Cases2 cases

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1. IL-0244 A queued pull request destroyed the EKS subnet route table associations and Cloud Platform services went offline

   UK Ministry of Justice2024

   Symptoms

   On 20 September 2024 at 11:24 the Cloud Platform team received high priority Pingdom alerts for services on the live cluster, and from 11:26 teams reported in the #ask channel that services were unavailable. Users reported that services could not be resolved.

   Service outageNetwork unreachableResources deleted

   Trigger

   At 11:21 the infrastructure-vpc-live-1 pipeline was unpaused, and a pull request that had been waiting in its queue ran automatically.

   Root cause

   Operator error

   Component

   TerraformCI systemVPC route tables and firewall rules

   Contributing factor

   No safeguard on destructive change

   Detection

   High priority Pingdom alerts for live cluster services reached the Cloud Platform team at 11:24, and users reported that services could not be resolved.

   Remediation

   • Ran terraform apply locally to rebuild the subnet route table associations

   Action items

   • Review and update the process for pausing and resuming infrastructure pipelines so every team member knows its implications
   • Find a way to hold queued pull requests while manual infrastructure updates are under way
   • Find ways to isolate the plan and apply tasks of infrastructure pipelines better

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2. IL-0467 Boskos crash-looped after a node drain started it from a buggy StatefulSet image, failing Kubernetes PR jobs for 9 hours

   Kubernetes project2019

   Symptoms

   Overnight into 26 March 2019 (PDT), every Prow test job that needed a GCP project from Boskos, the Kubernetes test-infra service that hands out GCP projects to test jobs, failed. The required job pull-kubernetes-e2e-gce failed on every run, so no pull request could be merged in kubernetes/kubernetes for just over nine hours, and other projects saw similar failures.

   Container crash loopService outage

   Trigger

   At 23:04 PDT the node running the only Boskos pod was drained to be replaced with a 1.13 node during the upgrade of the Prow clusters from Kubernetes 1.11 to 1.13. The replacement pod started from the StatefulSet's current spec, which named a newer Boskos image containing the bug.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   CI systemNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Change with a delayed effectUnverified assumptionSingle point of failureNo alert on limitChange started before off-hours

   Detection

   Users reported the failure on GitHub at 02:50 and on Slack at 05:16 and 06:27, and an engineer saw the Slack reports on waking at 07:16. The Boskos monitoring dashboard showed the failure, but no alert caught it.

   Remediation

   • Built and deployed a new Boskos image with the bug fixed
   • Cleaned up the GCP projects that had been left open

   Action items

   • Change the Boskos configuration so that deployments actually take effect (#11956)
   • Automate Boskos deploys (#11957)
   • Improve alerting on Boskos status (#11953)

   Lessons

   The write-up lists what went poorly: a ten-hour upgrade was started shortly after 17:00 when on-call coverage ended at 18:00; deployments were not checked to confirm that something had actually rolled out; the Boskos StatefulSet was not set up to perform updates, so changing its spec left the old pod running; the December change appears never to have been tested; and Boskos was deployed by hand, unlike most of Prow, which left more room for error. Once people were available, the problem was fixed quickly.

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