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1. IL-0553 CircleCI's orchestration database filled its transaction log volume, and no workflows or jobs started for 50 minutes

   CircleCI2026

   Symptoms

   On 6 October 2026 CircleCI pipelines were slow to be created and workflows and jobs were slow to start, in short bursts from 13:30 UTC and continuously from 15:30 UTC. From 15:48 to 16:38 UTC no workflows or jobs started at all, and pipelines triggered from 16:02 UTC failed.

   High latencyService outageThroughput degradationNode disk full

   Trigger

   Around 12:40 UTC, on top of the regular workload, anti-wraparound autovacuum runs on several of the largest tables of the orchestration service's database began writing transaction logs faster than the database could archive them.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   DatabasePostgreSQL vacuumCI system

   Contributing factor

   Ignored early signalNo alert on limitSingle point of failure

   Detection

   Monitoring raised short alerts about errors in the orchestration service from 10:02 UTC, each clearing on its own. At 13:35 the alerts came back together with related alerts from several other services, and after they returned around 14:30 and engineers investigated further, an incident was declared at 14:54 UTC.

   Remediation

   • Changed the anti-wraparound autovacuum settings to help it finish faster
   • Moved the transaction logs onto the database's main storage volume, which took the database offline from 15:47 to 16:38 UTC
   • Changed database parameters to stop further maintenance runs from starting
   • Changed a database setting at 18:19 UTC to cut the time each write spent waiting on storage
   • Added database and server capacity to the systems that hand jobs to the execution fleet to clear the backlog faster

   Action items

   • Alert on how full the transaction log volume is and on how far archiving has fallen behind
   • Alert on the database maintenance that drives transaction log growth
   • Review all alerts so that noisy or sensitive alerts do not hide real issues
   • Tune how often and how aggressively autovacuum runs on the database
   • Track the size of the largest tables over time so they stay within safe limits
   • Remove the single transaction log bottleneck by splitting the service across several database instances or moving it to a distributed database
   • Make CircleCI's systems wait for the orchestration service to recover instead of failing jobs after retrying
   • Include specific impact and timing sooner in status page updates during long incidents

   Lessons

   CircleCI says the combination of alerts should have been recognised sooner: brief error alerts that cleared on their own were treated as routine, and nothing alerted on the transaction log volume or on archiving lag. Because every write of the orchestration service went through one database and one transaction log, a backlog in that log slowed every pipeline, workflow and job.

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2. IL-0211 A Mandrill PostgreSQL shard shut down at transaction ID wraparound and email sending was impaired for about 40 hours

   Mailchimp2019

   Symptoms

   From 05:35 UTC on 4 February 2019 Mandrill, Mailchimp's transactional email service, sent only 80% of queued emails, because one of its PostgreSQL shards, shard4, stopped accepting writes. When Mandrill engineers opened an investigation at 11:58 UTC, they saw a sharply elevated load on shard4.

   Writes rejectedThroughput degradationLoad imbalanceNode disk full

   Trigger

   At 05:35 UTC on 4 February the transaction ID counter of shard4, the busiest Mandrill PostgreSQL shard, reached its upper limit and PostgreSQL shut the database down to protect against wraparound.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   DatabasePostgreSQL vacuum

   Contributing factor

   Ignored early signalNo alert on limitSignal buried in noiseRetry stormMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The first exception was logged overnight but was buried by unrelated exceptions in the centralized error reporting. Mandrill engineers opened an investigation at 11:58 UTC and, while looking for the source of the rising load on shard4, found the wraparound at 12:56 UTC.

   Remediation

   • Put shard4 into standalone mode and started VACUUM at 14:16 UTC on 4 February
   • Stopped and restarted the vacuum with settings that made it run faster
   • Started a dump and restore of the database without the Search and Url tables while the vacuum ran
   • Replaced storage volumes on the Mandrill app servers whose disks were filling with queued jobs and logs
   • Moved the job-queue tables from shard4 to other live shards
   • Truncated the Search and Url tables on the locked database at 19:12 UTC on 5 February, after which the vacuum finished in about an hour
   • Started sending from the backlog at 21:36 UTC
   • Added alerting for XID wraparound by 22:40 UTC

   Lessons

   Mailchimp named the factors that slowed its response: knowledge of and access to Mandrill systems and monitoring rested with a few people, Mandrill logging needed a locally writable disk, logs of malformed API requests were hard to separate from real application errors, job health was hard to see, and the disk space problem made partial deployments for triage risky. What helped was trained incident commanders with clear roles (incident commanders in 3-hour rotations, scribes, technical liaisons and points of contact between teams), periodic summaries with a list of recent and open decisions, and taking time in a video meeting to reassess, which led to the truncation. Running in the cloud let the team expand storage quickly, and the team was lucky that the largest table holding up the vacuum held data it could delete.

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