Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

    Trigger

    An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

    Remediation
    • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
    • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
    • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided
    Action items
    • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
    • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths
    Lessons

    Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

  2. Symptoms

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting, with some sign that image pulls were involved. Many pods across the cluster were in error states related to image pulls, while applications that were already running were not affected.

    Trigger

    A change to the permissions on a storage bucket that one application needed to read. The application could no longer start, and its DaemonSet, running on roughly a thousand nodes of the cluster, went into a crash loop with imagePullPolicy: Always, so every restart pulled the image again although it was already on the node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their jobs were not starting; monitoring had not caught it first.

    Remediation
    • replaced the affected NAT instances so registry traffic came from new source IPs
    • reconfigured the static IPs and firewall rules so applications could reach the Cloud SQL database again
    Action items
    • Add an admission webhook that rejects floating image tags, starting with latest
    • Apply the image tag webhook to workload objects only, not to pods, after it blocked pods created by in-cluster controllers
    Lessons

    The speakers' takeaway is to be very careful with DaemonSets in large clusters: they say they had broken everything DaemonSets depend on, including DNS, Vault and the image repository, and that it is very easy to break things when managing them by the thousand. imagePullPolicy: Always made every crash-loop restart pull the image again. Sending all registry traffic through three NAT instances put the whole region behind three source IPs, which the registry rate-limited, and changing those IPs cut the connections to a critical database reached over the internet through them. An admission webhook on pods rejects the pods that controllers in the cluster create, where no user sees the error.

  3. Symptoms

    On Friday, January 18, Moonlight's API began returning occasional errors that looked like connection problems with its Redis database. The API checks Redis on every authenticated request to validate the session. At the same time the Kubernetes monitoring reported some nodes and pods as unresponsive.

    Trigger

    The Kubernetes scheduler put several CPU-heavy pods on the same node, including all three replicas of the website and the server-side rendering pods.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    API errors that looked like Redis connectivity problems, and Kubernetes monitoring that showed nodes and pods as unresponsive. Google Cloud Support later found the link between sustained 100% CPU and kernel panics.

    Remediation
    • added anti-affinity rules to all major deployments so their pods spread across nodes
    Action items
    • Keep working with Google Cloud support to find and fix the cause of the node kernel panics
    Lessons

    Three replicas give no fault tolerance if the scheduler places them all on one node; anti-affinity rules make the spread explicit. A node failure that comes from the workload itself moves with the workload when the scheduler reschedules it.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Application database and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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