Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    At about 23:00 UTC on 21 January 2025, an automated alert reported that the CircleCI database instance holding archived data was almost out of free storage space. From 23:50 UTC customers saw slow starts and cancellations of workflows and jobs, and delays and difficulty viewing workflows in the CircleCI UI, although pipelines for a specific project could still be viewed.

    Trigger

    A code change to a function in the archival database on 16 January 2025 unintentionally made it write an excessive number of log messages, and the database filled its storage.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An automated alert at about 23:00 UTC warned that the archival database was almost out of free storage, before customers were affected. The growing workflows queue was not linked to it at first because a separate alert about request volume fired at about the same time.

    Remediation
    • Scaled up the event consumer that processes the workflows queue at 23:44 UTC
    • Promoted a read replica of the archival database to a standalone primary at 23:55 UTC
    Action items
    • Fix the database function so it no longer writes an excessive number of log messages
    • Add a max duration to the workflows retry policy for archiving so it fails earlier than the default timeout
    • Move workflow archival to an event-based model that decouples it from the workflows service
    • Add forecast and anomaly monitoring for databases that alerts on unusual activity before it reaches critical levels
    Lessons

    The storage alert on the archival database did fire, but the database filled much faster than forecast, so there was little time to act before customers were affected. Because the workflows service called the archival service synchronously, a problem in the archival database slowed the whole workflows service.

  2. Symptoms

    At 9:47 AM Eastern (14:47 UTC) on 7 February 2023, Daily's database alerts reported a performance problem under normal operational load: a high level of lock contention on a database that had been upgraded the weekend before and had run normally since Monday. Users could get websocket connection errors when joining calls, and REST API requests could time out or return 5xx errors.

    Trigger

    Database maintenance the weekend before had upgraded the database to a MySQL point release with a low-level behaviour change, and on 7 February, under normal load, that change produced the deadlocks Daily saw on Aurora MySQL 2.11.0.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Database alerts at 9:47 AM Eastern reported a performance issue with high lock contention on the newly upgraded database.

    Remediation
    • Disabled MySQL binlog replication to the old database and restarted the database to reduce load
    • The database restarted by itself at 10:47 AM, the SFUs dropped the stale meeting updates without restarting, and the platform recovered
    • Rate-limited the POST /rooms endpoint to the same limit as DELETE /rooms/:name
    • Updated an index on the affected table in production on the Saturday evening to work around the MySQL behaviour change
    Action items
    • Work with AWS so the Aurora MySQL 2.11.0 deadlock issue is documented, understood and fixed in a future release
    • Add more API request patterns to the testing workload used for infrastructure changes
    • Add production monitoring alarms on more fine-grained database metrics
    Lessons

    Daily tests infrastructure changes under production-like workloads, but its synthetic workload did not have the shape that triggers these deadlocks. A deadlock behaviour change in MySQL 5.7 that was already known turned out far more severe in production than either Daily or the AWS Aurora team expected.

  3. Symptoms

    On 10 July 2019 the Stripe API failed a substantial majority of requests twice, from 16:35 to 17:02 UTC and from 21:14 to 22:47 UTC. In the first period automated monitoring detected within a minute that a database cluster had failed to elect a new primary.

    Trigger

    The primary node of a database cluster failed at 16:35 UTC while one shard had several stalled nodes. The second period was set off by rolling the election protocol back to the previous minor version at 20:42 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the failed election within a minute, and the team was alerted at 16:36 UTC. The second period was announced at 21:14 UTC by automated alerts that some shards in the cluster were unavailable.

    Remediation
    • Restarted all nodes of the database cluster, which forced a successful primary election
    • Updated the production configuration and restarted the database cluster's nodes
    • Ramped traffic back up, putting services for user-initiated API requests first
    Action items
    • Alert when nodes stop reporting their replication lag
    • Alert when a shard enters a state that could trigger the election fault
    • Work with the database maintainers on a fix for the underlying fault
    • Add circuit breaking on failed operations to particular database clusters
    • Use fault isolation to contain the impact of a single failed shard
    • Limit the resources used by clients that keep retrying failed requests
    • Add procedures and tooling that make rapid configuration changes during incident response safer
Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Database and CI system. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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