Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 8 May 2026 IONOS Cloud reported "K8s Control Planes not available": some Managed Kubernetes customers in DE/TXL, DE/FRA and DE/FRA/2 had trouble connecting to the control plane and saw degraded Kubernetes functionality. Between 15:22 and 16:12 (UTC+2) applications meant for a new internal development cluster were installed on other customer clusters, which were also modified.

    Trigger

    A routine internal operation onboarded a new Managed Kubernetes development cluster. The scoping configuration file for the onboarding operator failed to reach the deployment branch because of a merge conflict, and at the same time a second change removed the operator from the exclusion list, which deployed it at once.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Corrected the onboarding operator so it needs an explicit namespace configuration before acting on any cluster
    • Reconfigured the deployment system to fail deployments when required configuration files are missing
    • Rolled back the identified changes on the affected resources
    • Ran a recovery script, validated in staging, that removed all unintended installations and updates from the affected clusters
    Action items
    • Add a mandatory CI/CD step that confirms all required configuration files reached the target branch before any deployment starts
    • Require additional peer review and change management approval for every deployment that touches production, whatever its size
    • Give teams a way to inform each affected customer in time about the status of post-incident cleanup
    Lessons

    IONOS treats the unintended change to cluster configurations as a failure of the controls that should keep internal operations from affecting customer environments.

  2. Symptoms

    At 14:22 a Cloud Platform team member noticed failed Docker Hub logins. Fetching an image returned: failed to fetch manifest: Head "https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/ministryofjustice/cloud-platform-tools/manifests/2.1": toomanyrequests: too many failed login attempts for username or IP address

    Trigger

    The Docker Hub password was changed as part of LastPass remediation activities while the EKS cluster nodes and Concourse still logged in with the previous password.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Cloud Platform team member saw the failed Docker Hub login error at 14:22. The Kuberhealthy daemonset check showed at 14:52 that the cluster could not pull images, and a user reported ErrImagePull in #ask-cloud-platform at 14:54.

    Remediation
    • Changed the Docker Hub password back to the previous value still used by the EKS cluster nodes and Concourse
    • Confirmed with the reporting user that the pod deployed and that cluster image pulls worked again
    Action items
    • Switch from the Docker Hub username and password to a Docker Hub token created specifically for Cloud Platform
    • Rotate the password cleanly out of hours with a graceful recycle of the nodes
    Lessons

    The write-up states no separate lessons. Its review action replaces the Docker Hub username and password with a Docker Hub token created specifically for Cloud Platform.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve CI system and Container registry and its credentials. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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