Incident Library
Applied filters ComponentCloud load balancerSymptomIntermittent connection failuresFactorRetry stormClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

    Trigger

    One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

    Remediation
    • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
    • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
    • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
    • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
    • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
    • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM
    Action items
    • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
    • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
    • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
    • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
    • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue
    Lessons

    A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

  2. Symptoms

    The graph of WebSocket connections to messaging-hub, the messaging platform used by the Japanese food delivery service Demaecan, showed sudden deep drops even outside peak traffic. The drops kept coming back at irregular intervals. Messages still reached clients, because messaging-hub switches to Firebase Cloud Messaging when a WebSocket is gone.

    Trigger

    Another service that shared the same L7 load balancer deployed its own load balancer configuration in the Verda dashboard, which reloaded HAProxy; 30 minutes later, at the hard-stop-after limit, the old HAProxy process exited and closed every WebSocket connection it still held.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The developer noticed deep, sudden drops in the WebSocket connection graph that were not tied to peak traffic and kept recurring irregularly. The Nginx packet drops were found through network monitoring.

    Remediation
    • separated the Merchant system's token issuance API into its own deployment so reconnect traffic did not delay other Merchant APIs
    • scaled out Nginx with pod anti-affinity and a label selector so each pod ran on a different node, which stopped the nf_conntrack packet drops
    • raised Ingress Nginx proxy-read-timeout and proxy-send-timeout and the load balancer timeout to 3600s, which did not stop the drops
    • moved messaging-hub from the shared L7 load balancer to an L4 load balancer, which ended the WebSocket drops
    Lessons

    A reload of a shared load balancer by a different team can cut long-lived connections, and with hard-stop-after the cut comes 30 minutes later, far from the change that caused it. The author's lesson is not to narrow the scope of the search too early: trusting that the infrastructure was fine kept the investigation inside the team's own systems for days. A reconnect wave from many WebSocket clients can overload the systems that issue connection tokens and fill nf_conntrack on proxy nodes. Scaling Nginx out only helps for conntrack if the pods land on different nodes, and anti-affinity leaves extra replicas Pending once they outnumber the nodes. That messaging-hub problems can still load the connected systems remains an open problem.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cloud load balancer and conntrack table. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause2