Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 21 October 2024 Sentry could not ingest data in US SaaS from 9:42 AM to 10:06 AM PT, and the status page reported elevated errors for ingestion. The same failure had also happened on 4 and 16 October.

    Trigger

    In each of the three incidents an ingestion region saw an increase in backlogged traffic; the trigger was different each time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Action items
    • Create more, smaller edge regions to reduce the chance of cascading failures, adding one region each in South America, North America and Europe
    • Change the autoscaling rules to use stronger signals than CPU load
    • Scale down more slowly so that iowait-based backlogs do not trigger scale-down events
    • Improve the metrics the edge produces to refine the autoscaling rules and their sensitivity
  2. Symptoms

    During the Americas' morning of 4 January 2021, an external monitoring service paged Slack because error rates were creeping up. While the investigation was starting, Slack's own dashboarding and alerting service became unavailable, so responders had to work without their usual dashboards and alerts.

    Trigger

    On the first working day after the holidays, Slack's traffic went from the quietest time of the year to one of its biggest days overnight, with cold client caches pulling more data than usual, and one of Slack's AWS Transit Gateways did not scale fast enough for it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An external monitoring service paged Slack when error rates started creeping up during the Americas' morning. AWS engineers were separately alerted to the packet drops by AWS's internal monitoring.

    Remediation
    • Disabled automated downscaling of the web tier to keep serving capacity and allow investigation
    • Cleared up the broken, partly provisioned instances that filled the autoscaling groups
    • Repaired provision-service so new web tier instances could be provisioned and enter service
    • AWS engineers increased the Transit Gateway capacity manually across all Availability Zones
    Action items
    • AWS reviews its Transit Gateway scaling algorithms for large packet-per-second increases
    • Request a preemptive upscaling of the Transit Gateways at the end of the next holiday season
    • Run the dashboard service instances in the same VPC as their database to remove the Transit Gateway dependency
    • Load test provision-service regularly
    • Reevaluate health-checking and autoscaling configurations so they cannot overload provision-service again
    Lessons

    Monitoring has to stay as independent as possible of the infrastructure it watches, or it fails when it is needed most. Here the dashboard and alerting services failed because they ran in a different VPC from their databases and so depended on the Transit Gateways. provision-service had been load tested before, but this event exceeded the earlier scale-ups.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Automated capacity manager and CDN and edge network. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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