the Google authenticator as the user id, giving stable user ids
    • Switch to Google Cloud SQL, a hosted and managed MySQL database
    • Take regular and tested backups of the database
    • Start an operational FAQ of things to do and not to do
    • Set up better monitoring and paging
    • Document escalation procedures explicitly
  3. Symptoms

    At 2:39 AM PDT (9:39 UTC) on 18 July 2013, services that relied on the redis-master of Twilio's billing system began to fail because the load on its host had become extreme. At 2:42 AM PDT monitoring alerted the on-call engineers to a failure in the Redis cluster.

    Trigger

    At 1:35 AM PDT on 18 July a loss of network connectivity disconnected all billing redis-slaves from the redis-master at once, and all of them requested a full synchronization at the same time. On-call engineers then restarted the overloaded redis-master.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 2:42 AM PDT monitoring alerted the on-call engineers to a failure in the Redis cluster. At 3:28 AM PDT the billing system monitoring reported the anomalous charges, and at 12:36 PM PDT monitoring detected the recurrence.

    Remediation
    • Restarted the redis-master to relieve the high load, which loaded a wrong configuration
    • Took the billing system offline to stop further credit card charges
    • Restored service to all suspended accounts
    • Restored the lost account balances from the independent double-bookkeeping record in the relational datastore
    • Took billing offline again after the recurrence and reactivated the newly suspended accounts
    • Refunded all erroneous credit card charges
    • Gave all affected accounts a credit of 10% of their last 30 days of spend
    • Replaced the original Redis cluster and corrected the redis-master configuration
    • Activated the billing system progressively for groups of customer accounts
    Action items
    • Disable Redis restarts on the redis-master and recover the master by pivoting a slave instead
    • Add fail-safes so the billing system neither suspends accounts nor charges cards when balances are missing or cannot be written
    • Validate the billing system against the double-bookkeeping databases in real time
    Lessons

    Losing the in-flight balances and the ability to write balances at the same time exposed a flaw in the auto-recharge system: it failed in a dangerous way, charging cards and suspending accounts instead of stopping.

  4. Symptoms

    On Thursday 24 January 2013 GitHub's exception tracking and monitoring systems detected a large spike in exceptions. Most of them were timeouts in code search queries and in the background jobs that update the code search indexes with data from new pushes, and the outage of the newly launched Code Search lasted into Friday 25 January.

    Trigger

    On 17 January GitHub upgraded the code search cluster from Elasticsearch 0.19.9 to 0.20.2 before launching Code Search publicly; the outage began on 24 January, after the public launch.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    GitHub's exception tracking and monitoring systems detected a large spike in exceptions, mostly timeouts from code search queries and from the indexing background jobs.

    Remediation
    • Stopped the whole cluster and brought it back in maintenance mode, with shard allocation and rebalancing disabled
    • Brought in engineers from elasticsearch, the company, to review the cluster and its unallocatable shards
    • Upgraded Java and Elasticsearch and applied the recommended configuration through a Puppet topic branch and environment
    Action items
    • Provision a staging environment for the code search cluster to test infrastructure changes
    • Have the elasticsearch team audit the code search cluster configuration again in future
    Lessons

    The Elasticsearch upgrade was not tested enough on GitHub's infrastructure before it reached the code search cluster, partly because the cluster had no proper staging environment. For large clusters the elasticsearch team recommended equal minimum and maximum JVM heap through ES_HEAP_SIZE, at 50% of system RAM, starting recovery immediately instead of after recover_after_time, and configuring minimum_master_nodes so that paused nodes do not form their own clusters.

Check your cluster for this

These 7 cases involve Database and Database replication. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Operator error4 cases

  1. IL-0286 An exercise cleanup destroyed Honeycomb's Kafka brokers, leaving partitions leaderless and ingest crash-looping
  2. IL-0242 Both PostgreSQL servers behind matrix.org were lost during a disk expansion, and the homeserver was down for 24 hours
  3. IL-0332 A test run against the production database truncated every table and travis-ci.com was down for about 5.5 hours
  4. IL-0506 UC Berkeley DataHub logins failed and students got empty home directories after the JupyterHub database was overwritten

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0591 Gitpod workspaces in all regions became IO bound and unresponsive for days after the ws39 workspace cluster release
    Gitpod2022

Configuration change1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0215 Twilio's billing Redis master lost all balances and went read-only, and auto-recharge charged customer cards repeatedly
    Twilio2013

Software defect1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0274 GitHub's code search Elasticsearch cluster hit near-100% CPU and rapid master elections; a restart found lost shards
    GitHub2013