Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 11 July 2022 users reported in the #ask-cloud-platform Slack channel that their applications on the Ministry of Justice Cloud Platform were slow some of the time. About 25% of ingress traffic was affected: after an AWS incident the day before, one of the three network interfaces of the 'default' ingress controllers performed slowly, and clients timed out when they tried to connect to one of the Elastic IPs of the Network Load Balancer (NLB) in front of them.

    Trigger

    Some instances of the AWS NLB health checking subsystem were restarted, which set off a latent software race condition in that subsystem.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    Users reported slow performance of their applications in the #ask-cloud-platform Slack channel.

    Remediation
    • AWS restarted the NLB health checking subsystem, which refreshed its list of targets and recovered the NLB in the affected Availability Zone
    Action items
    • Raised mitigation tickets after a post-incident review, filed as post-aws-incident issues in the ministryofjustice/cloud-platform repository
  2. Symptoms

    At 18:27 on 21 September 2020 the Cloud Platform team detected that some services running on the live-1 production cluster had gone down, and some users could not reach them. The incident was declared at 18:40.

    Trigger

    A script for deleting a test cluster was triggered while the kube context was pointing at the live-1 production cluster instead of the test cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first detection was at 18:27, and the incident was declared 13 minutes later, at 18:40.

    Remediation
    • restored the default ingress controller together with external-dns and kiam, which it depends on
    • corrected the owner field in the Formbuilder Route 53 TXT records so external-dns pointed their A records at the new NLB
    • restored the remaining components with a targeted apply
    • ran the apply pipeline to restore all certificates, ServiceMonitors and Prometheus rules from the environment repository
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cloud load balancer and Ingress controller. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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